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ABSTRACT 
The past two decades have seen the rise of power sharing agreements as a means to end protracted civil 
wars. Following from the perceived success of these agreements, power sharing has become an 
important tool in the mediator’s arsenal and has increasingly been advocated in periods of democratic 
deadlock and civil strife following highly-contested elections. The viability of this model has rarely been 
questioned. This study will undertake a deep analysis of the success or failure of the power sharing 
agreements undertaken in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008 following the outbreak of violence in both 
countries. It will explain the different results seen in these two cases through an examination of the 
agreements, the roles played by regional and international actors as well as through an analysis of the 
influence of local political culture and inter-elite relations. The relative success of the Kenyan agreement 
can be attributed to a culture of cooperation amongst the elite alongside consistent and concerted 
pressure exerted by the mediation team and international actors. In contrast, the Zimbabwean 
government of national unity has hobbled along and little progress has been made to implement the 
agreement. This can largely be attributed to a badly drafted document which allowed for an inequitable 
distribution of power, the obduracy of the ZANU-PF elite and the unwillingness of the agreement 
guarantors to place sufficient pressure on the parties for reform. In a context where inter-elite relations 
are characterised by opposition and intransigence, the framing of the document and the actions of 
enforcer parties become particularly important. Due to the political cultures in both countries, it is 
unlikely that the power sharing agreements will have produced significant gains for democracy or have 
reformed the prevailing culture of impunity. This report concludes that in spite of the problems with the 
power sharing model, there are currently few alternatives to help mend torn societies. In order to 
overcome the problems that have been highlighted within this report, it is necessary for mediators to 
undertake innovative and reflexive strategies to ensure the full implementation of future agreements. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and 
Background of the Study 
Introduction 
The past two decades have seen the unprecedented rise of power-sharing agreements as a means to 
overcome political and military deadlocks, particularly those that have arisen on the African continent. 
International bodies and mediators have been the foremost proponents of these measures and have 
often projected and implemented them without pause for reflection. The past five years have seen the 
emergence of a new trend that has arrived largely unnoticed and has been the focus of little 
international dialogue; this is the application of power-sharing formulations, which have hitherto been 
utilised as a means of post-conflict reconstruction and mitigation, to instances of democratic deadlock 
and heightened civil tensions resulting from electoral crises.  
The two primary examples of this emerging paradigm are Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2008). Following 
the elections of 2007 and 2008 respectively, each country saw a dramatic escalation of tensions which 
erupted into politicised violence. At the insistence of the international community, continental and 
regional bodies, the governments of both countries undertook a power-sharing agreement (Global 
Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act in Kenya) which 
created power-sharing structures and which set the stage for the new Governments of National Unity 
(GNU). These two agreements are different to those that have come before in as much as they were 
undertaken in the wake of democratic deadlock and not after military stalemate in the context of a civil 
war. The views of civil society, scholars and practitioners regarding the success of these agreements 
have been divergent; many in the international community have hailed them as a great success while 
local scholars and members of civil society often have a less positive outlook on the agreements and 
their propensity to entrench democracy and democratic norms. 
Globally, scholars are becoming increasingly critical of the current formulation of power-sharing 
agreements. Recent research suggests that the current optimism of the international community 
towards these accords may in fact be misplaced or misguided.1 This research will address these concerns 
                                                          
1
 Cheeseman, N. & Tendi, B-M. 2010. “Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective: the dynamics of ‘unity 
government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe”, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 48; LeVan, A. C. 2011. “Power 
Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies”, in Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
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via a thorough examination of the local, regional and international processes that have affected the 
relative success or failure of the implementation of these agreements in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean 
cases.  
Rationale 
This research is valuable as it speaks to a number of important research and policy paradigms including 
peace-building, state-building, post-conflict reconstruction, democratic consolidation and reconciliation. 
The findings of this research will have important implications for practitioners and policy-makers as best 
and worst practices will be identified with a view to assisting mediators to formulate better and more 
sustainable agreements. A greater understanding of the processes involved in securing the relative 
success or failure of these agreements will lead to the conceptualisation of more suitable and sound 
policies for ensuring the success of future accords. The role of the accords in fostering and promoting 
democratic consolidation will be elaborated on within this research and thus the author hopes to be 
able to contribute to the burgeoning literature on democratisation and democratic consolidation within 
the context of power sharing in Africa. This research has both scholarly and practical implications; it will 
add to existing knowledge in the fields of power-sharing, democracy and post-conflict reconstruction as 
well as being of pragmatic value for practitioners and mediators. 
Aims/Objectives 
Following election-related violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2008 respectively, both 
countries accepted the institution of a power-sharing political agreement as a first step towards 
constitutional reform. In the three years since, the Kenyan situation has improved considerably with 
relative political stability and the achievement of a peaceful referendum supporting the constitutional 
changes whilst the Zimbabwean agreement and process has arrived at an impasse after making little 
progress. What are the internal, regional and global factors that have resulted in the divergent results 
achieved by these two states?   
The aim of this research is to compare and contrast the implementation of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act in Kenya and the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe and to examine the 
dynamics behind the failure or success of these political contracts. I would like to use the findings of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Administration, and Institutions, 24, 1; Mehler, A. 2009. “Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious 
Relationship”, in African Affairs, 108, 432.  
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report to formulate tentative suggestions for improving the process currently underway in Zimbabwe, to 
add to the academic literature regarding the dynamics of power-sharing agreements and to hint at 
suggestions for ways that the current formulation of power-sharing agreements could be improved. 
Research Questions 
This research will aim to shed light on a number of questions. The most important questions that it will 
seek to answer are those surrounding the reasons for the relative success or failure of these agreements 
in the two cases and an elucidation of the variables that led to the divergent outcomes. Through the 
discussion of these two cases, I hope to be able to comment on the viability of these agreements for 
promoting long-term development and democratisation. In turn, this research should be able to answer 
questions about how this paradigm could be revised in order to make the outcomes of these 
agreements more functional and sustainable. 
Primary Research Question: 
 What are the local, regional and international factors that have led to the divergent outcomes 
in these two cases? 
To answer this question, I intend to explore:  
o The initial formulation of these agreements which amount to a political compromise 
between competing factions 
o The role of regional and continental bodies tasked with overseeing implementation –
SADC and the AU  
o The importance of international pressure from INGO’s, IGO’s and world leaders such as 
Kofi Annan as well as private firms such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the 
role of international sanctions regimes  
o The influence of local political factors and cultures in affecting implementation 
 
Secondary Research Questions: 
 Are Governments of National Unity/power-sharing agreements viable vehicles for long-term 
development and democratisation? 
 What are the negative and positive outcomes of these accords? 
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 How could these agreements be formulated in the future to increase their efficacy? 
Method 
This research will take the form of a comparative case study of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean 
agreements. These two cases were chosen for their similarities and differences. They are similar in as 
much as they both suffered post-election violence and signed power-sharing agreements within a year 
of each other. Political power sharing agreements have also recently been undertaken in Madagascar 
(2009) and Zanzibar (2008) in the wake of the Madagascan coup d’état and election-related violence on 
the island of Zanzibar. Whilst these cases would be interesting and would no doubt hold significant 
insights for the study of power sharing agreements, they are not comparable to either the Kenyan or 
Zimbabwean cases due to the circumstances that brought about the signing of the agreements and the 
particular nature of the states. In the Madagascan case, the power sharing agreement was undertaken 
in the wake of a coup d’état rather than an electoral crisis and it thus has less in common with the 
Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases. The Zanzibar agreement was as a result of a crisis that had emerged in 
the post-election period but the intensity of the crisis was far lower than that in the Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean cases and the nature of the territory is different in as much as Zanzibar is not a sovereign 
state but maintains a political union with Tanzania in spite of having its own parliament and president. 
These circumstances differentiate other recent agreements from those undertaken in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe and make comparisons difficult. 
The Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases are naturally comparable; both countries were former British 
colonies with political systems that were influenced by the British parliamentary system although both 
states had a ‘democratic’ presidential system with a unicameral parliament prior to the electoral crises. 
Kenya and Zimbabwe are at similar stages of development with both states having undergone structural 
adjustment during the 1980s and 1990s; although the Zimbabwean economy has been in decline since 
2000 due to the economic policies of the ZANU-PF government (this decline has slowed since the signing 
of the power sharing agreement and creation of the unity government). The crises in both states 
emerged after widespread reports of electoral manipulation by the government and the refusal of 
incumbents to step down in the wake of electoral defeat. Although the nature of the violence in the two 
states differed, the circumstances that sparked the conflict were similar. The agreements undertaken in 
the two cases were strikingly similar, both led to the sharing of political power through the dispersal of 
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cabinet and ministerial posts and both resulted in the creation of the position of prime minister for the 
opposition leaders whilst the incumbent retained the post of president.  
 The cases diverge due to their differing degrees of ‘success’ in implementing the agreements which may 
be attributable to the different interests and roles of local and regional actors among other factors. The 
unity government created by the Kenyan National Accord and Reconciliation Act has been relatively 
harmonious and effective and no further political violence has broken out since the signing of the 
agreement and the creation of the coalition government; a consultative constitution drafting process 
was undertaken in 2009 and the draft constitution was passed by referendum in late 2010 in a process 
that was free of any political violence. The decision by the proponents of the ‘no campaign’ to accept 
the results of the referendum is a victory in and of itself. In spite of major successes, there has been no 
justice for perpetrators of violence nor attempts at national reconciliation – the  underlying factors that 
enabled the violence of 2007-2008 still exist and it has been predicted that violence may break out again 
during the 2012 presidential elections. 
The implementation record of the power sharing agreement in Zimbabwe has been less positive, the 
government created by the agreement is significantly unbalanced with the ZANU-PF retaining core 
ministries including the Department of Home Affairs and all security-related ministries. The government 
often seems to be composed of two separate and competing administrations and disagreements 
between the three major parties have resulted in recurring deadlocks and administrative stagnancy. 
Security sector reform has consistently been side-lined – this has proven to be one of the core sticking 
points for implementing the GPA and scheduling elections. Parties are also deadlocked on the 
deployment of soldiers during elections, the composition of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), 
amendments to the draconian Public Order and Security Act, the role of the secret service in 
government and the issue of deploying international election monitors 6 months before and after the 
elections - all of these factors need to be resolved for any future elections to be credible and legitimate 
both locally and internationally. Vitally, the constitution-writing process has not been completed and 
has created significant tension between the principals while President Mugabe has vowed to hold 
elections before the constitution is finished and the voters roll is overhauled - in direct contravention of 
the GPA. 
In an effort to understand these divergent outcomes, this research will seek to elaborate on the 
similarities and differences in the two cases with regards to the composition of the initial agreements, 
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the roles and political cultures of the relevant domestic actors, the roles accorded to regional, 
continental and international bodies as well as the effects of incentives and penalties.  
This research will be grounded in the qualitative research tradition and will use an inductive research 
approach which has variance on the outcomes of both cases and attempts to add to existing theory by 
explaining the outcome variance. This research design is less open to selection bias than deductive 
methods where the cases are selected to fit the theory rather than theory being developed through the 
analysis of specific cases. 
A comparative case study is the most appropriate format for this type of research as it provides an in-
depth account of the variables that impact on the outcomes of both cases or as Burnham et al (2008) 
suggested “the goal of comparative research... is to be able to remove proper names, and to reason 
instead in terms of variables.”2 This provides the ability to make generalisable deductions concerning 
the variables that impact positively or negatively on the outcome of power-sharing accords.  
The method that I will use will be the collection and analysis of primary and secondary sources such as 
government policy documents, the agreements themselves, scholarly articles, implementation reports 
and newspaper articles. 
 This research will use process-tracing methods to show correlation or causality between the variables 
and the outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Burnham, P. Gilland Lutz, K. Grant, W. & Layton-Henry, Z. 2008. Research Methods in Politics (2
nd
 edition). New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 69 
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Introduction 
Following the end of the Cold War, there has been a substantial increase in ‘new wars’, particularly on 
the African continent. These new wars are less likely to be fought between states than within states - 
this is the increasing prevalence of civil wars. In an attempt to mitigate intrastate conflicts and reduce 
the likelihood of a resurgence of violence, power sharing conditions have become an increasingly 
important factor in negotiations and peace agreements. Mukherjee (2006), using a dataset that captures 
information regarding 111 civil wars between 1944 and 1999, counts 61 cases in which the ensuing 
peace agreement enshrined elements of power sharing.3 The prevalence of power sharing, particularly 
in Africa, has increased significantly in the post-1999 period, with power sharing agreements being 
undertaken in Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan, the Central African Republic, the 
Congo, the DR Congo, Djibouti, Somalia, Burundi, Angola, the Comoros, Zanzibar, Madagascar, Kenya 
and Zimbabwe in the decade between 1999 and 2009.4 
A considerable academic literature has emerged in tandem with the increasing popularity of this tool in 
the mediator’s arsenal. In spite of this, the concept of power sharing and its boundaries is somewhat 
hazy and has been understood differently by various authors. The large body of literature that is 
concerned with power-sharing arrangements deals primarily with power-sharing arrangements that are 
undertaken in the wake of civil wars. As the application of power-sharing agreements to cases of 
democratic deadlock (such as those seen in Kenya and Zimbabwe) are a relatively recent phenomenon, 
the literature on this topic is not yet extensive. The following chapter will attempt to clarify the concept 
and define its boundaries for the purposes of the later discussion of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases; 
this shall be done by tracing the development of the power sharing paradigm, exploring its definition 
and limits and delineating its strengths and weaknesses before moving on to a discussion of the 
precipitating factors behind instances of electoral crisis.  
Consociationalism or Power Sharing? 
The origins of the concept have been attributed to Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart. In a series of 
papers, Lijphart spelled out the problems attendant on establishing democracy in plural societies, 
particularly those with a history of ethnic or identity-based animosity. He argued that in divided 
societies, political choices are often made along ethnic lines and parties representing ethnic minorities 
                                                          
3
 Mukherjee, B. 2006. “Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some 
Civil Wars but not Others?” International Studies Quarterly, 50, pp. 479-504 
4
 Mehler, A. 2009. “Introduction: Power-Sharing in Africa,” Africa Spectrum, 44, 3, pp. 2-10 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 17 
 
have little chance of ever establishing a majority in parliament while shifting majorities are unlikely.5 He 
argued that the result of this was not just an undemocratic system, but that the system would be likely 
to produce civil conflict. In response, he proposed a system of consociational democracy which involved 
four vital elements. These are: 1) the creation of a broad-based grand coalition government including 
parties that are not needed to form a majority, 2) the existence of a minority veto where threatened 
minorities can veto important decisions and reopen negotiations, 3) proportional representation in all 
major political and administrative positions and in the distribution of public goods and 4) group 
autonomy defined as the ability of groups in geographically limited entities to decide autonomously on 
issues not affecting the superior national interest.6 The cases that Lijphart used to build his model were 
those developed in Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus and Lebanon; each country’s experience is rather far 
removed from the political and social situations of modern African societies. Consociationalism, as it has 
come to be called, is seen as the starting point of power sharing, and the two terms are often used 
interchangeably. Consociationalism, however, takes as a point of departure permanent constitutional 
engineering such as that seen in Northern Ireland, and as a result there have been few cases of true 
consociationalism in Africa. The case of the interim government in South Africa between 1994 and 1996 
is often cited as an example of African consociationalism; indeed Lijphart’s model was considered during 
the scenario planning for the transition.7 Burundi (since 2005) stands as the closest African case to 
Lijphart’s original formula, where each of the key elements of the model were permanently written into 
the constitution.8 
While consociationalism involves permanent constitutional engineering and a small number of essential 
elements, power sharing is more conceptually vague and experiences of power sharing are extremely 
diverse. Although power sharing evolved from the consociational model, it is more likely to involve ad-
hoc concessions intended to achieve buy-in from opposition and militant groups in order to achieve 
peace and a semblance of political stability following intense civil conflict. As defined by Lemarchand 
(2006):  
                                                          
5
 Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries. New 
Haven: Yale University Press 
6
 Mehler, A. 2008. “Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace 
Agreements,” Brooks World Poverty Institute, BWPI Working Paper 40, p. 6 
7
 Mehler, A. 2009. p. 4 
8
 Lemarchand, R. 2006. “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” African Affairs, 106, 422, p. 3 
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“One is enshrined in a set of carefully calibrated constitutional norms; the other is more 
in the nature of an improvised bricolage, aimed at co-opting the bad guys. One 
underscores, among other characteristics, the importance of elite cooperation, 
proportionality, and minority veto; the other makes short shrift of all three.”9 
While consociationalism is the most formalised variant of power sharing, these two concepts should not 
be used synonymously. Power sharing arrangements, as defined by Lemarchand, are almost always a 
product of fire-engine diplomacy, a stop-gap measure to end or mitigate violent conflict and reach a 
‘least-worst’ arrangement for all parties concerned. As such, there are extreme variations in the form 
which power sharing may take in each case, it is largely determined by the interests of mediators and 
the power struggles between the elite representatives of belligerent groups.  
Power Sharing Theory 
There are a number of existing theories that deal with power sharing; Barbara Walter is one of the 
foremost proponents of this paradigm. She argues that the more power-sharing is built into a peace 
agreement, the less reliant peace will be on international enforcement.10 Many international scholars 
shared this belief in the virtues of power sharing but the concept and its implementation were rarely 
questioned. In fact, it seems that in the context of agreements undertaken in circumstances of 
democratic deadlock, international and regional commitment is a markedly more important factor to 
determine the pace and depth of implementation of power sharing agreements and the sustainability of 
these accords. 
Not all models of power sharing were created equal and there is considerable conceptual variance 
between models. Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) distinguish between four levels of power-sharing, these are 
1) central or political power-sharing, 2) territorial (such as federalism/decentralisation), 3) military and 
4) economic power-sharing (such as that proposed in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end 
the civil war between North and South Sudan).11 These authors conclude that while military and 
territorial power sharing impact positively on peace processes and their sustainability, political power 
sharing often does not lead to sustained peace. 
                                                          
9
 Loc. Cit. 
10
 Walter, B. 1997. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War”, International Organization, 51, 3, pp. 335- 364 
11
 Hoddie, M. & Hartzell, C. 2005. “Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the transition from civil war”, in 
P. Roeder & D. Rothchild (eds.), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil War New York: Cornell 
University Press. P. 103 
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Anna K. Jarstad (2009) suggests that in order to achieve conceptual clarity, it is necessary to distinguish 
between different modes of power sharing. These modes are dependent on the context, legal basis and 
forms of arrangement.12 The context of the agreement refers to the difference between power sharing 
implemented in a situation of civil war compared with those achieved in stable democracies. Thus 
power sharing in New Zealand and Switzerland would not be comparable with that in Rwanda (1993) 
and the DRC (2002-2006). While in Switzerland and New Zealand, sharing power is associated with 
stability and democracy; in the latter cases it is associated with instability and civil war.13 Although the 
Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases were not examples of civil war, there was sufficient violence perpetrated 
in both cases to justify placing them in the latter group. The second distinction aims to differentiate 
between the different bases for power sharing, whether they are informal, part of electoral law or 
agreement. It can be a result of informal agreements or as part of electoral law such as the proportional 
representation of all parties in the South African transitional government of 1994. In both the Kenyan 
and Zimbabwean cases, the power sharing formulation was as a result of agreements to end civil 
conflict. The final distinction is between power sharing as a temporary measure compared with one that 
is a permanent governance structure. In contexts of war and violence, power sharing agreements are 
usually a transitional mechanism as part of an agreement to undertake constitutional reform and hold 
new elections, such as in the cases under consideration for this research. It is important to distinguish 
between the different contexts of power sharing as it is misleading to compare permanent democratic 
power sharing such as that in Switzerland with temporary power sharing in contexts of political 
instability as seen in Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
Problems and Dilemmas of Power Sharing  
Power sharing agreements are almost invariably undertaken during periods of crisis, either in times of 
civil war or extensive civil strife. In this environment, negotiators and mediators face innumerable 
problems, particularly with regards to the inclusivity of the negotiations and subsequent agreement. It is 
difficult to establish the identity of the main players during contexts of civil war, and political 
entrepreneurs with small or non-existent support bases are often able to manipulate their way to the 
negotiating table.14 When included in the resulting government, these enterprising would-be leaders 
often have little interest in representing something beyond themselves; this can lead to 
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unrepresentative and unaccountable governments. While it has been assumed that the more inclusive 
an agreement is, the more effective it will be, this is not always the case. In the case of Cote d’Ivoire, the 
less inclusive Ouagadougou agreement (2007) was more successful in terms of encouraging peace than 
the more inclusive Linas-Marcoussis agreement (2003).15 Unfortunately the crisis of 2011 gave lie to the 
success of the second agreement as Laurent Gbagbo attempted to clutch onto the vestiges of power 
following his defeat in presidential elections. It is problematic to exclude the main actors in any conflict, 
and it is particularly difficult to accommodate all interests. Frequently part of the leadership of a militant 
group will sign an agreement while others in the movement feel that they have not been 
accommodated and will initiate a split in the organisation which sparks more violence and requires a 
new round of negotiations.16 This has led to the failure of many peace agreements, such as those 
undertaken in the DRC prior to 2002 and those in Chad and the Central African Republic. 
The influence of ‘spoilers’ is particularly relevant to the cases that will be looked it in this paper, as the 
interests and disposition of participants are important to determine the degree of success or failure of 
these agreements. Stedman (1997) points out that the greatest risk to peace-building in post-conflict 
situations can come from ‘spoilers’ – these are defined as leaders and parties that have the capacity and 
will to resort to violence to subvert peace processes through the use of force.17 He argues that spoilers 
may in fact be the most important determinant of the success or failure of peace agreements18, and 
while commending his intent to bring actors’ interests back into discussions, Mehler (2008) critiques his 
approach for failing to fully delineate the spoiler label and for failing to account for the fact that spoilers 
in a recent peace process may have in fact been defenders of democratisation in earlier periods. He 
argues that the spoiler dimension may in fact hide more than it reveals.19 While this critique has merit, 
the spoiler perspective should not be dismissed entirely as the interests of actors in peace processes and 
power sharing agreements are particularly important in determining the outcome of these agreements, 
as will be seen in the following discussion of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases. In addition to the 
interests of the parties involved, this research contends that international and regional commitment and 
enforcement as well as the degree to which these agreements cover all pressing issues would also 
determine the expected success or failure of these pacts.  
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Mehler and Tull (2005) argue that the increasing usage of power-sharing agreements to end civil wars 
and insurgencies in Africa is problematic as it offers perverse incentives for marginalised or power-
hungry groups to fight their way to the negotiating table.20 As extremist groups are often prioritised at 
the expense of moderate groups, this encourages tendencies towards extremism or results in the 
exclusion of moderate groups whose inclusion in power sharing agreements would likely allow for a 
greater degree of stability and cooperation. These agreements thus offer political pay-offs for violence 
and extreme behaviour. While their model has been developed in conversation with models of power 
sharing that are undertaken in the aftermath of civil war, this research will argue that this model, once 
adapted, may also be relevant to agreements undertaken in the context of democratic deadlock. The 
possibility of undertaking a power sharing agreement once an incumbent has lost power after an 
election increases incentives for incumbents to refuse to relinquish power and resort to violence. This 
was the case in Zimbabwe in 2008 and in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011 where Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede 
power after his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, had won the elections. The AU decision to offer Gbagbo a 
place in a power sharing government on condition of his cessation of hostilities in fact offers incentives 
that promotes this undemocratic behaviour and increases the likelihood that incumbents will use force 
to fight their way back to power.  
These agreements are primarily negotiated by political elites and politico-military entrepreneurs with 
little input from civil society or the population as a whole. The assumption of mediators and the existing 
literature is that the sharing of power at a central and at a national level results in a “territorially 
uniform and locally meaningful peace process” but this is often not the case.21 These power sharing 
accords are unlikely to foster national peace if they are not implemented at a local level and account for 
local actors and their interests. In Kenya during the 2008 crisis, the violence was perpetrated at a local 
level by local political and community leaders, a failure to implement power sharing or cooperative 
political structures at this local level is unlikely to result in sustainable peace at a local, or even national 
level. These arrangements often fail to achieve what they were intended to, which is to provide greater 
security for the people.22 The local level of a) conflict generation and b) escalation as well as c) conflict 
management and d) security production is often completely neglected in peace agreements.23 This is a 
problem as in many cases, including Zimbabwe and Kenya, violence is perpetrated within communities 
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and following the peace agreement, there continues to be a lack of security for civilians at a local level. 
The failure to effect transitional justice, power sharing or reconciliation at this level is likely to lead to a 
continuation of the local circumstances that led to the initial outbreak of conflict. 
Sriram and Zahar (2009) have suggested three major factors that which may affect the creation and 
implementation of power sharing agreements; these have largely been influenced by existing literature 
on the subject although the authors have elaborated on previous research.24 These three factors are the 
nature of the state; the nature of the armed groups and the degree of third party engagement. The 
literature that posits these three factors as vital indicators of the success of agreements will inform the 
current research. However, Sriram and Zahar fail to mark the wording and nature of the original 
agreement itself as a predictor of the success or failure of implementation. Mehler (2009) touches on 
this when he suggests that the extent or degree of power sharing is an important variable in the success 
of these accords.25 He suggests that often these agreements - particularly in the wake of electoral crisis - 
do not sufficiently alter the nature of power relations in a given case; this is often a product of the 
agreement in as much as the presidency is retained by the party whose obstinacy precipitated the crisis. 
This research will look at the agreements themselves in an attempt to assess the degree to which the 
nature and wording of these accords impacts future implementation. The nature of the state and armed 
groups may be equated with the discussion in this research of the role of political culture and the 
motivations of the actors involved as a determinant of success. The degree of third party engagement 
will be a vital indicator for this study and this research will focus on the roles of regional, continental and 
international bodies and mediators and guarantors in determining the impact of these agreements and 
their speedy implementation. As most of the research and literature on power sharing has focused on its 
role in mitigating and ending violent conflict in the context of civil war, this research will seek to expand 
upon and compliment this literature with a discussion of the applicability of these pacts in times of 
democratic deadlock and heightened civil tensions following electoral crises.  
Power sharing agreements are intended as short-term stop gap measures to mitigate violent conflict but 
often these are undertaken as elite pacts with little involvement of members of civil society, as in the 
case of Zimbabwe26, and many question whether ‘democracy is being sacrificed for peace’27. But what is 
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the relationship between power sharing agreements and democracy? For negotiators of power sharing 
agreements, these accords are intended to solve short-term security demands and are seldom intended 
to create strong and sustainable states; their goal is negative peace – the absence of war – rather than 
democracy and development over the longue durée. In spite of this, there is a tendency by many 
scholars to see power sharing and consociational agreements as the starting point for both lasting peace 
and democratic sustainability.28 It may in fact be premature to decry the consequences of power sharing 
agreements for democracy and development as these are not the primary goals of these accords29; 
however given the relatively dire state of democracy on the African continent, the intended and 
unintended consequences of these agreements must be explored to try to mitigate negative outcomes 
for democratic consolidation.  
Here, democracy is not merely understood as the presence of elections but rather as a system that is 
intended to keep the government accountable to the electorate – elections are a vital part of this but 
are not the sum of democracy. Although building democratic states is not the foremost intention of 
mediators of conflict, research has suggested that fragile and non-democratic states are more likely to 
resort to repressive or discriminatory practices in dealing with the grievances of their populations.30 
Thus if power sharing agreements lead to the emergence of weak/undemocratic states, it is likely that 
conflict will re-emerge – concerns with the long term consequences of power sharing agreements 
should be foremost in the minds of proponents who hope to see the permanent cessation of hostilities. 
As discussed above, power sharing agreements may lead to incentives for incumbents to pervert the 
democratic process, but in addition to this, these agreements may also reroute channels of 
accountability and remove the ‘watchdog role’ of the political opposition.31 This research will attempt to 
gauge the long term consequences of these agreements in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases; although 
at this stage a comprehensive and conclusive appraisal is not possible, the negative consequences that 
these agreements may have on the future of democratisation in both states must be elaborated upon, 
even at this early stage.  
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Elections and Electoral Crises 
The ‘third wave’ of democracy that swept through Africa in the 1990s brought changes to the African 
political space, between 1989 and 1997, 49 of 53 African states held competitive elections.32 By the 
beginning of the next century, conflicts and the resurgence of political repression had decimated the 
hope of the 1990s; it became clear that in spite of the proliferation of elections, there had not been a 
fundamental restructuring of the political rules of the game in most African states. Governments and 
parties had used elections as a means of postponing political reforms that would lead to genuine 
political competition; little attention had been paid towards building institutions and rules to govern and 
promote organised competition.33 The 2000s have seen increased societal agitation in many countries, 
including Kenya, for genuine constitutional and electoral reforms; in spite of this, there have been few 
countries to adopt such measures in a genuine manner without the supervision of the international 
community. This struggle for constitutional reform has led to political and institutional paralysis in many 
countries, particularly those plagued by ethnic fragmentation.34 In spite of this, elections have been 
internalised by continental bodies and African constituencies, they are widely seen as the only 
legitimate means by which to effect change in governments.  
Following from these changes, there has been a growing tendency towards post-election crises in 
African polities, particularly in countries riven by ethnic, communal and sectarian divisions.35 In these 
cases, elections can widen existing fissures as parties mobilise constituencies by politicising identity and 
ethnicity and encouraging groups to use violence to influence electoral outcomes.36 Khadiagala (2010) 
suggests that the violence seen in the wake of elections may either be as a result of the above 
circumstances or as a consequence of imperfect electoral rules and institutions which allow parties to 
manipulate elections through fraud, vote buying and rigging.37 The confluence of both factors, may 
result in a perfect storm of violence in the wake of a perceived stolen election, as in the cases of Kenya 
and Zimbabwe in 2007 and 2008. 
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As has been stated above – elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy, 
although they are not without their own problems and dilemmas. In some cases, electoral systems may 
in fact contribute to violence due to their inability to inspire the confidence and trust of parties and the 
electorate.38 Not all electoral systems were created equal; some may in fact leads to a greater likelihood 
of the emergence of conflict. The first-past-the-post (FPTP), winner-takes-all or majoritarian system is 
said to be the most dangerous electoral system as it reduces political competition to a zero-sum game 
where losers are vanquished.39 This increases the risks of the game in societies where the loss of political 
power will likely result in a loss of economic power and personal safety. The FPTP system allows a party 
with a simple or overall majority to be declared the winner and to create the new government without 
the inclusion of opposition parties. In spite of its drawbacks this system is seen to be efficient at creating 
direct channels of accountability, based as it is on single member constituencies. The proportional 
representation system, as used in South Africa, is relatively new to the African continent. This system 
leads to the representation in government of all parties that gained a percentage of the vote over a 
certain threshold. This leads to a more inclusive government and reduces the risks of coming in second 
at the polls; it is also more likely to lead to government by consensus. In spite of this, it has been 
criticised for reducing accountability, particularly when government representatives are chosen using 
the part-list system.40 There is a third system which draws from the best aspects of both systems; this is 
the mixed member proportional system. Unfortunately this system has not been widely implemented in 
Africa, apart from the small nation of Lesotho. 
In spite of the above discussion, the particular context of a given case is more likely to determine the 
likelihood of conflict; electoral systems will just work to amplify problems where they exist. Primary 
determinants of electoral conflict lie in the political terrain, whether or not political and civil society 
groups are able to organise freely without fear or prejudice; if all actors have access to the news media 
and if the media is able to operate openly; and finally if the playing field is level and all parties are able 
to embark on voter education and mobilisation.41 In cases where the political terrain is uneven, there is 
significant polarisation or opposition parties are subject to intimidation and repression, civil conflict is 
more likely to occur. The existence of institutions to manage political competition and mediate 
uncertain outcomes is also crucial. In situations where there is a highly contested election, inadequate 
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trust in electoral institutions, frustration with an uneven playing field, a winner-takes-all electoral 
system and an uncertain electoral outcome, it is likely that societal frustration will erupt in violence as in 
Kenya in 2007 and early 2008. 
Omotola (2010) elaborates on the available mechanisms for resolving election related conflicts in Africa. 
He suggests that there are three options, 1) constitutional frameworks for electoral justice, 2) electoral 
reforms and 3) power sharing constellations.42 As many African countries foresaw that there would be 
contestation over elections, a large number adopted constitutional frameworks for dealing with these 
issues. The countries of the SADC region have constitutional provisions for the adjudication of electoral 
disputes in the pre-election, election and post-election periods. However, this method of dealing with 
these crises demands a high level of trust in institutions and the willingness of actors to play the game 
according to established rules.43 In addition, the judiciary must be professional, independent and 
efficient, and willing to defy the prevailing political forces in the search of justice. Unfortunately, due to 
the prevalence of a culture of patronage, a lack of political will and the inefficiency of the judiciary, 
constitutional frameworks have not been able to deal adequately with post-election conflict resolution 
apart from a few notable cases such as South Africa and Ghana.44  In the wake of violently or hotly 
contested elections, the civil societies of African states have often called for electoral reform and 
politicians have conceded in the face of declining legitimacy. The case of Nigeria in 2007 under President 
Yar’Adua is instructive; following questionable elections, he instituted an electoral reform panel to 
review and redress electoral law. Following consultation with a diverse set of stakeholders and a 
number of public hearings, the panel released its report to national and international acclaim in 2008. 
Subsequently, the reform process was aborted; it became clear that the primary goal of instituting the 
panel was to reduce tensions in the wake of the elections, appease the opposition and civil society and 
secure legitimacy for the presidency.45 Electoral reforms are undertaken only when the constellation of 
forces within the state is conducive to it, reforms are at the mercy of political actors whose motives and 
interests are often less than altruistic. The final mechanism discussed by Omotola is that of power 
sharing agreements. These agreements have only recently been revived as a strategy to manage post-
election crises in Africa. The efficacy of these accords as a means of mitigating and resolving these crises 
shall be discussed in subsequent chapters of this research.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the evolution of the power sharing paradigm, from consociationalism to the 
advent of a one-size-fits-all tool in the mediator’s arsenal. It is clear from this discussion that there are 
significant problems associated with the application and implementation of these agreements, although 
currently few alternative methods of resolving civil conflicts exist. The chapter concluded with a 
discussion of elections in Africa and the circumstances under which they may precipitate conflict. There 
are currently three important mechanisms by which to resolve post-election crises, namely: 
constitutional frameworks, electoral reforms and power sharing agreements. The first two suffer from 
problems of political will and expediency, which has led to the increasing importance of the third, the 
role of power sharing agreements in resolving post-election crises shall be the focus of the rest of this 
research. The following chapter will trace the circumstances that led to the emergence of violence in the 
wake of elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe and brought about the signing of power sharing agreements 
to create transitional governments of national unity (GNUs).  
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Introduction 
There are a number of striking similarities between the Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases, beyond their 
having signed power sharing agreements within months of each other. The two countries’ political 
histories are surprisingly similar; both are former British colonies with substantial settler populations 
and in the 1980s, both Kenya and Zimbabwe were ruled by men with ambitions of becoming ‘president 
for life’ in contexts of one-party political systems.46 Following intense international and domestic 
pressure, both countries introduced surface-level democratic reforms in the 1990s. Levels of growth and 
prosperity in both countries were impressive with high literacy levels and a strong civil society, each 
country was seen as a hegemon and example for other states in their respective regions. From the 
1990s, civil society began to protest and plead for constitutional reform and the reduction of the powers 
of the ‘imperial presidencies.’47 Five years apart, the two states held referendums for constitutional 
amendments which were in the interest of the incumbent and in both cases; the referendums were 
defeated with disastrous consequences.48 Following the outbreak of violence in Kenya in the aftermath 
of the elections on 27 December 2007 and in Zimbabwe on 29 March 2008, regional and international 
mediators intervened and led to the signing of power sharing agreements between the main political 
contenders. This chapter shall seek to draw out the processes and circumstances that led to the crises in 
each country as a means to understand the political context prevailing in each case at the time of the 
agreement. 
Kenya 
Introduction 
 
“[Kenya’s electoral violence had] tapped into an atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay 
beneath the surface in Kenya but until now had not produced widespread mayhem.”- Jeffrey 
Gettleman, New York Times, 31 December 2007
49
 
 
The 2007 and 2008 crisis in Kenya was greeted by the international community with a high degree of 
surprise; Kenya had been seen as a regional beacon of stability and growth and a vital ‘emerging 
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democracy’ – particularly after the peaceful transitional election of 2002 and the failed constitutional 
referendum of 2005. Many in the international community felt that Kenya, at least in African terms, was 
not a country to “worry about.”50 Perceptions of the violence such as the quote above abounded, Afro-
pessimists decried the Kenyan crisis as yet another case of violence as a result of tribalism and the 
inherent atavistic tendencies of African polities. Public discourse, the media and development literature 
often stereotype complex political and historical situations as merely a product of primordial disputes 
over ethnicity. In reality, the violence was a product of the complex interaction of a number of long-
term trends and short-term triggers within Kenyan politics which had left it a ticking time-bomb awaiting 
explosion. Long term trends can be identified as the politicisation of ethnicity by successive elites, the 
deliberate undermining and weakness of institutions combined with a political system lacking the 
necessary checks and balances on executive power and a decline in the state’s monopoly of force. These 
trends played into short term triggers such as elite fragmentation – which was precipitated by the failed 
constitutional reforms of 2005. This section will aim to delineate these trends to encourage a more 
nuanced understanding of the factors which led to the 2008 crisis and assist in analysing the success of 
the implementation of the 2008 power sharing agreement. 
Ethnicity and Politics 
Kenyan society is extremely ethnically diverse; it is comprised of more than forty ethnic groups. The 
perceived dominant group is arguably the Kikuyu of Central Province, who along with closely affiliated 
Bantu groups, the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru and Akamba (GEMA) make up approximately 25% of the 
population. The Luo of the Lake Victoria Region and a collection of other Bantu groups from Western 
Province known as the Luhya comprise 13 and 14% respectively.51 The Kalenjin - a confederation of 
ethnic groups rather than a single distinctive group - is resident largely in the Rift Valley and urban 
centres such as Nairobi and is constituted by the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Marakwet, Pokot and a number 
of smaller groupings which collectively make up 12% of society. The Kamba of Eastern Province are 
approximately 11%, the Kisii of Nyanza another 6%, the Mijikenda of Coast Province comprise 5% and 
the remaining groups make up the final 14% of the total population.52  
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Politics in Kenya has long been ethnically stratified, but not as a result of atavistic tendencies. Instead, 
ethnicity has been ‘politicised’ by successive elites in search of a platform from which to launch 
themselves into the presidency.53 Jomo Kenyatta, and later David Arap Moi, used patrimonialism and 
patron-client relationships with those belonging to their ethnic group to shore up their support. 
Kenyatta centralised power within the presidency and began to benefit people of Kikuyu origin 
disproportionately. Moi was a Kalenjin and following his ascendance in 1978, he placed Kalenjins in all 
important government and economic positions. This trend which continued largely unabated until 2002 
helped to develop the perception amongst members of society that the benefits of incumbency would 
be carried down to people of the same ethnic group; this increased the stakes of elections and led to 
increased stratification of people along politico-ethnic lines. Through subsequent decades, the 
patronage system was largely maintained by extensive corruption where “ill-gotten gains were 
distributed to ethno-regional power brokers to lubricate the ethnic coalition building.”54 
In the 1990s, the confluence of the renewed international push towards democracy and the emergence 
of a broad reformist coalition began to push Moi to institute democratic reforms; the re-emergence of 
‘democracy’ in fact led to substantial insecurity on the part of Moi and the ruling coalition. Prior to the 
1992 elections, they mobilised ethnic militias to intimidate and harass political leaders and voters. These 
militias would also play a part in the 1997 and 2007 elections, becoming an integral part of the 
informalisation of violence that led to the outbreak of hostilities in 2007.  
In spite of the ethnically stratified nature of politics in Kenya, politicians had long sought alliances and 
coalitions that crossed the tribal divide. In spite of the apparent positive implications of this coalition-
building, Khadiagala (2010) notes that these coalitions tend to lead to instability rather than ethnic 
cooperation and political predictability, these are loose opportunistic alliances which are dissolved as 
soon as they have served their purpose.55 The purposes of these agreements are often more individual 
and idiosyncratic than altruistic, they often reflect the particular interests of individual leaders jockeying 
for power and a seat at the table. As a result of this culture, political parties are barely distinguishable in 
terms of their ideology, programmes, platforms and organisation.56 Leaders of these parties, including 
President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, have moved opportunistically from party to 
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party and coalition to coalition based on the political circumstances of the day. This has served to 
undermine the evolution of parties along more coherent, predictable and institutional lines.57 Rather 
than combining around common principles and ideals or similar programmes for action, Kenyan parties 
are “opportunistic machines for ethnic alliance and coalition building.”58  
Undermining Institutions 
The institutions of government in Kenya leading up to the 2007 elections were extremely weak and 
perceived to be partial to the incumbent rather than being independent arbiters serving in the interest 
of society. This weakness of institutions is a long term trend that began under Jomo Kenyatta and was 
consistently continued by successive constitutional amendments under Moi, and later Mwai Kibaki.59 
These leaders worked to increase the power of the presidency relative to the other organs of state 
including the judiciary, parliament and civil service. Checks and balances were abandoned and 
understanding the political context, the arms of government tended to defer to the president. This 
allowed for the repression and torture of opposition during the Moi years and the pervasive corruption 
of the 1980s and 1990s.60 In spite of widespread human rights violations and electoral violence in 1992 
and 1997, no perpetrators were ever punished - this led to the judicial system being perceived to be 
biased and the emergence of a corrosive culture of impunity which caused widespread frustration. This 
culture of impunity was pervasive and it initiated a deep sense of resentment in many members of 
society. 
Prior to the 2007 election, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) was also compromised; President 
Kibaki unilaterally replaced 19 of 22 electoral commissioners and appointed his former lawyer as the 
Vice-Chair in a move that violated an Inter-Party Parliamentary Group agreement and undermined 
opposition and voter confidence in the electoral process.61 In addition, there was no agreed-upon 
institution to deal with electoral disputes and allegations of rigging, a dangerous flaw in a context of 
highly contested elections. Only two days prior to the elections, Kibaki appointed 5 new High Court 
judges – including judges responsible for the electoral appeals processes – to a bench that was already 
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believed to be favourable to him.62 Institutions that were already particularly weak lost all semblances of 
autonomy, independence, integrity and legitimacy.  
Decline in the State’s Monopoly of the Use of Force 
Following the reintroduction of multi-party politics in the 1990s, President Moi resorted to the 
mobilisation of ethnic militias to undermine opposition party mobilisation. This was a result of the 
insecurity of the ruling elite when faced with the prospect of an open political process in which state 
institutions would be subjected to public scrutiny and accountability.63 Moi and his supporters then 
called upon an ethnic grouping calling themselves the ‘Kalenjin warriors’ to kill and displace opposition 
voters who were drawn from other ethnic groups, mostly Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo.64 This happened 
before, during and after the 1992 and 1997 elections. As opposition groups and vulnerable ethnic 
constituencies became subject to violence perpetrated by these state-sponsored militias, they resorted 
to creating their own self-defence and militia groups. Some of the opposition-sponsored gangs were the 
Jeshi la Embakasi, Baghdad Boys and Amachuma.65 The result of this was the proliferation of self-styled 
militias, vigilante groups and organised criminal gangs in urban and rural areas which have usurped the 
state’s monopoly of force and contributed to the increasing informalisation of violence.66 The most 
notorious of these gangs were the Mungiki (Nairobi/Rift Valley/Central), the SLDF (Mount Elgon), Kaya 
Bombo Youth (Mombasa/Kwale), Sungu Sungu, Chinkororo and Amachuma (Kisii/Nyamira/Gucha/ 
Transmara) and Taleban, Jeshi la Mzee and Jeshi la Embakasi (Nairobi).67 Many of these militias were to 
play a role in the 2007 election crisis. 
While these gangs allowed Moi and his cohorts to retain access to the state, they took on a life of their 
own in the intervening decade leading up to the 2007 elections. These groups moved into urban areas 
and slums of Nairobi as well as the rural areas of Central Province; they acted as protection rackets and 
shakedown gangs in areas neglected by the state where police and officials would turn a blind eye in 
return for kickbacks.68 In many cases these gangs became a shadow state, usurping the role and 
functions of the government. By 2007, these gangs were prolific and the state had largely lost its 
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monopoly of the use of force; these groups represented the potential for violence merely waiting to be 
tapped. The culture of impunity and the legacy of the use of violence for political currency played into 
this and led to the widespread violence perpetrated by ethnic militias and gangs during January and 
February 2008. 
Elite Fragmentation 
The 1997 elections were lost to Moi due to the divided nature of the opposition and his mobilisation of 
extra-judicial means of coercion, but the 2002 elections could not have been more different. The 
National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was formed prior to the 2002 elections; it was broad-based 
multi-ethnic coalition that included Mwai Kibaki’s National Alliance of Kenya party and Raila Odinga’s 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It came to power in 2003 with a 63% mandate amidst promises of 
ending corruption and impunity, jump-starting the economy, improving the spread of public services 
and making constitutional reforms to redistribute power from the leviathan executive.69 Kenyans 
expected that the new government would end the culture of impunity and kleptocracy that had 
prevailed during the Kenyatta and Moi years, they also expected public appointments to be fair and to 
‘reflect the face of Kenya’ and that malefactors would be prosecuted.70  
During the 2002-2007 terms, the Kibaki administration oversaw the emergence of a stunning economic 
recovery premised on macroeconomic discipline, reduced deficit spending, an improvement in tax 
collection and thus increased state revenue, an improved business environment and the privatisation of 
failing state-owned enterprises.71 Economic growth reached a staggering 7% in 2006 and poverty levels 
dropped by 10% to just 46% in 2006. Unfortunately the regime’s record of political governance was not 
as impressive, they failed to prosecute and convict high-level corruption from both before and after 
2003 – the Goldenberg and Anglo Leasing scandals in particular. In both scandals, high-level government 
functionaries were implicated but prosecutions and convictions were not carried through and the 
persons responsible for the investigations were subjected to death threats and harassment.72 The NARC 
government had also promised to eradicate privatised violence and restore public order and undertook 
a particularly violent counter-insurgency campaign which was widely criticised by civil society and 
human rights groups.73 The violence used by the state security apparatus to eradicate these militias gave 
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way to violent retaliatory killings, particularly by the Mungiki. Although this campaign greatly 
undermined the strength of the Mungiki and other militias, it also encouraged the emergence of a 
divided and increasingly violent movement that was forced underground and would pose a great threat 
in 2007-2008.74 Kagwanja (2009) suggests that the failure of the police to control extra-judicial forces 
and their ‘trigger-happy’ reputation led to a strong perception that the Kibaki government was a ‘state-
amok’ and that this had profound effects on the resurgence of populism and ethnic nationalism ahead 
of the elections.75 This process, alongside the stormy collapse of the NARC coalition, set the stage for the 
eruption of ethnic tensions in the wake of the elections. 
In 2005, the NARC alliance imploded as a result of pressure from Kibaki’s closest Kikuyu aides, the 
deliberate sabotage of the constitutional review process and Kibaki’s failure to implement the terms of 
his memorandum of understanding with Odinga and the NARC constituent parties.76 The 2005 
constitutional referendum saw the first vestiges of ethnic divisionism with anti-kikuyu rhetoric being 
directed at various constituencies.77  
The 2005 constitutional referendum marked a watershed moment in the process of elite fragmentation. 
A new constitutional review process had been initiated in 2000 under Moi; the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission (CKRC) was concluded shortly before the 2002 elections and recommended the 
creation of a mixed presidential and parliamentary system to reduce the powers of the president,78 as 
well as the devolution of authority to district governments.79 With the new NARC administration 
following the 2002 elections, the CKRC findings were to be debated at the National Constitutional 
Conference (the Bomas process), but this was paralysed by widening rifts within the NARC alliance 
following Kibaki’s failure to implement the provisions of the founding Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU).80 The constitutional review process, campaigned for with determination prior to the elections, 
was no longer a process to remove Moi, and it soon became apparent that a revised constitution would 
have different implications for each of the various actors. Discussions over the limiting of presidential 
powers were particularly acrimonious as the Kibaki clique resisted attempts at reforming the executive 
presidency. The ‘Bomas draft’ was finalised by late 2004, it was very close to the recommendations of 
                                                          
74
 Ibid 
75
 Ibid. p. 372 
76
 Branch & Cheeseman. 2008. p. 17 
77
 Chege, M. 2008. p. 132 
78
 Kersting, R. 2011. p. 71 
79
 Khadiagala, G. M. 2010, p. 76 
80
 Ibid 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 36 
 
the CKRC, and it included a parliamentary system, an elected president and prime minister as well as a 
stringently protected autonomous judiciary.81 Due to his dissatisfaction with the diminished powers of 
the presidency, Kibaki engineered fundamental revisions to the draft constitution, removing the 
provision for a prime minister and the devolution of power away from the capital as well as restoring 
presidential authority.82 This deepened antagonistic sentiments between the two main factions within 
NARC who found themselves in opposing camps when campaigning for the constitutional referendum 
scheduled for 21 November 2005. Following weeks of violent campaigning, Odinga and the ‘no’ 
campaign defeated Kibaki’s ‘yes’ campaign with 58% of the vote. In spite of the contentious nature of 
the competition, the referendum process was praised by international observers for the independence 
of the electoral commission and for the undisputed nature of the results; indeed Kibaki appeared to 
accept the defeat graciously. Following his defeat, Kibaki dissolved his cabinet and removed all seven 
ministers who had mobilised against the draft constitution; his new, enlarged cabinet was seen as far 
less representative.83 The referendum was enough to tear apart the fragile NARC coalition. Opposition 
groups then coalesced around a determination to remove Kibaki from power and formed the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) with Raila Odinga at the helm. The ODM burst onto the scene with a 
populist agenda and 2005-2007 marked the high noon of populist and ethnic politics in Kenya.84  
The failed referendum process and Odinga’s growing popularity began a groundswell of panic within 
Kibaki’s administration, victory in the 2007 elections was less than assured and this raised the stakes of 
the competition. The electoral system in Kenya was a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, which as 
discussed in the previous chapter, leads to a winner-takes-all political configuration. This increases the 
costs of losing an election, as the loser is vanquished and denied participation in the resulting 
government. 2007 was an election that Kibaki was not prepared to concede. 
Ethnicity became the axis about which the 2007 elections turned, both parties - but particularly the 
ODM – paid lip-service to nationalism while whipping up ethno-nationalist rhetoric to fever pitch.85 The 
ODM was a broad anti-Kikuyu alliance, while Kibaki and his inner circle were primarily Kikuyu. The ODM 
leaders had been freed of ministerial responsibilities by the Kibaki government, they were nursing 
grievances from their exclusion from government and many expressed bitterness at what they saw as an 
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increasing pro-Kikuyu bias in high-level government appointments.86 Rapidly, the blame for all of 
Kenya’s social and economic ills was laid at the feet of the Kikuyu and of Kibaki in particular.87 This anti-
Kikuyu rhetoric built on a perception that the Kikuyu had received preferential treatment in the past and 
this strategy would prove to be an effective means by which to consolidate ethnic support in non-Kikuyu 
regions. What emerged was a party campaign based on the idea of “forty-one tribes against one” and 
“Kenya against the Kikuyu.”88 ODM politicians stoked the flames of ethnic tension through an effective 
campaign of disinformation which highlighted (unproven) assessments of the benefits accruing to 
Kikuyu areas, the domination of Kikuyu in banking, government, trade, out-migration, education and 
commercial farming.89 This played into land grievances, particularly amongst the Kalenjin and Maasai in 
Rift Valley, an area that had already seen substantial political violence in contestations over land. This 
was not, however, the sum of the campaign. Importantly, the ODM revitalised the majimbo debate. This 
inspired fear amongst members of the Kikuyu community residing in non-Kikuyu areas, their social 
memory of majimbo was marred by violence and ethnic cleansing.90 This majimbo regionalist agenda - 
understood variously to mean a form of federalism, a reconsideration of land rights and a license to 
commit ethnic cleansing - became the most divisive issue of the campaign.91 Odinga failed to delineate 
his understanding of majimbo as the confusion would allow the ODM to garner as many Kalenjin and 
minority supporters as possible. This disarray likely heightened fears amongst the Kikuyu and their 
affiliated groups. In return, Kibaki’s newly-formed Party of National Unity (PNU) began to disseminate 
propaganda that translated this fear of majimbo to the grass-roots level, comparing Odinga to Idi Amin, 
Stalin and Hitler.92 By the end of 2007, elite fragmentation, the perceived partisanship of state 
institutions and the informalisation of violence had eroded all trust from the political system. 
Things Fall Apart 
The pre-election phase witnessed an increase in intimidation, threats to political candidates, the rise of 
hate speech, distribution of hate-inspired leaflets, violence between rival groups, mob-lynching of 
members of rival ethnic groups and the tearing up of Kikuyu voters cards in parts of the Rift Valley.93 
These tactics and the ethnic rhetoric pushed by election candidates served to undermine all remaining 
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inter-communal trust, Kenya was a time-bomb waiting for a trigger. By December, the violence had 
already killed hundreds and displaced over 2 000 families in Mount Elgon, Molo and Kuresoi. Prior to the 
election, Kibaki manipulated electoral institutions to improve his chances against Odinga’s ODM. The 
simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections held on 27 December 2007 were the most 
contentious in Kenyan history. Early results indicated that Odinga’s ODM had won a clear majority in 
parliament, winning 99 seats as opposed to the PNU’s 43.94 This sent waves of panic through the PNU 
during the counting of the presidential votes, leading to state intelligence officers infiltrating the ECK 
and undertaking a campaign to inflate the results in PNU strongholds in favour of Kibaki.95 This rigging 
was successful, and shifted the balance from the ODM to the PNU, resulting in Kibaki’s win by a mere 
231 000 votes. 
Violence began to escalate on 29 December following the delay in announcing the presidential election 
results and when Odinga’s lead began to fall away amid allegations of fraud. The ODM refused to 
recognise the PNU victory as soon as the results were announced by the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
chair, and refused to recognise Kibaki as president when he was hastily sworn in an hour later.96 Even 
the chairman of ECK, Samuel Kivuitu, admitted that he did not know who the victor was, but that he had 
succumbed to pressure which resulted in his announcing Kibaki’s victory.97 The ODM immediately 
dismissed judicial procedures as a means to solve the crisis as it argued that the judiciary was under the 
control of the incumbent, Kibaki. The ODM called for a million-man civic action to be undertaken by 
supporters and advocated civic disobedience. In the aftermath of the rigged elections, the violence 
became increasingly diffuse, but it is possible to separate it into three separate forms, spontaneous 
violence, organised (including retaliatory violence) and state-perpetrated violence 
Spontaneous Violence in Urban Areas 
There was a sudden eruption of violence on 30 December when Kibaki was declared the winner of the 
elections; this violence was comprised of largely unplanned damage to property and random killings of 
suspected ethnic rivals.98 On Odinga’s home turf, in Nyanza Province, thousands poured into towns and 
cities to protest, angry mobs began to loot and torch property, particularly that of Kisii, Kikuyu and 
Kamba. Violence also erupted in Nairobi’s ethnically diverse slums such as Dandora, Kibera, Kariobangi, 
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Kawangware and Mathare.99 The violence was primarily directed against people of Kikuyu ethnicity as 
well as their perceived allies. 
Organised Violence in the Rift Valley and Western Province 
This spontaneous violence gave way to ethnic reprisals and counter-attacks with Kikuyu militias taking 
up arms and undertaking organised pre-emptive attacks against communities that were broadly seen as 
supporting the opposition.100 This organised violence began in the conflict-prone Rift Valley, with the 
epicentre in the town of Eldoret. As discussed above, land issues and other motivations for ethnic 
distrust and fear have been a source of violence between the majority Kalenjin and minority Kikuyu 
populations. These tensions were increased with the sharpening of ethnic divisions during the 2007 
election campaigns and the community was divided between ODM and PNU supporters. Local politicians 
stoked the existing tensions, for example a Kalenjin councillor reportedly professed at a rally in the town 
of Soi that, if elected, the ODM would “remove the roots” of local Kikuyu communities “so there would 
be only one tribe there.”101 As a result of this rhetoric, local Kalenjin believed that once the ODM came 
to power, they would remove the local Kikuyu and redistribute their land to the Kalenjin; when these 
ambitions were frustrated by the stolen election, they resolved to do by force what they wanted to 
achieve through elections.102 Human Rights Watch and the Waki Commission (the Kenyan government 
commission tasked with investigating the causes of the violence) both discovered the complicity of local 
political leaders in the incitement of violence, with some even demanding payment for carrying out the 
violent acts.103 Although Human Rights Watch found no direct links between the national ODM 
leadership and the violence, many blame local factors and the violent ethnic rhetoric of William Ruto, an 
ODM member of parliament.104 There were also reports of opportunistic violence, of attacks by Kalenjin 
taking advantage of the collapse of law and order to attack Luo and Kisii settlers for personal gain, 
regardless of political affiliation.105 
Following the reports of instances of violence against Kikuyu women and children in Kiambaa and the 
entry of Kikuyu internally displaced persons in Central Province, Kikuyu gangs and militias began to 
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undertake retaliatory attacks against Luo, Luyha and Kalenjin communities. This crisis allowed the 
Mungiki to regroup and operate openly as a defender of Kikuyu communities in Nairobi and the Rift 
Valley.106 The Waki commission later found that the Mungiki had been used by some civil servants, 
ministers and members of parliament to fight back against the Luo and Kalenjin but was unable to prove 
that the PNU as a whole had used these militias in a systematic way.107  
Police Repression and Failure to Protect 
The role of the police in controlling the violence has been questionable with a substantial amount of 
evidence pointing to police involvement and the use of terror tactics against slum dwellers.108 Many 
victims have reported that the police stood by as their families were killed and their homes were 
torched and looted.109 The police in Kisumu were blamed for the exceptionally high number of fatalities 
experienced there and there were a number of reports of indiscriminate police killings of people not 
linked to the protests. In spite of the low levels of violence in Western Province, the police crackdown 
was exceptionally brutal. Dozens were killed, many in cold-blooded executions; this was blamed on one 
notorious criminal investigation officer who was said to be running a parallel police unit.110 The Waki 
(Commission of Enquiry into the Post-Election Violence) report revealed widespread police violations 
including those of a sexually violent nature.111 
Conclusion 
The violence in the wake of the elections of 27 December 2007 was as a result of a number of important 
and interlinked factors. An important factor was the mobilization and politicization of ethnicity for 
personal and electoral gain at a national and local level. This politicised ethnicity fed into decades of 
ethnic division that had been perpetuated by successive elites and consolidated through ethnically 
differentiated access to resources. The mobilisation of ethnicity was largely a result of the 
unprogrammatic nature of Kenyan political parties and the zero-sum nature of the electoral system and 
of politics following the loss of the referendum and the increasingly fragmented elite. Another 
important factor was the distrust of state institutions to be able to mediate the post-election crisis due 
to the preponderance of the presidency and the undermining of independent institutions; this led to the 
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failure of the ODM and PNU to effect a compromise before the outbreak of hostilities. The culture of 
impunity that had prevailed in Kenya for more than forty years would also have impacted on the 
decision to take up arms rather than to try to petition for justice over the elections; there was a 
common perception that state institutions would be partial. Long term trends and short term triggers 
produced a perfect storm which threatened to destroy East Africa’s most stable country. Only 40 days of 
mediation headed by former UN Secretary General and African Eminent Person, Kofi Annan, was able to 
break the stalemate, bring an end to the violence and result in the signing of the Kenyan National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act on 28 February 2008 – a process which paved the way for the grand 
coalition government that would rule the country until the elections of 2012. 
 
Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
 
“The MDC leadership totally underestimated Mugabe. They believed the struggle for democracy 
would be hard, but they never understood that he was prepared to destroy everything – them, 
the economy, the institutions, the infrastructure, the whole country and everything in it – to 
survive” – Wilfred Mhanda (aka Dzinashe Machingura), former ZANU freedom fighter
112
 
 
While there are a number of important parallels between the Kenyan and Zimbabwean post-
independence experiences, there are also vital points of divergence. While the Kenyan crisis had deep 
historical roots, the actual crisis period was short, in essence only a few months of political and 
economic turmoil in an otherwise essentially stable country. In contrast, the Zimbabwean crisis was not 
one but many subsequent crises where the state and society were subject to an almost continuous state 
of crisis and disintegration for the better part of a decade. This was as a result of a number of long-term 
trends and unresolved issues left in the wake of the retreating colonial state, but also due to the 
misguided political, economic and fiscal policies of an elite bent on indefinite political survival. This 
chapter will elaborate on these trends and policies in an effort to explain the roots of the 2008 post-
election crisis and the resultant power-sharing agreement. 
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Unlike Kenya, the Zimbabwean nation is not constituted by a multiplicity of ethnic groups; instead it is 
made up of only two, the Shona majority (82% of the population) and an Ndebele minority (14% of the 
total population).113 Conflict within the state has not been characterised by a politics of ethnicity but 
rather by the politics of survival of a small coterie of the politically powerful. 
Political Consolidation 
Modern Zimbabwean politics has its roots in the liberation struggle of the 1970s and 1980s. From 1965 
when Ian Smith’s government made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from British colonial 
rule, the nationalist movements in Zimbabwe launched their guerrilla struggle for independence. At the 
forefront of this campaign was the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the predecessor of the 
party that would rule Zimbabwe unilaterally until 2008. In 1979, Smith’s white-minority government 
relinquished power in the Lancaster House agreement. While the change in government from Ian 
Smith’s regime to Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s ZANU administration led to a change in government and 
leadership personnel, the repressive state structures and practices were maintained alongside Smith’s 
repressive legislation.114 There was limited transformation under the Lancaster House independence 
constitution; it restricted socio-economic redistribution and major constitutional changes before 
1990.115 While displaying conciliatory and developmental characteristics, the new government did not 
break with the existing tradition of authoritarian nationalism, it failed to de-militarise state institutions 
and methods of political mobilisation and retained the security-oriented institutions of the old 
regime.116 
During the independence decade, the Zimbabwean economy grew and access to social services for all 
citizens improved markedly. Zimbabwe became home to the most educated workforce on the continent. 
Within 5 years of independence, nearly all children of primary school age were enrolled and more than 
80% of eligible students were moving on to secondary school.117 Simultaneously Mugabe and ZANU had 
set about consolidating power. The Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland were undertaken by ZANU 
militias and the 5th brigade in the early 1980s to remove the opposition posed by the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) who drew most of their support from this region. After decimating ZAPUs 
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support base, ZANU forced the party into a coalition, which effectively swallowed and silenced the 
opposition – it was at this point that ZANU adopted the suffix ‘PF’ for Patriotic Front. Elections in the 
1980s were regular, though flawed, and electoral participation was high due to high levels of legitimacy 
in spite of extensive political intimidation and the violence in Matabeleland.118 The Zimbabwean political 
system at this time may be characterised as an electoral authoritarian regime. 
During this decade, Mugabe introduced a number of constitutional amendments which centralised 
power in the presidency. In 1986 the constitution was changed to give the president powers to legislate 
unilaterally, creating an executive presidency by merging the posts of President and Prime Minister.119 
The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1987 also changed the electoral system from one based on 
proportional representation to a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. This system is well known for 
entrenching one-party dominance and leads to an increase in the zero-sum nature of electoral 
competition. 
The 1990s would not be as kind to ZANU-PF. When the Lancaster House Agreement expired in April 
1990, it removed a number of constraints regarding land reform and the constitution of the 
government. In response to the re-emergence of a small opposition party prior to the 1990 elections, 
ZANU-PF resorted to underhanded tactics to win at the polls. They monopolised the airwaves, disrupted 
opposition rallies, directed state resources to the election campaign and resorted to violence; state 
security agents assassinated the national organising secretary of the emergent opposition just days 
before the polls.120 Mugabe later used the power of the presidency to pardon members of youth groups 
and security forces who were convicted of electoral violence,121 this period can be seen as a precursor to 
the practices used extensively in the first decade of the 21st century. It also marked the beginning of 
voter apathy in Zimbabwe, where citizens expected that a ZANU-PF win was a foregone conclusion and 
many began to refrain from voting.  
ZANU-PF also began to actively politicise the state. The Politburo and Central Committee of the party 
(modelled on the Stalinist communist party structures) usurped the policy-making roles of Cabinet and 
parliament, ensuring that the party dominated almost every political institution in the country.122 The 
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politicisation of state institutions increased with the economic decline brought on by global economic 
hardships and the strictures of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) instituted by the 
International Monetary Fund. The liberalisation of the economy and the plan to finance the ESAP 
through growth in exports failed, which led to increasing fiscal and current account deficits.123 This 
programme required the reduction of salary payments to civil servants and retrenchment of many; this 
led to many competent technocrats opting for early retirement schemes.124 ZANU-PF then chose to fill 
vacant posts with individuals who displayed strong loyalty to the party rather than those with the 
necessary technical skills; the bureaucracy became politicised and filled with functionaries who could be 
depended upon to do the party’s bidding. While the ESAP had led to de-industrialisation, growing 
unemployment and the erosion of living standards, conspicuous consumption by the ruling elite and the 
removal of subsidies on food, education and healthcare were worsening the national crisis.125 
This led to increasing fraud, corruption and nepotism within state structures. The state remains the 
most valuable prize in African politics as private sector opportunities are limited and public office 
remains the most reliable means by which to accumulate wealth.126 This also explains the politics of 
survival which emerged in Zimbabwe, as party functionaries used access to the state to acquire wealth 
and a loss at the polls would translate into a loss of livelihood, party and government functionaries could 
not countenance a loss of political power. In defence of the status quo, ZANU-PF began to 
institutionalise its patriotic nationalism, claiming to be the only legitimate power-holders and 
demonising political opponents as treasonous enemies of the people and of the project of national 
liberation.127  
As government became increasingly characterised by fraud, nepotism and a culture of impunity in an 
atmosphere where economic hardship was on the rise for the majority of citizens, the late 1990s saw 
the rise of labour militancy and increasing dissatisfaction with ZANU-PF governance. In 1997, the war 
veterans of the liberation struggle – a key ZANU-PF constituency – began a revolt.128 They demanded 
economic support from the state and protested at their exclusion from state patronage, particularly 
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when it emerged that the War Victims Compensation fund had been emptied by corrupt state 
officials.129 The president could not afford to lose this key constituency that could be mobilised to enlist 
support for the party and enforce discipline, he conceded to their demands for exorbitant compensation 
and this unbudgeted expenditure led to a crash in the Zimbabwean dollar and began a pattern of politics 
which would define the following decade.130 In an attempt to regain his reputation as an eminent 
statesman and placate the increasingly restless security forces and securocrats, Mugabe sent troops to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 to prop up the regime of Laurent Kabila.131 Mugabe then fell 
upon the mineral wealth in the DRC as a means to uplift his ailing economy. While this process was 
successful in generating enormous wealth for certain members of the security cabal, it was disastrous 
for the Zimbabwean fiscus. In the coming decade, economic rationality and the nation’s well-being 
would be sacrificed time and again at the altar of political survival. 
The Politics of Survival 
The late 1990s were characterised by increasing popular dissatisfaction and social unrest, it was a time 
of worsening economic crisis compounded by imprudent financial policies. In 1997 there emerged a 
body called the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) which represented a major step forward in the 
direction of civic action. Its intention was to raise awareness of the inadequacy of the Lancaster House 
constitution and the need to create a new national charter.132 Following from this resurgence of civic 
action, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) announced the formation of a new political 
party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The MDC was a broad coalition made up of 
civil society, trade union representatives and former ZANU-PF cadres. In 2000 Morgan Tsvangirai, chair 
of the NCA and ZCTU Secretary General, was elected president of the nascent opposition movement. 
ZANU-PF faced an emerging opposition party, but the cracks were beginning to show within the party as 
well. It was clear from the 1996 presidential election that ZANU-PF support was waning, in spite of 
garnering more than 90% of the vote, rival candidates had withdrawn from the race due to irregularities 
and barely a third of all registered voters turned out at the polls.133  Within the party, a succession battle 
had begun to open rifts in its formerly cohesive fabric.  
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The constitutional referendum of 2000 marked a watershed in Zimbabwe’s political history and culture 
and led to ZANU-PF finally abandoning all remaining pretence of tolerance towards opposition parties. 
The NCA proposed a draft constitution which reduced presidential powers and introduced much-needed 
reforms. The government-appointed Constitutional Commission then presented its draft which retained 
the executive presidency and the repressive legislation of the Lancaster House Constitution and allowed 
for increased powers to censor the press and restrict individual rights. The government put this draft to 
a referendum in February 2000, and following its defeat by the emergent MDC who spear-headed the 
‘No’ campaign, the Mugabe regime unleashed its violent campaign of fear, dispossession and 
intimidation. The implications of this loss were profound for ZANU-PF, who was to face a general 
election in June 2000. White farmers and their employees were seen to be a key constituency for the 
MDC and ZANU-PF believed that they had played a key role in their first ever loss at the polls.134 The 
invasions of white-owned farms began within days of the outcome of the referendum. 
The Politics of land 
Issues over land had long been a powder-keg in Zimbabwe. The Lancaster House Agreement had 
restrained the incoming elite from redistributing land until the expiry of the agreement in 1990. At 
independence, 42% of the land was owned by some 6 000 commercial farmers, the vast majority of 
whom were white.135 Following the 1990 constitutional amendment allowing government to purchase 
land at set prices without leave for appeal, and the 1992 Land Settlement Act, the government’s hand 
was strengthened with regards to land restitution, and property rights were no longer formally 
guaranteed. From 1990, land was an important issue in successive elections but few benefitted from 
restitution measures other than senior politicians, military officials and ministers.136 Just days after the 
constitutional referendum in February 2000, the government announced its Fast Track Land Reform 
Process. This process led to the removal of thousands of white farmers and black farm workers from 
their land, this process was used to systematically purge commercial farms, particularly in areas where 
the MDC received substantial support from farmers and workers.137 The redistribution of land was used 
to satisfy key ZANU-PF constituencies and individuals and to shore up support for the party ahead of the 
June elections. Indeed land seizures have since been a key part of election preparations; they are 
dramatically stepped up ahead of polls. ZANU-PF has repeatedly used the land question to remind the 
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populace of its liberation history, using the land issue to tap into people’s emotions and remind them of 
the key role of the ruling party. This land reform process resulted in widespread human rights abuses, 
the displacement of approximately 400 000 farm labourers and their families, and the formation of 
militia bases on the farms from which the state would launch an intimidation and repression campaign 
ahead of the election.138 This led to the international pariah status of the Zimbabwean government and 
the decision in 2001 of the USA and EU to place targeted travel and economic sanctions on members of 
Mugabe’s inner circle, sanctions that would still be in place in January 2012. The land reform process 
was a crucial victory in Mugabe’s campaign for political survival, but had disastrous effects on the 
agriculture export-dependent economy; foreign investment fled, manufacturing largely collapsed, 
unemployment skyrocketed and the economy came to a virtual standstill. 
The Militarisation of the State and the Rise of the JOC 
In the face of increasing external and internal pressures, Mugabe openly began to align himself with 
conservatives, hardliners and extremists in the form of the war veterans, party securocrats and 
traditional leaders. ZANU-PF’s nationalist ideology was reinvented in a more authoritarian, selective and 
racialised discourse of citizenship and belonging.139 ZANU-PF began to frame the MDC as the result of a 
white colonialist plot trying to subvert ‘his revolution’. In a speech to the party central committee in 
2000 Mugabe stated: 
“The MDC should never be judged or characterised by its black trade union face; by its youthful 
student face; by its black suburban professionals; never by its rough and violent high-density 
[urban] elements. It is much deeper, whiter and wider than these human super-fices; for it is 
immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or 
unwittingly the repulsive ideology of return to white settler rule... It is a counter-revolutionary 
Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our 
people yesterday.”
140
 
These pressures ensured the increased violence of the following decade and resulted in the increased 
militarisation and militancy of state institutions and the ruling elite. 
The country’s particular liberation history would have profound repercussions for the nature and 
composition of the post-independence state. At independence, the ZANU regime chose to retain the 
legislation and practices of the repressive white regime. From the 1990s and the wide scale withdrawal 
of the technocrats from public office, the easiest means by which to attain public office was to have 
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‘liberation credentials’, that is to have participated in the liberation struggle of the 1980s.141 The 
Commissioner General of Police, Commander of the Airforce, the Commander of the National Army, 
Commander of the Armed Forces, Commissioner of the Prison Services and the head of the increasingly 
important Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) all had impeccable liberation credentials, and were a 
part of Mugabe’s inner circle. From the time in which Mugabe’s hold on power became less assured, the 
electoral authoritarian regime hardened, the ruling cabal became more restive, “the polity became 
militarised and the military was politicised.”142 Though military commanders had always occupied seats 
on the central decision-making bodies, they had remained behind the scenes until 2000. Following the 
uncertainty of the political survival of the elite, military officers began to be deployed to strategic 
political posts formerly occupied by civilians.143 In 2001, a senior ZANU-PF judge advocate from the 
Zimbabwe National Army was appointed to the High Court, in 2004 he was moved to the head of the 
Delimitation Commission to demarcate voting constituencies ahead of the 2005 election and when the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was created in 2005, he was appointed as its inaugural chair.144 
Serving or retired military officials were also appointed to the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe and the Grain Marketing Board. 
By the early 2000s, it was apparent that the civilian Cabinet was no longer in complete control, it had 
been side-lined in favour of the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The JOC had originated in the colonial 
era as a counter-insurgency coordination organ chaired by the army commander.145 It is composed of 
heads of the army, police force, air force, intelligence services and prisons and it reports directly to the 
president; it sees its mandate as discussing and dealing with any issue that impacts on national security 
(which is very broadly defined) and often unilaterally announces ‘Operation X’ or ‘Operation Y’ to be 
carried out by the security arms of the state.146 This mode of governance emerged with the fast track 
land reform process but soon became standard operating procedure. The JOC and the ruling party’s 
officials are deeply fused; they rely on the CIO and military intelligence to police the population while 
relying on the police force to stifle dissent. In addition to this, the war veterans and youth militias known 
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as the ‘Green Bombers’ have been used as an extra-judicial source of repression and intimidation.147 
Repression and intimidation would be stepped up in the years between 2000 and 2008. 
Elections as Periods of Increased Violence 
Zimbabwean elections in the new millennium were characterised by increasing levels of state-sponsored 
violence. The parliamentary elections of 2000 and presidential election in 2002 were marred by the full 
deployment of government and extra-judicial forces to intimidate and decimate the opposition; many 
analysts believe that the MDC may have won these elections if it had not been for the use of force, the 
‘restructuring’ of civil society and the manipulation of vote counting.148 ZANU-PF retained its 
incumbency, but had lost its two-thirds majority in parliament. In 2004, the leadership succession 
struggle within the ruling party was heating up; it came to a head with a split in the party between those 
who supported Joyce Mujuru and those who were backing Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mugabe was able to 
defuse these tensions, but the split would remain in the party structures, and would have lasting 
consequences for the 2008 power sharing agreement and ensuing GNU. 
By 2005, Mugabe had firmly re-established control by suppressing and controlling the media, closing the 
democratic space, unleashing widespread violence against opposition parties and stacking the judiciary 
with sympathetic judges.149 Mugabe regained his two-thirds majority in parliament and undertook 
another violent campaign to undermine the opposition’s core constituencies. The JOC undertook 
‘Operation Murambatsvina’ in May 2005 which uprooted and decimated the livelihoods of an estimated 
700 000 people living in informal settlements in urban areas. Following the reintroduction of the Senate 
and the ensuing debate within MDC structures, the opposition fractured and split into two factions, 
MDC-T under Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC-M/N under Arthur Mutambara and Welshman Ncube. The 
split in the party would undermine its electoral support and diminish its negotiating power vis-à-vis the 
ruling party during the 2008 mediation. 
Things Fall Apart 
By 2007, the economy had collapsed. Runaway inflation, a feature of the Zimbabwean economy reached 
a high of 231 million percent due to the Reserve Bank Policy of printing additional money to offset rising 
prices. Unemployment was at over 90% and there was an acute cholera epidemic due to the failure of 
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the water reticulation systems.150 All basic services had crumbled, electricity blackouts were a daily 
occurrence, up to half the population was dependent on aid and basic commodities and medicines were 
either unavailable or unaffordable. Even as the country collapsed, Mugabe’s elite continued to prosper; 
their preferential access to trading and import licenses, land, urban housing, petrol products, basic 
commodities and even foreign exchange allowed them to turn over small fortunes when they sold these 
products on the black market at hugely inflated prices.151 A mass migration to South Africa occurred 
when as many as a quarter of all Zimbabweans crossed the borders in search of a means by which to 
save their starving families. Governance broke down as poorly paid public workers absconded from their 
positions to take up places in fuel lines or undertook illicit work for better pay. Zimbabwe was a virtual 
collapsed state.  
As the economy and society collapsed, the elite tightened its grip on power. A loss of state power would 
mean a loss of economic power and possible destitution. The stakes of political survival had been raised 
even higher. In 2006 and 2007, the democratic space was restricted even further. When in 2007, a rally 
of the ‘Save Zimbabwe Campaign’ composed of civil society organisations and the MDC was halted and 
activists were arrested and brutally beaten, the pictures were broadcast around the world and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) was finally persuaded to intervene.152 Mediation and 
negotiations to end the violence was undertaken by SADC under the guiding hand of South African 
President Thabo Mbeki. By the end of 2007, the parties had signed a draft constitution, agreed to 
legislative reforms and discussed a range of important issues; regional leaders were optimistic that the 
initiative would bear fruit.153The MDC’s main objective was to have the new constitution guaranteeing 
basic freedoms in place prior to the holding of another election and the ruling party had accepted in 
principle that the election date would be determined by the time necessary to finalise and implement 
the new constitution.154  
It is apparent that Mugabe had agreed to negotiate with the MDC in the hope that participation in the 
mediation efforts would lead the international community to remove or reduce the sanctions which 
were crippling his regime. While the mediation continued, in December 2007 the USA and Australia 
expanded their targeted sanctions, giving lie to the aspirations of the incumbent. With no remaining 
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incentive to carry through the reforms, Mugabe announced that harmonised (presidential, 
parliamentary and local government) elections would be held on 29 March 2008, long before the 
constitution would be finalised. The failure of the agreement had been a result of Mugabe’s 
intransigence and negotiation in bad faith, but also due to Mbeki’s reticence and failure to press 
Mugabe for further concessions.155 The MDC had also been at fault, divisions between the two factions 
had led to the lack of a united front from which to push for reform, they failed to rally their supporters 
and exert extra pressures on the regime. 
The 2008 election was a high-stakes game. The ruling party was experiencing serious internal 
convulsion, evidenced by the announcement that ZANU-PF member Simba Makoni intended to contest 
the presidency with significant support from moderate party heavy-weights.156 Mugabe needed a two-
thirds parliamentary majority to ensure that he could pick his successor and ensure his long-term 
political future. The run-up to the elections was characterised by a reduction of state-sponsored 
repression, but the continued manipulation of food aid to buy votes.157 The media remained under state 
control while constituency demarcation, voter registration and education, inspection of the voters roll 
and the party primaries were all deeply flawed.158 The judiciary was heavily weighted in favour of the 
ruling party while the ZEC was controlled almost entirely by party functionaries. Prior to the elections 
President Mugabe had stated that “the MDC shall never be allowed to rule this country... Only God, who 
appointed me, will remove me...”159 In spite of this, the political space had been opened significantly 
due to the presence of international and regional observers and voters were excited to cast their ballots.  
The voting day passed peacefully and few expected the events that were to follow. The MDC had 
managed to secure a provision that all voting results would be posted on the doors of the voting 
stations, leading to increased transparency in terms of vote counting procedures. As the parliamentary 
results were announced, it became clear that the MDC had won a majority in parliament, 99 seats to 
ZANU’s 97. The balance of power was held by Arthur Mutambara’s breakaway MDC which won 10 seats 
in the lower house. The announcing of the presidential result was far less straightforward; the 
announcement was suspiciously delayed with the ZEC announcing that the MDC had garnered 48% to 
Mugabe’s 43%; neither had achieved the absolute majority necessary and a constitutionally-mandated 
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run-off election was scheduled for June 2008. In response to its loss at the polls and the possibility of the 
MDC winning the second round of elections, the ruling party undertook vicious crackdown codenamed 
‘Operation Mahvotera Papi’ (How Did You Vote?). More than 100 MDC officials were killed, thousands 
were injured in politically-motivated beatings, an untold number were ‘disappeared’, most likely by 
state security operatives, and up to 200 000 people were displaced.160 In response, Tsvangirai withdrew 
from the race; the resulting election saw Mugabe win the one-man contest with 85% of the vote in an 
election which even African leaders could no longer endorse. Bratton and Masunungure (2011) assert 
that reliable reports suggest that Zimbabwe’s top military cabal seized political control of the state in 
the wake of the March elections.161 Reports suggest that Mugabe had informed his security chiefs that 
he would step down and concede the victory to the MDC, but that the commander of the Zimbabwe 
Defence Force, the police chief, air force head and head of the prisons had vetoed his proposal and 
insisted on the run-off. 
In June 2008, Tsvangirai suggested that “the country has witnessed a de facto coup d’etat and is now 
effectively ruled by a military junta.”162 Bratton and Masunungure (2011) characterise the resultant 
regime as a civilian-military coalition, a product of the liberation struggle but also of the overwhelming 
desire to retain power at all costs. Anecdotal evidence from a number of sources suggests that the 
securocrats are firmly in control of the Zimbabwean state, and are still willing to do all that is necessary 
to maintain a grip on the levers of power. Following the flawed election and widespread violence, 
regional and continental leaders insisted on the creation of a power sharing agreement between the 
three major political factions; the resulting government would be wracked by divisions and plagued by 
deadlock, this will be dealt with later in the paper. 
Conclusion 
The Zimbabwean crisis leading to the power sharing agreement of September 2008 was a crisis with 
deep historical roots. The history of the struggle for liberation and the unresolved ‘land question’ would 
play important parts in Zimbabwe’s post-independence history. The militarisation of the state had 
begun in the 1980s and been stepped up in periods of crisis and real electoral competition, leading to 
the civilian-military hybrid regime that characterised the government from 2000 – 2008. Imprudent 
fiscal policies and global financial imperatives undermined the Zimbabwean economy and encouraged 
the crisis of legitimacy that led to the formation of the country’s first real electoral threat to ZANU-PF 
                                                          
160
 Bratton, M. & Masunungure, E. 2011, p. 30 
161
 Ibid 
162
 Ibid, p. 31 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 53 
 
dominance. An elite bent on retaining power at all costs destroyed the economy and bankrupted 
society, it remains to be seen if the Global Political Agreement will be able to repair this blighted system 
and restore the country to a semblance of normalcy.  
Conclusion 
While there are substantial similarities between the two cases, there are also crucial differences. The 
Kenyan crisis was precipitated by a number of long-term trends which were ignited by short-term 
triggers. Although the violence was largely a result of the politicisation of ethnicity following a period of 
elite fragmentation, there had been an extensive history of cross-party collaboration. This would have 
important implications for the resulting agreement. In Zimbabwe, the perennial political crises were 
precipitated by fierce antagonism amongst the ruling ZANU-PF towards the opposition which was 
viewed as a threat to their political and thus economic survival. This threat encouraged the militarisation 
of politics and the emergence of a siege mentality amongst the liberation elite. Following from its 
decreasing support at the polls, the regime increased its reliance on coercion to retain its incumbency 
and created a discourse of liberation nationalism to legitimise the status quo. While in Kenya, the 
violence had been perpetrated by a number of people across class, ethnic and political divides; in 
Zimbabwe the violence was the result of a state-sponsored crackdown on the opposition and their 
perceived support base. In both cases, a long history of violence, corruption and patronage politics had 
created elites that would be resistant to efforts to hold perpetrators accountable or bring justice to 
victims. This would not bode well for long term reconciliation or transitional justice. 
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Introduction 
Prior to a discussion of the implementation of the agreements, it is necessary to reflect both on the 
process that engendered the agreements and the provisions and structure of the documents. The 
mediation process is invariably characterised by disagreement and deadlock, and the way in which the 
negotiator manages the competing interests of the principals is of vital importance for the future of the 
accord. The likelihood of the creation of a functional government and the full implementation of the 
accord can often be gauged early on from an analysis of the agreement and its provisions. As suggested 
by Mehler (2009), the extent or degree of power sharing is an important variable in the success of these 
accords.163 He suggests that these agreements - particularly in the wake of electoral crisis - often do not 
sufficiently alter the nature of power relations. Thus, it is vitally important to look at these agreements 
to determine the degree to which they recalibrate the structures and divisions of power to create an 
environment which allows for the implementation of the reforms. This chapter will seek to achieve 
three things. It will begin with a discussion of the process through which the agreement was reached. It 
will then discuss the documents themselves and the ways in which they would hinder implementation 
and challenge the functioning of the unity governments. Finally, this chapter will seek to delineate the 
progress made in both cases to implement the provisions of the power sharing agreements. The 
following two chapters will then attempt to outline the factors that contributed to the relative success 
or failure of the documents. 
Kenya 
Introduction 
The process which led to the signing of the Kenyan power sharing agreement otherwise known as the 
‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ was fraught with setbacks and 
disagreements between the principals. Finally, after 41 days of mediation, the agreement was signed on 
28 February 2008 by PNU leader Mwai Kibaki and ODM principal Raila Odinga in the presence of 
mediator and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, African Union head and Tanzanian President 
Jakaya Kikwete and former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. The piece of legislation which would 
bring the power sharing government into existence was signed the same day and entitled The National 
Accord and Reconciliation Act. Rather than constituting a single document, the power-sharing 
negotiations resulted in the creation of ten separate documents, each detailing a different aspect of the 
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crisis. Altogether they have been designated as the outcomes of the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation, and they address issues such as the constitutional review process, immediate security 
concerns and humanitarian aid, the power sharing formulation as well as pertinent issues which 
contributed to the crisis such as unemployment, national unity and land reform. This chapter will briefly 
describe the negotiations process and the ways in which the outcomes were determined by both 
national and international actors. Following this, it will discuss the way in which the document was 
structured and how this has impacted on the implementation process. Finally this chapter will aim to 
trace the implementation of the commitments in the agreement, particularly those relating to power 
sharing and electoral and constitutional reform. 
Negotiations 
The violence that broke out in Kenya in late 2007 took many in the international community by surprise. 
In spite of this, there was a rapid response from both African and international personalities, who 
immediately intervened to try to restore stability and resolve the disagreements between the ODM and 
PNU. The procession of interested persons began with the arrival of Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu on 2 January 2008, just days after the first outbreaks of violence. He was soon followed 
by US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, former heads of state Tanzania’s Benjamin Mkapa, 
Mozambique’s Joachim Chissano, Botswana’s Katumile Masire and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda as well as 
AU Chairman and Ghanaian President John Kufour. The multiplicity of actors served only to complicate 
efforts to find a diplomatic solution.164 Following the failure of John Kufour’s efforts, the AU chief 
personally wrote a letter to former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, requesting that he 
take on the position of AU Special Advisor and Chief Mediator of the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities (PEAP) in the mediation process.165 Annan possessed a number of exemplary qualities 
alongside years of mediation experience, which made him the best possible choice of mediator. He is an 
internationally renowned personality with strong moral authority and the ability to mobilise a wide 
range of human and financial resources to enable the mediation process.166 Annan’s strengths as a 
mediator were also supplemented by his embeddedness in broad global structures of authority and 
leverage.167 The other members of the mediation team and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, 
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former President Benjamin Mkapa and former first lady Graca Machel, were also inspired choices. 
Mkapa represented the power of geographical proximity and was familiar with the principals and 
pertinent issues, whilst Machel’s strong international reputation and experience in dealing with 
intransigent parties helped to disarm the principals at crucial points in the mediation.168 Between them, 
the members of the mediation team presented a powerful force of legitimacy and moral rectitude which 
commanded the respect and cooperation of Kibaki and Odinga. Additionally, Annan invited members of 
private firms such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue to bolster the team’s mediation capacity and 
provide technical support during the process. This will be looked at in more detail in Chapter 5. 
The strength of the negotiating team was bolstered by a high degree of pressure placed on the parties 
by international actors. While the mediation was initiated by the AU, the Panel had realised that in order 
for it to be successful, it needed the support of vital members of the international community, including 
African nations, the US, European Union and the United Nations.169 While the AU’s swift response to the 
crisis was a crucial factor in preventing further escalation of the crisis, the pressure placed on the 
principals by the international community was crucial in reining in contumacy and forcing a compromise 
between the two parties. The consensus within the community of states around the crisis created a 
formidable pressure group which generated momentum for the process, provided a pool of resources 
and exerted pressure for the parties to find a solution to end the violence.170  
This pressure was evident initially through the efforts of US Assistant Secretary of State, Jendayi Frazer, 
who was one of the first international personalities to travel to the crisis-wracked country. The USA was 
a pivotal actor in pushing the principals to the negotiating table. During the mediation period, the US 
Congress held a hearing on Kenya; Nairobi received both Jendayi Frazer and Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice and the principals received a number of direct messages from President Bush, urging 
them to continue the search for solutions within the ambit of the AU mediation process.171 The US 
government also issued a number of ambiguous and somewhat threatening statements suggesting that 
it may take action to resolve the crisis. On such example was the call by Jendayi Frazer in late February 
for an “external solution” without giving details of what such a solution might entail.172 Statements by 
Condoleezza Rice reinforced the stance that failure would not be countenanced and that the future 
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relationships of both parties with the US government would depend on “their cooperation to achieve 
this political solution.”173 The US pressured the parties by implicitly suggesting that less appealing 
alternatives to the mediation were still on the table, including unilateral action and the imposition of 
sanctions through the UN Security Council through its statement that the country was “exploring a wide 
range of options.”174  
Other international actors such as the World Bank and European Union (EU) placed great pressure on 
the government of Kenya by threatening to suspend assistance in the absence of a negotiated 
settlement to the crisis. The EU took a particularly strong stance by stating that “until a legitimate 
solution is agreed, the EU and its member states cannot conduct business as usual with Kenya.”175 The 
EU, World Bank and the African Development Bank each released statements of concern over the 
economic and political repercussions of the violence and encouraged the political leaders to seek a 
viable long term solution through the AU-Annan mediation effort. 
The most sustained pressure and backing for the AU initiative came from the United Nations (UN). This 
began with a UN Security Council briefing on the situation on 30 January 2008, following which the 
council issued a statement calling for the country’s leaders to act decisively to end the violence and 
restore stability.176 The following day, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon addressed the UN General 
Assembly to underscore the need to resolve the crisis and pledge UN support for the mediation process. 
On 1 February, Ban flew to Nairobi to meet with Annan, Kibaki and Odinga and show his support for the 
initiative while emphasising that the international community was eagerly awaiting a resolution to the 
crisis. The UN Security Council issued statements commending the AU-led mediation and the multi-
nation body provided technical assistance in the form of staff members who assisted with analysis, 
policy advice and provided general staff support to the mediation team.177 This pressure by international 
actors encouraged Kenya’s political leaders to stay the course, and it helped to level the playing field by 
creating incentives for cooperation rather than conflict. 
There are a number of reasons for the sustained pressure by the international community. As noted 
above, the violence in Kenya took the international community by surprise as the country had always 
been seen as a beacon of stability and democracy in a region often wracked by turmoil. It seemed to 
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become an issue of ‘drawing a line in the sand,’ the consensus was that if Kenya could suffer such a 
crisis, what were the implications for the rest of the region and indeed the continent? Support for the 
mediation was seen as a battle for the protection of democracy in Kenya, seen by many as a model for 
the continent.178 Kenya is also particularly important from a geostrategic perspective. It is a key partner 
of the USA and front line state in the ‘war against terror’ as well as being an important regional base for 
US interests in the region. Kenya hosts the largest US diplomatic mission in sub-Saharan Africa, this 
mission houses 18 federal agencies and offices. Kenya also hosts the third largest UN headquarters with 
over 1 000 international staff and a humanitarian logistics hub for the region, with all international 
assistance programmes for the Greater Horn of Africa being organised out of Nairobi. The collapse of 
Kenyan infrastructure would have had dire consequences for major humanitarian theatres such as those 
in the Eastern DRC, Somalia and South Sudan.179 The crisis in the country had also held negative 
consequences for landlocked countries which rely on the country for trade and aid supplies, such as the 
Eastern DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan. The continued crisis threatened to exacerbate 
problems within the region. Finally there was a sense that unwieldy intervention from Western states 
may push Kenya further towards China, whose influence in the region and within Kenya was growing 
significantly. Each of these factors contributed to the support of the international community for the 
AU-led mediation efforts and explains the sustained pressure placed upon the parties to support and 
encourage a negotiated settlement. In spite of the initial gulf separating the stances of Kibaki and 
Odinga, a confluence of factors came together to produce success in the form of the signing of the 
Kenyan Accord.180 
The Kenyan National Accord of 28 February 2008  
Following 41 days of mediation, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga signed a document on 28 February 
entitled the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’, which would lay 
the basis for the Grand Coalition government. In contrast to the Zimbabwean power-sharing agreement 
which was a single document covering all the issues to be addressed by the unity government, the 
Kenyan Accord181 was made up of ten documents which were signed over a period of four months. Each 
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document deals with a specific issue addressed by the four agenda’s developed by the mediation team. 
Agenda One involved the immediate cessation of hostilities and the restoration of fundamental human 
rights; Agenda Two involved addressing the humanitarian crisis and promoting national reconciliation; 
Agenda Three was concerned with negotiations to overcome the immediate political crisis; and Agenda 
Four dealt with the development of long-term strategies for durable peace.182 Agenda’s One and Two 
were resolved by 4 February, while the contentious issue of power sharing at the heart of Agenda Three 
proved to be particularly difficult to negotiate. This issue became protracted and the negotiations were 
marked by brinkmanship, prevarication and delays – mostly on the side of government/the PNU who 
were reluctant to share power equitably. The negotiations over Agenda Three consumed more than 
three weeks of the negotiations process, and the outcome was seen as the culmination of the mediation 
process. When the mediation teams were deadlocked, Annan side-lined the hardliners by negotiating 
directly with the principals in isolation from their parties. The agreement was finally hammered out in 
the presence of the AU chair and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, the former Tanzanian President 
Benjamin Mkapa and mediator, Kofi Annan. Each of these actors provided the legitimacy and the 
leverage that would ensure the cooperation of the principals. On 28 February, the principals signed both 
the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government and the National Accord 
and Reconciliation Act which would be passed into law by Parliament and give effect to the Partnership 
Agreement. 
General 
While the negotiation process has been seen as a resounding success, the agreement that it produced 
has not been without its faults. The agreement did not provide for an institutional mechanism to 
mediate conflict between the two parties or stipulate the organisation or party that would be tasked 
with ensuring the implementation of the agreement. This has meant that when discussions in 
government stalemated, such as those during the division of cabinet posts in April 2008, Kofi Annan was 
recalled by the principals to mediate a solution to the impasse. Later, the AU mandated the PEAP to 
continue to oversee the process in Kenya, although this was not written into the documents or agreed 
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to by the principals. The lack of a monitoring and enforcement mechanism defined in the document 
alongside the ambiguity of the agreement as discussed below, has meant that the implementation of 
the agreement has largely been contingent on the political will of the parties involved. The agreement 
also failed to stipulate how long the coalition government would last, and what would happen if it 
collapsed prior to new elections scheduled for 2012. This created substantial uncertainty over these 
issues. 
In spite of the failure to stipulate the creation of a monitoring mechanism within the document, Annan 
undertook to have civil society act as a monitoring party and his clever manipulation of which parties 
would be attendant at monitoring and implementation meetings has led to increased pressure on the 
principals to enforce the agreement. This will be looked at in more depth in chapter 5.  
The Structure of Government 
The agreement allowed for the creation of the posts of Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers. 
The Deputy Prime Ministers would be appointed by the two parties, one by the ODM and one by the 
PNU. The cabinet would consist of the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, the two Deputy 
Prime Ministers and the other ministers and the removal of the members of cabinet would be subject to 
consultation between the principals and concurrence in writing. The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime 
Ministers were insulated from reneging by the provision that they could only be removed by the 
National Assembly’s passing of a vote of no confidence via simple majority. The principle of power 
sharing was further entrenched by the provision that “the composition of the coalition government will 
at all times take into account the principle of portfolio balance and will reflect their relative 
parliamentary strength.”183 Finally, it stipulated that the coalition government would only be dissolved if 
the tenth parliament is dissolved or if the parties agree in writing, or lastly if one of the coalition 
partners withdraw from the coalition.184  
The National Accord and Reconciliation Act which was to embed the new power-sharing arrangement 
within the constitution failed to delineate the role of the newly-created position of Prime Minister which 
set the stage for political wrangling following the constituting of the Grand Coalition government.185 The 
Act stated that the Prime Minister “shall have authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of 
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the functions and affairs of the Government of Kenya, including those of the Ministries,” and “shall 
perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President or under any written law.”186 This 
lack of clarity created opportunities for conflict and brinkmanship between the President, Prime 
Minister, the Vice President and the two Deputy Prime Ministers as each vied for power and tried to 
outmanoeuvre the other. This has also created tension with regards to the remuneration of the Prime 
Minister, as the PNU suggests that it should be equal to the Vice President, while the ODM suggests that 
it should be equal to the President, in keeping with the spirit of the Accord.187 The lack of clarity over the 
role of the Prime Minister has also created conflict with the Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the 
Cabinet over a perceived duplication of duties and a lack of a distinct hierarchy within government.188 
These tensions and the power struggles between the parties led to the perception that there is a ‘two-
in-one-government’ where the PNU is more powerful than the ODM.189 
In addition to the problem highlighted above, the agreement fails to clarify important concepts on which 
the coalition government is built. The meanings of ‘portfolio balance’ and ‘composition of the coalition 
government’ are not clarified or defined at all in the agreement, or even in the Interpretations and 
General Provisions Act in Chapter 2 of the former Constitution. The failure to define these concepts has 
led to differing interpretations between the two parties according to self-interest. Some have argued 
that portfolio balance means that the positions in cabinet and the civil service should be shared equally, 
rather than according to the electoral strength of the parties as determined by the 2007 parliamentary 
elections. While these issues ceased to be a major stumbling block for the coalition government after 
approximately 18 months, they served to undermine public confidence in the power sharing 
arrangement and undermine public perceptions regarding government effectiveness.190 
Legislation 
The main goal of the National Accord was to create the necessary conditions under which a unity 
government could undertake far-reaching reforms and address the root causes of the conflict.191 Under 
the accord, the parties agreed to implement a number of reforms, including a constitutional review, 
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police, judicial, parliamentary, executive and civil service reforms; a land review; they pledged to fight 
unemployment, poverty, inequality and regional imbalances; the parties committed to promote 
transparency and accountability while fighting impunity and finally, they committed to encouraging 
national cohesion and promoting reconciliation.192 Each of these issues was identified as a primary 
determinant of the 2007-2008 crisis and a possible area for conflict and contention in the future.  
The coalition partners agreed to create commissions to make inquiries into the post-election violence 
and to make recommendations on the reform of the electoral institutions. They also committed 
themselves to the creation of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to encourage 
reconciliation and national healing. The extent to which these provisions have been implemented will be 
examined later in this chapter. 
Disarmament 
While the accord proposed reforms to the police and civil service, it failed to address the militarisation 
of Kenyan society that has been an issue since the early 1990s. Peace agreements usually contain 
provisions for the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups, as a means to 
reduce the likelihood of future conflict.193 The National Accord contained no mention of DDR, and this 
has been seen as one of its greatest flaws. The subsequent government’s failure to address the 
proliferation of armed gangs and militias has been a critical fault and these organisations continue to 
pose a threat to the stability of future elections and political processes. Brown (2011) suggests that a 
number of communities, particularly in the conflict-prone Rift Valley region have begun to re-arm 
themselves in anticipation of future attacks, which has led to an escalation of arms and an increasing 
security dilemma for affected communities.194 
A New Constitution 
A number of the documents in the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreements refer to the 
intention to undertake constitutional reforms. The Statement of Principles on Long-Term Issues and 
Solutions signed on 23 May 2008 includes a clause that reaffirmed the principals’ “commitment to 
complete the comprehensive constitutional review process within twelve months in accordance with 
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the roadmap agreed to on 4 March 2008.”195 The 4 March agreement was in fact a two-page document 
outlining the intended constitutional review process. This agreement is entitled “Longer Term Issues and 
Solutions: Constitutional Review,” and it outlines the commitment of the parties to undertake a 
participatory constitutional revision within 12 months of its initiation in parliament. This document 
further stated that the proposed constitution would be passed by parliament prior to a referendum in 
which the Kenyan people would consider the new fundamental law.196 The implementation of these 
provisions and the new constitution will be considered later in this chapter. 
Power Sharing? 
As noted above, in spite of the existence of an explicit agreement on the institution of a power sharing 
agreement, the wording of the document was vague and it left much to be interpreted by the parties to 
the agreement. The negotiations after the signing of the Accord deadlocked over the allocation of 
ministries. Both sides sought to control key ministries such as Finance, Internal Security and Public 
Service amongst others.197 The stalemate threatened to derail the government, and after weeks of 
negotiations, Kofi Annan was called back in to help broker a deal.198 Although it was not a part of the 
initial power sharing agreement, Annan introduced an interesting concept to bridge the rift between the 
feuding parties. In each of the ministries, the top positions would be split equally between the two 
parties, and balance would also be created within each ministry.199 This meant that if the top position 
within a particular ministry was filled by the PNU, the second position would be filled by the ODM and 
vice-versa.200 This is an important addition as it allows each party to keep an eye on the other, increasing 
cooperation and trust while making it difficult for either of the parties to turn a particular ministry into 
their personal fiefdom. The deal led to the creation of an expanded cabinet of 40 posts alongside 50 
assistant ministers, the largest and most expensive in Kenyan history. In spite of the tendency of the 
leaders to suggest that this was a matter of principle, analysts have suggested that this was in fact 
undertaken as a means to increase the avenues for patronage for both parties.201 
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While initial disagreements in the coalition government revolved around the distribution of positions 
and the roles of newly created government positions,202 as the coalition matured the nature of disputes 
changed. The coalition has not seen open disagreements between the principals for some time, and 
rather than the open lobbying between preferred candidates that is seen between mid-range political 
elites, Kibaki and Odinga appear to quietly ‘horse-trade’ and share public positions between their 
preferred candidates.203 The public show of unity between the President and Prime Minister belies 
political undercurrents of competition and mistrust, particularly as the 2012 election draws nearer.204 
While the agreement failed to delineate the role of the Prime Ministerial positions and the early months 
of the agreement witnessed substantial political manoeuvring and bickering, a political culture of 
collusion – which will be looked at in chapter 6 – has led to the relative success of the power-sharing 
agreement. 
Implementation 
The implementation of the Kenyan Accord has been seen to have been largely successful as it served to 
stop the violence seen in 2007 and 2008 and it has witnessed the promulgation of a new constitution 
ratified by a peaceful referendum in August 2010. 
Successes 
Reduction of Conflict 
The immediate reduction of conflict which formed part of Agenda One of the mediation was successful. 
The end of the mediation process saw an end to overt hostilities and a reduction of the conflict that had 
characterised the post-election period. It had also overseen the restoration of human rights and 
freedoms and a return to relative stability. However, as noted above, the government has not 
undertaken a concerted campaign to demilitarise society and demobilise armed groups. There has been 
a failure by police and officials to arrest and prosecute members of these gangs, including those who 
perpetrated the violence that led to the signing of the accord. The likely reason for this failure is that 
many politicians continue to provide support and patronage to these groups and it is not in their interest 
to see them demobilised.205 Although these groups have not been overly active in the four years since 
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the signing of the Kenyan Accord, they remain dormant and can be reactivated with ease if political 
circumstances favour their re-emergence.206 
Review Commissions 
The power sharing agreement required the establishment of a number of commissions. The first was the 
Commission of Enquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), better known as the Waki Commission 
after its chair, Justice Waki. This was one of the most important institutions agreed to by the PNU and 
ODM principals and it would have far-reaching consequences for Kenya’s political landscape. This 
commission produced a report which became an invaluable account of the violence that was 
perpetrated during the two months following the December 2007 elections. It was released in October 
2008 and it documented a wide range of atrocities perpetrated by ODM supporters, PNU supporters and 
police members.207 This report not only provided an account of the violence, but it supplied powerful 
evidence of the guilt of a number of high-ranking politicians and civil servants. One of the commission’s 
recommendations was that a Special Tribunal be established in Kenya to prosecute up to several 
hundred suspected perpetrators. A number of similar commissions from the pre-2007 period had seen 
their reports and recommendations swept under the carpet. To avoid this eventuality, the CIPEV 
commissioners introduced a ‘Trojan horse’ provision to increase the likelihood of implementation.208 
The commission gave the government 105 days to create a tribunal to hold the perpetrators of violence 
to account. In the absence of this the head of the commission, Justice Waki, sent Kofi Annan a sealed 
envelope containing a list of names of people whom the commission had identified as bearing the 
greatest responsibility for the violence. When the Kenyan government repeatedly failed to institute a 
criminal tribunal, Annan passed the list of names to the International Criminal Court’s lead prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo on request that he institute an investigation.  
At the insistence of the ODM, the Kenyan Accord mandated that the principals institute a review 
committee to investigate all aspects of the 2007 election which had led to the worst post-election 
violence in the country’s history. In March 2008, the ODM and PNU negotiators signed the agreement 
on the creation of the Independent Review Committee. This body was mandated to investigate the 
systemic problems which had led to the violence and make recommendations to improve the electoral 
process. The report was issued in September 2008 and made a number of technical recommendations. 
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In spite of the desire of many Kenyan politicians and civil society members to receive a definitive 
account of who had won the election, the committee refrained from the ‘naming and shaming’ of 
politicians with regards to electoral irregularities and did not identify the legitimate winner of the 
election.209 Although this may seem to be a negative outcome, such a finding may instead have reignited 
conflict. Instead, the Independent Review Committee report led to the disbandment of the 
dysfunctional Electoral Commission of Kenya and the appointment of an interim electoral commission as 
well as resulting in the institution of wide-reaching electoral reforms.210 
A New Constitution 
The creation and institution of a new constitution following the referendum held in August 2010 is seen 
as not only the main achievement of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process, 
but it also signifies the potential for the emergence of a new culture in public political life. The 
promulgation of the constitution is not the end of this process however; Schedule 5 of the new 
fundamental law lists 49 pieces of legislation which are needed to bring the constitution into effect.211 
By the end of the first year, parliament had passed 26 of these laws, and had passed several more 
between October and December 2011.  
The creation of two committees to oversee the implementation of the constitution is particularly 
commendable. These bodies are the Constitution Implementation Commission (CIC) and Constitution 
Implementation Oversight Committee (CIOC) which effectively institutionalise the call for robust 
oversight over the implementation of the document.212 Since their creation, these bodies have been at 
the front line of monitoring progress, coordinating processes, reporting, building public participation 
processes and applying pressure on government bodies.213 This is a positive step which has helped to 
keep the creation and promulgation of new legislation on target. 
In spite of these successes, there have been delays with the creation of new legislation. Only 2 bills of 8 
which were to be vetted by 26 February 2012 had been submitted to the Constitutional Implementation 
Commission (CIC) by January 2012. These were the Land Bill and Land Registration Bill.214 South 
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Consulting (2012) suggests that this is an important issue as a pattern of rushing and delay at the 11th 
hour undermines public participation and oversight in the legislative process. The consulting group 
suggests that these delays are attributable to vested interests holding back the finalisation of the 
legislation.215 Current political attention is now focussed on the 2012 elections, and this has led to a 
battle for political and individual interests that is undermining the coherence and unity of the leadership 
in implementing the new provisions.216 There have also been a number of attempts by politicians to 
amend the constitution, which civil society members see as an attempt by the political leadership to 
undermine the creation of a new constitutional dispensation.217 
The new Kenyan constitution has been hailed as a great success, particularly as it has proposed a 
devolved system of government and lessened the powers of the strong executive presidency as 
enshrined in the previous constitution.218 It also introduced a revised bill of rights which enshrines a 
number of socio-economic rights where they had not previously been recognised. The new law also 
introduced reforms to the judicial arm of government by providing for an independent Judiciary Services 
Commission (JSC) and a new vetting process for judges which would serve to undermine attempts to 
exert undue influence upon them.219 This has served to increase public confidence in the judiciary.220 
Electoral Reforms 
Following the dismantling of the ECK and the creation of the new constitution, the government 
instituted the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). This is a crucial development 
considering that it was the failures of the ECK and the perceived partiality of the institution that led to 
the emergence of the post-election violence in 2007. This new commission is responsible for setting 
electoral boundaries, civic education, voter registration and the settling of electoral disputes. It is seen 
as more independent than its predecessor and this has greatly increased the trust of the electorate in 
the institution. Unfortunately, in spite of the recommendations in the Independent Review Commission 
(IREC) report, Kenya has retained its first-past-the-post electoral system, a system which encourages a 
winner-takes-all mentality. While this is not a definite indicator of the likelihood of future violence, 
many analysts have suggested that this electoral system is the most likely to encourage zero-sum 
politics. Additionally, electoral malpractices have still gone unpunished. The Kitutu Masaba by-election 
                                                          
215
 Ibid 
216
 Atta-Asamoah, A & Githaiga, N. 2011.  
217
 South Consulting. 2012, p. 18 
218
 Kersting, N. 2011. “Constitutional Review and Referendums in Kenya,” Africa Insight, 40, 4, pp. 76-77 
219
 Ibid 
220
 South Consulting. 2012, p. 28 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 70 
 
was the first to be held by the new IEBC. In spite of the reforms to the electoral body and system, the 
election saw reports of violence, bribery, vote buying and assault. The IEBC has refrained from taking 
any action on these offences.221 Further, election-related violence has been seen in Rongo, Migori 
County. These signs are problematic, there needs to be heightened political will from the leadership to 
send out a strong message that electoral offences will not be tolerated, particularly prior to and during 
the 2012 election. 
Failures 
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
The failure of the agreement to create conflict resolution mechanisms for the members of the coalition 
was a significant oversight. While the government matured over time, it has not been particularly 
cohesive during much of its four-year tenure.222 In an impressive show of initiative, the coalition 
government undertook to overcome this problem by establishing the Permanent Committee on the 
Management of the Affairs of the Coalition which was composed of six members of each of the parties 
and was jointly chaired by the President and Prime Minister.223 Unfortunately this committee was 
plagued by problems as a result of the selection of participants. Although the committee held a number 
of meetings following its institution in January 2009, these soon faded out and the committee became 
dormant. Internal divisions along power sharing lines threaten to derail the coalition ahead of the 2012 
elections, and it is crucial that this committee is reconstituted.224 
Addressing Impunity 
The KNDR mandated the creation of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). Within a 
week of signing the national agreement, the PNU and ODM reached an agreement which spelled out the 
parameters, principles and composition of this body.225 After a series of delays, the commission did not 
begin hearings until April 2011. These delays were attributed to government foot-dragging, the 
withholding of financial support and the appointment of a controversial ambassador as commission 
chairperson; indeed Bethuel Kiplagat has been implicated in abuses that are within the mandate of the 
commission’s enquiries.226 Additionally, the body was undermined by its extremely broad mandate, 
which was to investigate human and economic rights abuses from independence in 1963 until the 
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signing of the Kenyan Accord in February 2008. Additionally, human rights campaigners have criticised 
the insufficient independence of the institution and the government’s central role in determining 
whether to grant amnesty or prosecute. Compounding these issues, the provisions for witness 
protection are not adequate and are unlikely to induce full disclosure.227 There is a fear by some analysts 
that the report may not adequately fulfil its mandate; it is rushing through to make up for lost time and 
this has led to a failure to allow for in-depth discussion and analysis.228 For example, political 
assassinations were allocated only 2 days of public hearings, in spite of the fact that violations span 
more than 60 years.229 There is a sense that these failings of the commission were not incidental, but 
rather contrived by political actors to undermine the commission and continue to uphold the impunity 
that has been a fundamental factor in Kenyan political society since independence. 
During the four years since the signing of the Kenyan power sharing agreement, few perpetrators of the 
violence have been held accountable. The government has made no concerted effort to bring justice to 
the victims of the violence. Where there have been court cases, these have largely resulted in acquittals 
due to shoddy police work.230 In some cases, evidence has been tampered with and contaminated in 
calculated moves to prevent conviction.231 This means that there is still a widespread sense within Kenya 
that the perpetrators will not be held accountable and that impunity will prevail. 
The failure to address impunity for the post-election violence has been a sore point for the reform 
process. According to South Consulting (2012), it remains the main indicator that Kenya’s political 
culture has not changed fundamentally.232 Indeed Stephen Brown (2011) has described the coalition 
government as the “government of national impunity” as members of both parties – who have been 
equally responsible for human rights abuses and violence – share a common interest in preventing 
accountability for the post-election violence.233 This is why the intervention of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has been welcomed by large sections of Kenyan society. Following the confirmation of 
charges in early 2012 against four prominent Kenyans including Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, there 
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is significant concern over the implications of this process for the 2012 elections.234 Unfortunately, the 
ICC is unable to try middle and low level perpetrators of crimes, and domestic accountability 
(particularly at a local level) remains elusive. 
Land Reforms 
Agenda Four identified land reform as critical to securing sustainable peace and stability in Kenya. The 
Ministry of Land has been preparing draft legislation, but a number of non-governmental stakeholders 
pulled out of the process in September 2011 after protesting that the ministry is not consulting 
adequately and is lacking in commitment to the reform process.235 The Ministry has established the 
Lands Transformation Unit, but stakeholders have again insisted that it is weak and does not have 
sufficient autonomy. Many Kenyans and members of civil society feel that government has been 
particularly slow on land reforms. The National Land Commission, created by Article 67 of the new 
constitution should have been in place by 26 August 2011, and the office of the Commissioner of Lands 
disbanded and amalgamated. Delays with the implementation of the commission have been attributed 
to internal resistance by politicians with vested interests in the land sector, including alleged corruption 
cartels.236 It is likely that politicians are intentionally frustrating the land reform efforts to prevent the 
loss of their own illegally-owned land and possible prosecution. This is a critical deficit as the land 
question was a key ignition point in 2007 and the failure to effect reform in this sector will perpetuate 
the threat of violence. 
Internally Displaced Persons 
A significant focus of Agenda Two of the Accord was addressing the humanitarian crisis. Four years after 
the signing of the agreement, a significant number of the approximately 300 000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) remain displaced. Nearly all of the camps have been closed and the bulk of IDPs have 
been returned to their homes, but thousands who were not able to return to their homes are still 
awaiting land allocation by the government.237 In December 2011, Prime Minister Raila Odinga lamented 
that “the continued existence of IDPs remains a gaping wound on our conscience. Many post-election 
violence victims still live in squalid camps dotted across the country.”238 Government has recognised the 
need to resettle all displaced persons by the next elections in late 2012. There have been some moves 
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towards repatriation and reparations but these have been constrained by a lack of available, reasonably 
priced land and the displeasure of locals. A Draft National Policy on IDPs which was completed in 2010 
has been awaiting cabinet approval for more than a year. The Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Resettlement of IDPs has drafted a Bill on IDPs with the assistance of civil society organisations; this bill 
is a positive step towards solving this issue, and it will be presented to cabinet for approval in 2012.239 
Conclusion 
The Kenya National Accord was the product of what has been deemed a very successful mediation effort 
undertaken by the AU with significant international support. In spite of this, the agreement that was 
reached by the principals was not as strong as it could have been. This was as a result of political 
compromise during difficult negotiations, but it has undermined the effective functioning of the 
coalition government. Issues which were not adequately addressed or explained led to bickering 
between the two parties in the early years of the agreement. While these tensions settled down with 
the maturation of government, tension still simmers under the surface, and there is consensus between 
many analysts that high levels of cooperation denote the re-emergence of patronage structures and 
systems which have collaborated to stymie reform efforts. The reforms undertaken by the government 
of national unity have largely been successful, with high points being the promulgation of a new 
constitution in 2010 and extensive electoral reforms. In spite of these positive trends, the constitutional 
implementation process is still captive to political party interests and suggestions of reform to the 
document have been met with concern. The new electoral commission has wide-ranging powers and 
has successfully garnered wide support from the electorate, although anxiety remains over its handling 
of by-election irregularities in some areas. Crucially, impunity and corruption remain huge challenges 
facing the government which has not undertaken significant attempts to hold perpetrators of violence 
accountable, largely as a result of their own culpability. Internally displaced persons remain unsettled in 
many parts of the country and this may be a powder keg for violence in the 2012 elections. In spite of 
these issues, the Kenyan coalition government has undertaken significant reforms and should be 
commended for its implementation of the 2008 power sharing agreement. The reasons for its relative 
success will be outlined in the following two chapters. 
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Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
The creation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was fraught with problems and stalemates, and 
was only signed by the parties on 15 September 2008 following months of intense negotiations. The 
mediation process was dominated by a SADC-mandated facilitator in the person of South African 
President Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki’s role in the creation of the document and its subsequent 
implementation would have profound effects on the viability of the accords and the success of the unity 
government. This chapter will briefly trace the negotiations of the power sharing agreement and try to 
make sense of the resultant document. Following this, the implementation of the agreement since its 
inception in September 2008 will be covered. 
Negotiations 
Following the sham presidential run-off elections in June, not even the previously conciliatory SADC or 
AU accepted that the elections had represented the will of the Zimbabwean electorate, and they began 
to call for a negotiated agreement involving some level of power sharing to break the political impasse. 
SADC, in its Johannesburg Summit of 16-17 August 2008, made it clear that there was no acceptable 
alternative to an inclusive inter-party agreement.240 Mugabe’s ZANU-PF was facing a growing legitimacy 
crisis – both within Zimbabwe and across the continent due to the manipulated elections and the 
economic crisis which many had attributed to a failure of governance; he saw the discussions with the 
MDC as a means by which to retain power, increase his legitimacy and to secure the repealing of 
sanctions that had been placed upon him and his inner circle. The mediation period of mid-2008 can be 
seen as a continuation of mediation efforts that had begun in 2007 and had stalled in early 2008. The 
reason for the failure of the earlier phase of negotiations can be seen as the intransigence of the ruling 
party with regards to the agreed-upon process of constitutional reform and their failure to significantly 
relax political restrictions.241 The success of the post-electoral negotiations would hinge on the details of 
the power sharing agreement; in essence the way in which power was shared amongst the three main 
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contenders, the MDC-T (headed by Morgan Tsvangirai), MDC-M (under Arthur Mutambara) and ZANU-
PF. In spite of the decision to participate in negotiations, early on Mugabe was unwilling to relinquish 
core cabinet positions and the executive presidency.242 The mediation team then proposed a dual 
system of executive power with the retention of the presidency (which chairs the cabinet) and the 
creation of the post of prime minister who would chair a newly created council of ministers. The role of 
Thabo Mbeki in the negotiations was central while his long history of friendship with Mugabe and soft 
stance on Zimbabwe made him a partial mediator. The lop-sided nature of the agreement is likely due to 
Mbeki’s unwillingness to pressure Mugabe into a position of equality. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5 under the rubric of ‘regional influences.’  
A memorandum of understanding was signed between the contenders in Harare on 21 July 2008 while 
the formal agreement was signed in September. The agreement was only reached under intense 
regional and international pressure; each leader signed the agreement reluctantly.243 For the MDC, the 
election had shown that there was significant support for the party amongst the electorate but that the 
obstinacy of the ruling party would not allow for a handover of power; the GPA represented a different 
strategy by which to gain a foothold in government – and perhaps the only way to do so. For Mugabe, 
the GPA was a way to regain legitimacy and buy time in order to work out a new survival strategy.244 The 
GPA represented a “marriage of inconvenience”245 and in a rush to resolve the violence it papered over 
key issues and concerns, leaving these to be resolved at a later date. The main aim of the agreement 
was to end the violence that had characterised the early months of 2008 and create a transitional 
government that would be able to institute credible reforms; the end-goal being free and fair elections 
for a new government that would be representative of the will of the Zimbabwean electorate. 
The Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008  
The agreement has a lengthy preamble which commits the parties to the agreement to cooperate for 
the benefit of the country and the populace. The preamble is followed by 25 articles dealing with various 
facets of Zimbabwean political and economic life. It covers many aspects and activities that had been a 
cause or trigger of violence in the past, including land, political participation, the rule of law, freedom of 
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assembly and association and the National Youth Training Programme.246 This section will seek to 
evaluate the document to form a base from which to understand the implications that it has had on 
resolving the post-election crisis and facilitating a transition towards democracy and stability in 
Zimbabwe. The following paragraphs will largely be drawn from an analysis of the agreement 
undertaken by prominent Harare-based lawyer and researcher Derek Matyszak; he is a senior 
researcher with the Research and Advocacy Unit, a civil-society non-governmental organisation working 
extensively on the Zimbabwean crisis and the GPA. 
General 
To begin, the agreement itself is badly designed; the layout is inconsistent while the language used is 
imprecise and ambiguous.247 The bulk of the 15 page document is made up of pious statements which 
have few practical considerations and which amount to little more than political posturing; the accord is 
also silent on assigning blame for the political crisis. An example of this is article 11.1(b) where the 
parties agree that it is ‘the duty of all political parties and individuals to... adhere to the principles of the 
rule of law’; and that in article 18 (in spite of the fact that ZANU-PF was the main perpetrator of pre- and 
post-election violence) “both parties agree to eschew violence as a means of resolving political 
differences.”248 That violence continued to be committed against MDC supporters during the 
negotiations process indicates that ZANU-PF is prepared to make such statements while continuing the 
status quo and undertaking no significant behavioural changes.  
The agreement does not establish an adjudicating body to evaluate adherence to the principles of the 
agreement and which is able to give binding orders to ensure compliance and assign some form of 
sanction to prevent reneging. Instead the agreement provides that the accord ‘shall be guaranteed and 
underwritten’ by Mbeki, SADC and the AU (article 22.6).249 The implications of this are unclear and the 
agreement stipulates few mechanisms by which this shall be done. The document allows for the 
creation of an ‘Implementation Committee’ with the power only ‘to assess the implementation of this 
Agreement from time to time and consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy 
and full implementation of this Agreement in its entirety’ (article 22.3(b)).250 This committee would 
become known as the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), consisting of 
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representatives of each of the parties which would debate breaches of the implementation of the GPA 
but with no powers to coerce aberrant parties.  
A second implementation mechanism is set out in Article 23, and is named the Periodic Review 
Mechanism.251 This body is comprised of two representatives from each signatory party to the GPA and 
is tasked with providing an annual review focusing on ‘progress on the implementation and 
achievement of the priorities and objectives set out in the Agreement’ as well as ‘to make 
recommendations... that may be necessary to take and make to realise full implementation of this 
Agreement.’252 This mechanism was also not given any coercive powers to rein in defaulting parties. 
The Structure of Government 
Unless otherwise specified in the GPA, all existing constitutional provisions remain in effect until a new 
constitution passes a referendum and becomes the highest law of Zimbabwe. This is problematic as the 
GPA is not comprehensive enough to fundamentally alter power relations within the Zimbabwean 
government, indeed many important provisions have been overlooked which leave substantial power in 
the hands of the president and cabinet.  
Article 20 sets out the structure of the new power sharing government; there is the creation of the post 
of prime minister as well as two vice presidents and two deputy prime ministers. There were to be 31 
ministerial portfolios, divided 16:15 in favour of the two MDC parties. In addition to a Cabinet, chaired 
by the President (Mugabe), the agreement provided for the creation of a Council of Ministers chaired by 
the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai); this council’s function is to ensure that its chair (Tsvangirai) ‘properly 
discharges his responsibility to oversee the implementation of the work of government.’253 Thus the 
Council of Ministers seems to have oversight capabilities over the Prime Minister, rather than the 
converse.  
While the first article which deals with the structure of government (20.1.1) declares that: ‘The 
Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the President, the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet,’ the subsequent articles vest little authority in the office of the Prime 
Minister. Accordingly, the Prime Minister ‘shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the 
Cabinet’ and ‘shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of 
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government.’254 These provisions lack the necessary precision when dealing with the division of power, 
while he is vested with no authority to execute them. The oversight of the formulation of policy is vague, 
and fails to specify whether or not the Prime Minister has the capacity to veto or amend policies 
fashioned by Cabinet. Conversely, the president’s powers are still left largely intact in that the provisions 
of the GPA do not nullify section 31D of the Constitution which gives the president the power to hire 
and fire ministers. It does, however, provide that the number of ministers that the president may 
appoint is set at 31 and that 16 of these must not only be drawn from the MDC, but must be MDC 
nominees.255 This allows for the MDC to select their own ministers, but the portfolios are assigned by 
Mugabe ‘after consultation with the Vice-Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Ministers.’ The phrase ‘after consultation’ appears frequently in the document in relation to Mugabe’s 
powers, rather than the more precise legal phrase of ‘in consultation with.’ ‘After consultation’ is more 
likely to be construed as the President seeking the advice of the Prime Minister but he is not bound to 
act on the advice of those consulted and it thus leaves Mugabe with a free hand in the allocation of 
ministries. Similarly, the power to fire errant ministers remains vested in the presidency, and is phrased 
as ‘Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after consultation among the 
leaders of all the political parties in the Inclusive Government.’ This clearly indicates the way in which 
ZANU-PF was able to manipulate the negotiations in his favour. 
Cabinet 
The Cabinet, as the core of government and a body capable of introducing legislation, should be central 
in power sharing calculations. Instead, it is constituted in such a way by the agreement that in spite of 
the MDC’s 16 ministers to ZANU-PF’s 15, the MDC is unlikely to have a majority in cabinet. When read 
alongside the constitution, the GPA provides that the Cabinet consists of 17 members of the MDC – the 
Prime Minister and 16 ministers – and 19 members of ZANU-PF – the president, the two vice-presidents, 
the non-voting attorney general and 15 ministers.256 Regardless of this, the composition of Cabinet is 
likely to make legislating and governance particularly difficult as Cabinet decisions are to be made by 
consensus. There is no provision in the GPA as to what will occur if consensus should not be reached 
(which is likely given the partisan split within the body) and this will likely lead to a problem of legislative 
log-jams and slow decision-making.257 
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Legislation 
This legislative log-jam is further entrenched by the authority of parliament and the president to pass 
and amend laws. While emergency laws give the president legislative powers only to be utilised in cases 
of extreme urgency, Mugabe has long used these to rule by decree.258 Even by these laws, the legislation 
is only valid if presented to parliament for approval within 8 days and the MDC majority in parliament 
makes it unlikely that such laws will be rubber-stamped as before. Thus the president cannot legislate 
without parliament and parliament is unable to legislate without the president (as all new legislation 
requires presidential assent); so in the case of a lack of consensus between ZANU-PF and the MDC on a 
particular piece of legislation, there is likely to be deadlock. 
Military 
The GPA didn’t specify which ministries would be allocated to each of the parties, a serious flaw in the 
agreement which was no doubt as a result of the obduracy of both sides. Instead the GPA provided that 
the President would allocate ministries in a set proportion according to the results of the 2008 
harmonised elections. The MDC and ZANU-PF reached a deadlock shortly after the signing of the 
agreement over the allocation of ministries in spite of the ability of the president to allocate them 
unilaterally. The MDC ceded control over the military to ZANU-PF early in the negotiations process, 
which leaves the former ruling party with a continued grip on the reigns of coercive power. The GPA also 
fails to modify the constitutional provisions for the appointments of senior service-people within the 
police force, including the Commissioner General. This allows for the police force to remain beholden to 
ZANU-PF interests and fails to change the nature of coercive power within the regime. 
A New Constitution 
Article 6 of the multi-party agreement provides for the process to establish a new ‘people-driven’ 
constitution. The first step towards this is the establishment of a ‘Select Committee’ within two months 
of installing the new government; this is ambiguous as it is unclear as to what exactly constitutes a ‘new 
government.’259 Once the constitution is complete, it will need to be passed by a two-thirds majority of 
parliament which would necessitate ZANU-PF’s agreement. This is unlikely to be forthcoming if the new 
constitution intends to limit the powers of the president and executive.260 
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Power Sharing? 
Very little power has actually been shared between the MDC and ZANU-PF by the Global Political 
Agreement. The only ministries allocated to the MDC that would significantly change the balance of 
power in a particular area are that of the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Local Government – and 
in spite of this, Mugabe will retain his ability to reassign ministries and the administration of various 
legislative provisions across the ministries. However, the main way in which the MDC will have access to 
the levers of power will be through its parliamentary majority in the House of Assembly. No legislation 
can be passed without their vote and MDC control (by virtue of their majority) over the Parliamentary 
Committee on Standing Rules and Orders allows for the MDC to ensure the introduction of a fairer 
Zimbabwe Media Commission and Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. In spite of this, the agreement 
remains lop-sided with an asymmetrical division of powers in favour of the president and ZANU-PF. 
Constitutional Amendment 19 
The GPA was just an agreement, but it was Constitutional Amendment 19 which was provided for in the 
GPA that would turn the agreement into national law. Talks on this amendment began on 25 November 
2008, and it was expected that following the problems with the GPA and the unfinished business it 
contained, the discussions over Amendment 19 would be protracted. Instead, the negotiators reported 
that a draft had been finalised two days later. This was likely due to the need to reach a quick 
agreement following the cholera outbreak across Harare and other parts of the country due to the 
collapse of water reticulation systems and the health care system.261 Instead of adopting the well-
drafted and comprehensive MDC draft, or even the ZANU-PF draft, the parties reached agreement that 
the Amendment would be made up of only the executable part of the September agreement, article 20 
which referred to the structure of government. This was to override any parts of the constitution that 
were contrary to its contents. As was discussed above, the GPA provisions were relatively limited and 
descriptions of the duties of each post were vague, which left much of the substance of the Zimbabwean 
constitution unchanged. The President retained the ability to appoint the Commissioner General of 
Police, the Commander of the Army, and the Governor of the Reserve Bank as well as Permanent 
Secretaries, ambassadors, Provincial Governors, ministers, the Cabinet and persons who comprise the 
commissions under the constitution.262  
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Implementation 
It wasn’t long after the signing of the agreement in mid-September before ZANU-PF began to renege on 
the letter and spirit of the document. This began with Mugabe’s unilateral appointment of a number of 
sympathisers in key positions and extended to the continued abduction, detention and torture of 
opposition activists by state security agents.263 As was noted above, the GPA created a distorted power 
balance. Mugabe retained control of the critical portfolios by assigning ZANU-PF stalwarts to the 
ministries of defence and justice as well as the intelligence services.264 The MDC gained control of the 
influential Ministry of Finance as well as socio-economic ministries of health and education. Rather than 
conforming to the spirit of the agreement, Mugabe has often shown his disdain for both the GPA and for 
his forced ‘marriage’ to Tsvangirai. The GPA was violated at birth when Mugabe seized 22 ministries 
rather than the 15 that he was allocated. Instead of trying to encourage compliance or turn to the 
guarantors of the process, the MDC allowed the creation of a further 15 ministries, bringing the total to 
61, this created the largest and most expensive cabinet in Zimbabwean history.265 This suggests that 
both sides were willing to sacrifice the careful management of scarce public resources in order to 
distribute political spoils.266 Following this, Mugabe used his remaining presidential powers to re-
allocate major portfolio powers from Communications Minister Nelson Chamisa to Transport Minister 
Nicholas Goche, a ZANU-PF appointee.267 This allowed him to retain control over information and 
communications technology.  
Beyond Cabinet and the Council of Ministers, Tsvangirai and Mugabe were not forced to cooperate 
extensively by the GPA which has led to the ‘unity government’ often appearing more like two distinct 
governing entities, regularly sitting on opposite sides of particular issues.268 Mugabe has repeatedly 
neglected to consult with the Prime Minister over official appointments, has refused him the 
chairmanship of Cabinet in Mugabe’s absence (as required by Constitutional Amendment 19), he has 
consistently side-lined the Council of Ministers and even condoned the refusal of army and police chiefs 
to salute Tsvangirai.269 In spite of this, the MDC has framed the agreement as a flawed, but workable 
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arrangement, one which allows for incremental progress towards restoring the rule of law and a 
semblance of democracy to the crisis-wracked country.270 
Successes 
Economy 
Many analysts have pointed to the stabilisation of the economy as the greatest success of the GPA. The 
introduction of the multi-currency system consisting of the acceptance in all transactions of the US 
dollar, South African rand or Botswana’s pula was a driving factor in reducing the rampant inflation and 
returning basic commodities to shelves. Although this policy was adopted prior to the establishment of 
the government of national unity (GNU), it was instrumental in stimulating the return to relative 
economic stability. Some foreign investment and aid returned to the country after the advent of the 
GNU, expecting greater political stability. However the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as 
the IMF and World Bank refused to reinstate aid and balance of payments support until the GPA had 
been fully implemented. This has inhibited real growth and continued to undercut investor confidence.  
Another important economic aspect which is not mandated by the GPA and which the agreement failed 
to amend is the indigenisation policy adopted in 2007. This policy was passed into law by a ZANU-PF-
controlled parliament in October 2007 – during the first rounds of mediation by Thabo Mbeki between 
the three major parties. It forms part of the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act (2007). This 
act only became enforceable after the drafting of regulations governing the process; a process over 
which the MDC had no control as it was directed by the ZANU-PF minister administering the Act.271 The 
final policy adopted mandated that every company with an asset value of or over US$500 000 must 
within 5 years cede a controlling interest of not less than 51% to indigenous Zimbabweans.272 This had a 
severely negative impact on the investment climate in Zimbabwe and reversed many of the gains made 
towards encouraging foreign investment. This policy has also been received with substantial cynicism; 
the provisions of the regulations appear more likely to facilitate cronyism and patronage than to 
encourage the empowerment of the population at large.273 This policy is likely to contribute significantly 
in the future to the economic survival of the ZANU elite, and the failure of the GPA to reform this 
economically problematic policy is likely to lead to lower rates of investment and a longer road to 
economic and thus socio-economic recovery. 
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The stability brought on by the signing of the multi-party agreement also had positive effects on the 
failing health and education systems in the country. The decrease in overt violence, increased stability 
and management of these sectors by MDC ministers brought about by the GPA facilitated the release of 
larger amounts of directed aid into these sectors, particularly through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. This 
fund was set up by the IMF as a conduit for aid which bypasses all handling by ZANU-PF government 
officials.274 In spite of this, there are still channels for ZANU’s continued accumulation of wealth such as 
the recently discovered diamond and platinum reserves as well as a deal signed with the Chinese 
government in March 2011 for a loan to the value of US$585 million, including $100 million to finance 
government directly.275 
Media 
In May 2010, the newly created and constituted Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) – the origin of 
which was prior to the inception of the GPA – granted licenses to publish to four media houses and to 
Zimbabwe’s first independent daily newspaper since 2003. A further four licenses followed in July 2010. 
This has served to open up the print media in Zimbabwe, and represents an opening of democratic 
space. However continued progress in this direction is not guaranteed. Journalists and civic 
organisations have argued that the media should be allowed to be self-regulating.276 Instead, the 
Zimbabwean media is subject to the ZMC, which is a body established under the Access to Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA - 2002), a draconian law passed by a ZANU-PF-dominated 
parliament prior to the creation of the GNU. This act has a chilling effect on media freedom and the 
freedom of expression and was used extensively to intimidate and repress the media in the 2000s. In 
spite of the slight amendments to the ZMC under Constitutional Amendment 19, the body still has wide-
ranging powers accorded to it by AIPPA. This Act has not been repealed in spite of an extensive civil 
society campaign and the GPA also failed to remove or amend the act in a comprehensive manner. The 
MDC-T has realised that AIPPA needs to be replaced, but faces stiff challenges from ZANU-PF which 
shows little inclination towards easing the state’s control over the media.277 Currently the positive 
developments instituted by the ZMC can be attributed its composition. Under Constitutional 
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Amendment 19, the commissioners on the ZMC are appointed by the president from a list supplied by 
the parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders (CSRO), a body which is dominated by the 
MDC due to its parliamentary majority. This has allowed the commission to be staffed with people who 
are fairly evenly balanced between the two major parties.  
In spite of these minor successes in lifting restrictions on the printed media, they will have little effect in 
the rural areas. Information in these areas is primarily available through electronic media – chiefly 
through radio – which remains under the control of the Broadcasting Services of Zimbabwe (BSZ). This 
body is overseen by the Minister of Media, Information and Publicity, Webster Shamu, a key ZANU-PF 
loyalist.278 In 2009, Shamu appointed a new board to the BSZ which was staffed by ZANU-PF hardliners 
in contravention of the requirements of the GPA.279 In 2011, the board awarded licenses to two 
‘independent’ radio stations, though it has come to light that these organisations are linked to ZANU-PF. 
The Media Institute of Southern Africa in Zimbabwe has since petitioned both the BSZ and SADC to have 
the BSZ board reconstituted in line with the principles of the GPA.280 The electronic media have not been 
opened up under the GPA, and the state broadcaster continues to broadcast information in a politically 
biased manner.  
Electoral Reform 
In the 2008 elections, the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) could be described as anything but 
independent; it was little more than a mechanism by which ZANU-PF strategy was implemented. 
Amendments to the composition and mandate of the electoral management bodies was central to the 
GPA, as a new election could not be undertaken without an overhaul of the entire system. Under the 
GPA and Constitutional Amendment 19, the ZEC now comprises a chairperson, appointed by the 
president after consultation with the Judicial Services Commission and the CSRO, as well as eight other 
persons selected from a list supplied by the same select committee. Due to its parliamentary majority 
and thus majority in the CSRO, the MDC factions were able to see to it that a number of reform-minded 
members were appointed to the commission.  
The ZEC is also responsible for the maintenance and custody of the electoral roll, a responsibility that 
had previously been unlawfully entrusted to the Registrar-General of Voters. The new, more moderate 
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ZEC now has the power to ensure that an accurate voters roll is in place ahead of the next elections.281 In 
spite of this, there are two problems that may impede the future functioning of the ZEC. The first is that 
the Minister of Justice is technically in control of the ZEC in as much as all electoral regulations made by 
the body must be approved by him and thus, through the minister, ZANU-PF retains veto power over 
electoral regulations.282 The second problem is that the Minister of Foreign Affairs (another ZANU-PF 
appointee) has the power to veto the accreditation of foreign election observers, and thus influence the 
outcome of election observer missions by only accrediting sympathetic observers.283 However, these 
concerns should not override the fact that the ZEC is now a more independent body which will make it 
more difficult for Mugabe’s party to directly influence the outcome of the next election through the 
outright manipulation of the electoral institutions. 
Although not expressly dealt with in the text of the GPA, electoral reform has played a large part in 
discussions between the parties, and there is consensus amongst members of the former opposition 
and civil society bodies that electoral reform is a crucial part of securing a transition to a more 
democratic dispensation. Electoral reforms have been on the agenda of the MDC since 2007, and the 
necessity of it is apparent when reviewing the events of 2008. Although a number of piecemeal reforms 
were undertaken in 2007 which led to the relative peace of the Election Day in March 2008, these 
reforms have not been enough. ZANU-PF has consistently side-lined attempts to reform electoral 
processes.  
The Zimbabwean voters roll is still plagued by problems and inconsistencies. The obstinacy of ZANU-PF is 
apparent when the 2008 and 2010 voters rolls are compared; in 2010, 366 550 new voters appeared 
who had previously not been on the roll.284  This is extremely unlikely considering that the high mortality 
rate has led to an overall decrease in population growth and out-migration has been a widespread 
factor since the early 2000s. The roll includes the names of thousands of ghost voters, many of whom 
are not linked to a verifiable address as required by the constitution. There is an extraordinary 132 540 
people on the roll who are over the age of 90, and more than 40 000 people over the age of 100; this is 
concerning as life-expectancy in Zimbabwe is currently 44.8 years.285 This roll has clearly been tampered 
with in the post-agreement phase in an attempt to inflate the number of registered voters to allow for 
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the manipulation of electoral processes by ZANU-PF. The party has consistently denounced calls for the 
scrapping of the roll and sabotaged the creation of a new, credible electoral register.286 In spite of 
Mugabe’s calls for elections to be held first in 2011 and later in early 2012, there has still been no 
concerted effort to reform the voters roll. 
Following two full years of backsliding and stalling, in July 2011, Justice Minister and ZANU-PF stalwart, 
Patrick Chinamasa gazetted the electoral reform bill. This law restricts police involvement in the 
electoral process and addresses political violence.287 It also grants wide ranging powers to the ZEC to run 
elections, and mandates that all results must be announced within 5 days of the voting process. 
Although this law is a step in the right direction and may help to increase the credibility of the coming 
electoral process, they are unlikely to be sufficient. The post-independence and post-2008 history of 
Zimbabwe has consistently shown that ZANU-PF has little regard for legislation and the rule of law and 
this Act on its own, is unlikely to prevent manipulation of the process and results by the ruling ZANU 
elite.  
Human Rights Commission 
Although the creation of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) has been greeted as a 
significant departure from the impunity of the previous decade, the hope that accompanied its creation 
has not been justified by its composition. As with the ZEC, the president appoints the commissioners in 
consultation with the Judicial Services Commission and CSRO from a list supplied by the MDC-dominated 
CSRO. Persons appointed to the commission must be chosen for ‘their knowledge of and experience in 
the promotion of social justice or the protection of human rights and freedoms.’288 While appointments 
to the ZEC and ZMC had been fraught with political manoeuvring, the MDC and ZANU-PF paid little 
attention to who was appointed to head this commission; an indication of its lack of power and 
regard.289 An act of parliament is necessary to enable this body to carry out its mandate, but no such act 
has been passed or is planned; no money was budgeted for the ZHRC in 2010 and it has neither the 
offices nor the infrastructure to carry out its duties.290 The commission is currently not properly 
constituted and is thus open to significant legal challenges; while only one out of the eight 
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commissioners has experience in human rights matters. The human rights records of some of the 
commissioners is more than dubious, while two have been implicated in political scandals involving their 
overt support for ZANU-PF as well as corruption and food aid scandals.291 This is concerning as these 
conditions don’t inspire confidence in the ability of the ZHRC to protect civil liberties in Zimbabwe.  
Failings 
Human Security 
Many analysts have credited the GPA with a substantial reduction in the violence that characterised the 
time between the initial elections on 29 March 2008 and the presidential run-off in June. A longer-term 
analysis makes it clear that this is only partially true. After a brief period of restraint on the part of 
ZANU-PF and the security apparatus, the use of state machinery to repress and intimidate the 
opposition and the populace has continued, albeit in a more discreet manner. The police, working with 
the Attorney-General’s office, have arrested numerous MDC activists, MPs, and officials on dubious 
charges and have failed to act against ZANU-PF offenders in spite of ample evidence of criminality.292 In 
August 2011, Attorney General Johannes Tomana openly admitted that he was biased towards members 
of ZANU, and that he would not prosecute individuals with political connections.293 This is in direct 
contravention of the spirit but also the letter of the GPA which intended to ensure freedom from 
persecution and equal treatment under the law for all citizens regardless of political affiliation.294 It also 
shows that the GPA and Constitutional Amendment 19 have been ineffective to prevent the recurrence 
of violence as they did not ensure that the posts of Attorney-General and Commissioner-General of 
Police were allocated to non-partisan individuals.  
In early 2012, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum held an anti-torture training workshop for 
parliamentarians in Harare. The event was attended by MDC MPs but was snubbed by ZANU-PF 
parliamentarians. The group had found that ZANU-PF activists were the group most likely to employ 
torture against political rivals, but that they were still closely followed by the police and the army.295 The 
head of ZimRights, Abel Chikomo, reported that Harare province has the highest number of people 
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tortured by ZANU-PF activists and police since 2001, standing  at 49% followed by Manicaland at 15%, 
Mashonaland East province 12%, Mashonaland Central  7%, Midlands 5%, Masvingo 3%, Bulawayo 2% 
and Matabeleland North at 1%. According to Chikomo, “There are more torture incidences reported in 
Harare, Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces because in 2008 after ZANU-PF lost more parliament 
seats in those areas which used to be their strongholds, they started torturing people in revenge.”296  
In August 2011, the body of MDC director of elections in the Midlands province, Maxwell Ncube, was 
found in a shallow grave; the local MDC activists and his close friends and family suspected that he was 
killed by ZANU-PF militants following his efforts to galvanise the rural population against ZANU-PF 
rule.297 The detention, torture and intimidation of opposition and civil society members seems to have 
escalated significantly since late 2011, analysts believe that this is as a result of ZANU-PF  having called 
for new elections in early 2012 and the party now returning to ‘campaign mode.’298 Indeed, late in 2011, 
Mugabe had announced that ZANU-PF would begin campaigning for elections after the party’s annual 
conference which was held in December.299 In November 2011, the Zimbabwe Defence Force received a 
shipment of arms from China, courtesy of Beijing. This is in spite of an arms embargo against Zimbabwe 
since the early 2000s by almost all western countries. This shipment included 20 000 AK47 rifles and 21 
000 pairs of handcuffs, a non-traditional military accessory.300 The deal was reportedly arranged by 
Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, the leader of the hard-line faction jockeying for power in the 
ZANU-PF succession race.301 This suggests that ZANU-PF is planning to undertake a new campaign of 
repression, intimidation and arrests ahead of the next elections which Mugabe has suggested will be 
held in 2012. 
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Abuse of Power and Respect for the GPA 
During the nearly three years since the beginning of the implementation of the multi-party agreement, 
Mugabe has repeatedly flaunted his disregard of the accord. In May 2010, he unilaterally appointed four 
new judges, as well as selecting ZANU-PF stalwart Justice Chiweshe as Judge President and elevating 
Justice Makarau to the Supreme Court.302 This can be seen as an attempt to maintain the partisan 
nature of the Judicial Services to ensure preferential judgements for the hard-line party in the expected 
next round of disputed elections. In October 2010 Mugabe unilaterally reappointed old ZANU-PF 
provincial governors without consulting Tsvangirai as required by the GPA; this prompted a walk-out 
from cabinet of the Prime Minister.303 ZANU-PF has repeatedly taunted both MDC factions during the 
tenure of the unity government in an attempt to provoke them into withdrawing from the accord, thus 
ensuring its failure without ZANU-PF incurring the blame.304 Mugabe has an important incentive to try to 
push the MDCs out of the unity government. This is due to the fact that Constitutional Amendment 19 – 
which limits the powers of the presidency – only operates for as long as the inclusive government exists, 
if the unity government was disbanded, Zimbabwe would return to the pre-GPA constitutional 
dispensation.305 On 1 November 2011, Zimbabwean police sealed the head offices of Tsvangirai’s MDC 
and fired teargas into the building without warning; this was also part of a growing trend of police and 
militants attacking and disrupting MDC-T rallies in Harare and Western Matabeleland.306  
Throughout the period following the signing of the GPA, Robert Mugabe and the upper echelons of 
ZANU-PF have acted in bad faith. They have acted and made statements that are contrary to both the 
spirit and the letter of the Global Political Agreement. In 2009, ZANU-PF politburo member, Jonathan 
Moyo, encapsulated the sentiments of ZANU-PF when he stated that all the reforms attempted by the 
MDC were doomed to fail as they take place at the pleasure of ZANU-PF – and ZANU-PF takes no 
pleasure in reforms.307 It appears that ZANU-PF initially agreed to the ‘truce’ of the unity government as 
a means by which to reclaim the international and regional legitimacy lost after the one-man run off of 
June 2008 and as a way by which to buy time to create new strategies of ‘governance.’ It is clear that 
                                                          
302
 Matyszak, D. 2010, pp. 173-174 
303
 Bratton, M. & Masunungure, E. 2011, p. 36 
304
 Ibid, p. 33 
305
 Mavhinga, D. 2011. “The Inclusive Government: Milestones and Millstones,” in Zimbabwe at the Crossroads, 
published by the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, p. 8 
306
 Reuters. “Zimbabwe Police Seal MDC Offices, Fire Teargas,” Reuters Africa, 1/11/2011, found at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE7A00EV20111101?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews 
307
 Mavhinga, D. 2011, p. 8 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 90 
 
ZANU has only made temporary concessions under the GPA and holds little sincere commitment to 
democratic reforms. 
Constitutional Reform Process 
The Global Political Agreement stipulated that a new constitution should be formulated and introduced 
in parliament following a successful referendum within 18 months of the inception of the new 
government.308 As the new government was constituted in February 2009, the deadline for the 
introduction of the new constitution would have been in August 2010. The inter-party agreement noted 
the secretly negotiated draft constitution agreed to by the parties in Kariba on 30 September 2007 
during the first round of negotiations, but demanded that the new constitution be the result of wide 
public engagement and consultation; it was to be a people-driven process. A 25-member Select 
Committee of Parliament on the new Constitution (COPAC) was instituted in April 2009; it was co-
chaired by representatives of the three major parties.309 However, the programme was plagued by 
problems from its inception. In spite of its receiving extensive donor funding, the body soon ran out of 
funds as members spent lavishly and used the funds to enrich themselves, reward activists and extend 
their patronage networks.310 Civil society framed its dissatisfaction with the process early on, arguing 
that it was dominated by political parties and partisan interests with inadequate consultation with civil 
society bodies and NGOs. The process also began with disagreements between the MDC-T and ZANU-PF 
over the starting point for the constitution; ZANU-PF wanted the secretly-negotiated 2007 Kariba 
draft311 to be the starting point and for public consultations to be made only on this document, while 
the MDC-T was facing pressure from the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) who argued that the Kariba draft was elite-driven and 
unrepresentative.312 Thus the MDC-T argued that the Kariba draft should only be considered as one of 
several resources on constitutional reform to be considered. These different stances on the starting 
point of the constitutional reform process were to complicate and delay the process as each party 
jockeyed for position. 
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The outreach programme specified by the GPA was plagued by delays but finally began in June 2010, the 
date initially scheduled in the GPA for holding the constitutional referendum. For this, COPAC planned to 
hold 5 805 consultative meetings over a four month period, although this was later extended.313 In spite 
of the good intentions behind the consultative process, it was not as successful as it was intended to be. 
In a country with an extensive history of state-sponsored violence and partisan political repression, few 
Zimbabweans felt empowered enough to attend these constitutional consultation meetings and air their 
views about the government and the future powers of the president. This is particularly the case in light 
of the campaign of violence and intimidation undertaken in many areas by ZANU-PF supporters which 
was tacitly condoned by police.314 These intimidation tactics were largely prevalent in the rural areas; 
most reports suggest that ZANU-PF, the party youth, war veterans and sections of the state security 
apparatus were undertaking a campaign to coerce attendees to support the party’s position on the 
Kariba draft which would leave the president’s powers largely intact.315 Following numerous outbreaks 
of violence, the process was halted in a number of areas. In spite of attempts at creating what the GPA 
mandated as a ‘people driven,’ “inclusive and democratic” constitution,316 as much as 80% of what will 
likely make up the new draft constitution will not have been part of the outreach programme and will 
have to be negotiated within COPAC.317 
The constitutional drafting process had been plagued by delays, posturing and bickering between the 
three main parties and their principles. Disputes remain over the powers of the presidency and the 
independence of government institutions. While the draft constitution was expected to be released in 
late January 2012, the parliamentary committee had again announced a delay and the draft was still not 
ready by early March.318 ZANU-PF is still trying to stymie reforms and to push for a new election319, with 
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the party taking the stance that reforms are not necessary prior to the election.320 Elections must be 
held prior to March 2013 when the current parliamentary term expires and the constitution mandates a 
new election.  
In February 2012, a draft version of the new constitution was leaked by the Herald newspaper, a ZANU-
PF mouthpiece. This draft holds a clause which states that “a person is disqualified for election as 
president if he or she has already held office for one or more periods, whether continuous or not, 
amounting to 10 years.”321 The draft constitution would also limit presidential powers to make senior 
appointments to government and the military. This draft produced a sustained outcry from members of 
ZANU-PF and prompted Mugabe to call a meeting with his party’s COPAC members. Only two weeks 
later, news reports emerged that this controversial clause had been amended to provide that the term 
limits would only come into force after the introduction of the constitution and would not apply 
retrogressively. The result of this is that Mugabe will be able to stand for a further two terms under the 
new constitutional dispensation.322 This has reaffirmed civil society fears that the constitution would be 
a negotiated document which represents the interest of the parties, rather than those of Zimbabwean 
society. This view was reinforced by Charles Mangongera, the MDC's director of policy and research, 
who stated that: 
"Ultimately the draft constitution is going to be a negotiated settlement and most likely it will be 
very close to the Kariba Draft. Political gladiators from the three parties have in fact publicly said 
so. The political dynamics are such that for as long as the unity government is in place, then key 
political processes will always be negotiated. In some cases this has supplanted democratic 
processes and popular will, but that is the nature of politics under negotiated governing 
pacts".
323
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
period. Makova, P. “Zanu PF steps up efforts to derail constitution-making process,” The Standard, 15/01/2012, 
found at http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/33535-zanu-pf-steps-up-efforts-to-derail-constitution-making-
process.html 
320
 Moyo, J. 3/02/2012 
321
 Banya, N. “New Zimbabwe Constitution could Bar Mugabe Candidacy,” Reuters, 10 February 2012, found at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE81909X20120210, accessed on 24/02/2012 
322
 Sibanda, T. “Change to Draft Constitution Ensures Mugabe can Seek Re-election,” The Zimbabwean, 24 February 
2012 found at http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/56547/change-to-draft-constitution-
ensures.html?utm_source=thezim&utm_medium=homepage&utm_campaign=listarticle&utm_content=headinglin
k, accessed on 24/02/2012 
323
 Scofield, M. “Horse-Trading Over Constitution,” Times Live, 26 February 2012 found at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2012/02/26/horse-trading-over-constitution, accessed on 26/02/2012 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 93 
 
The final problem with the GPA and remaining constitutional provisions with regards to the 
constitutional reform process is that ZANU-PF retains the power of veto over the process due to their 
role as a swing vote in parliament. While the GPA mandated that once Constitutional Amendment 19 
had been agreed, the parties were bound to ensure its passage through parliament; no such provision 
exists for the constitutional draft. As a two-thirds parliamentary majority (and thus ZANU-PF support) 
will be required to enact the new constitution, it is likely that the party will veto a draft that contains 
clauses which would curtail their power; they would undoubtedly prevent it from being passed into 
law.324 From this, it is clear that the GPA was drafted in such a way that would make it virtually 
impossible to fulfil the mandate of creating a people-centric constitution; the resulting constitution will 
no doubt be the product  of an elite bargain and the reforms are unlikely to drastically alter the power 
relations within Zimbabwe. 
Implementation Mechanisms 
The unity agreement allowed for the creation of two monitoring and implementation mechanisms, the 
first is the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) and the second is the Periodic 
Review Mechanism.325 The JOMIC was to be composed of four senior members of ZANU-PF and four 
from each of the MDC factions while being co-chaired by the parties. The function of the committee is to 
“ensure implementation in letter and spirit” of the agreement and consider steps that may need to be 
taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of the GPA. Contrary to the wishes of the GPA, 
JOMIC has not been an effective monitoring tool; initially the committee began without funding or 
resources from the state and even lacked secretarial staff and office space.326 In spite of blatant 
disregard for the GPA from some sectors of government, particularly ZANU-PF, and the failure to comply 
with both the letter and spirit of the agreement, JOMIC has largely been unable to act as an effective 
mechanism to ensure compliance. 
One of the greatest problems with the commission is that it is built on the principle of ‘self-monitoring’, 
making the political parties both the players and the referees.327 As the body is constituted by members 
of the three signatory parties, their political biases have been imported into the mechanism; this has 
often led them to report only those issues that are in their party’s interest. This may have been effective 
if SADC kept a keen eye on developments and pressured all sides to ensure compliance, but instead 
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there was little interaction between SADC and JOMIC until mid-2011.328 Instead, it is likely that this 
arrangement emerged as a result of SADC not wanting to be seen to be impinging on Zimbabwean 
sovereignty, a concept which is often invoked by Mugabe and ZANU-PF in the face of external criticism. 
The necessity for the JOMIC body to take decisions based upon consensus has made decision-making a 
cumbersome affair and has prevented the body from making real progress on monitoring the 
implementation of the GPA.329 Political and civic analysts have dismissed the 12-member panel as a 
“toothless bulldog” due to its repeated inability to deal with violations of the agreement. The 
mechanism has no power to summon violators, nor to sanction violations, it relies only on the power of 
persuasion. JOMIC reporting doesn’t include an evaluative component on GPA implementation and it is 
often unable to deal with the scope and complexity of the issues brought before it.330 
Until 2011, JOMIC had largely been reduced to issuing statements requesting that the parties to the 
agreement abide by their commitments. The body was given new impetus by its development of a new 
strategic plan and the establishment of sub-committees dealing with violence, media, human rights, 
land and sanctions and an operational sub-committee to oversee all its operations.331 Following this, it 
issued a number of statements on violations of the rule of law and incidents of hate speech by civil 
servants and security agents. In March, the Commissioner-General of Police and ZANU-PF stalwart, 
Augustine Chihuri, established a senior team of officers to work with JOMIC and agreed to submit 
investigation reports to the body.332 This relationship soon buckled as Chihuri snubbed JOMIC in 
December following a requested meeting with him to discuss the failure of the police service to take 
action against increasing political violence.333 JOMIC’s inability to force Chihuri to account for the actions 
of his officers is an indicator of the mechanism’s lack of power. 
Following the Livingstone Communiqué of March 2011, South African President Jacob Zuma has 
promised to increase the efficacy of the JOMIC body by seconding three advisers to augment the power 
of the committee. The decision taken in June 2011 to deploy a technical team to strengthen the body 
had still not been carried out by March 2012, calling into question the resolve of SADC to strengthen the 
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body.334 In spite of these commitments, JOMIC remains ineffective. The biggest challenge remains 
political; the response to JOMIC’s work and recommendations has never been adequate. Welshman 
Ncube, the new leader of the MDC-M, lamented that “the most important handicap was our assumption 
that if something was agreed at JOMIC, it would have the full weight of the political parties and 
therefore, because of that alone, compliance would be easy; it has not turned out that way.”335 The 
political will to implement the recommendations of the commission has been consistently lacking, while 
the body itself has often been torn by partisan interests. The failure of the drafters of the mechanism to 
include non-partisan members such as members of civil society or respected African leaders has led to 
the mechanism’s lack of efficacy and inadequate buy-in.  
While JOMIC has been plagued by problems, the second implementation mechanism has been entirely 
ineffectual. The Periodic Review Mechanism (PRM) was also to be constituted by two members of each 
of the principal parties to the GPA and the body was tasked with reviewing progress made on the 
implementation of the agreement on an annual basis.336 The first report of the PRM was only published 
in April 2011, two years after the creation of the inclusive government. Compiled by the very negotiators 
responsible for the lack of progress on many issues of the GPA, the report was particularly thin on 
content.337 It avoided many crucial issues and was unable to provide guidance on the way to overcome 
the roadblocks to reform. Instead it did little more than to confirm that the primary disputes concern 
issues such as the rule-of-law, alleged unconstitutional behaviour by security forces, freedom of 
assembly and association and the continued existence of political violence.338 In addition, the review 
highlighted issues regarding the media, electoral reform and delays in capacitating democracy-
supporting institutions but reduces the polarisation of the Cabinet on these issues to confusion over the 
proposed election date.339 This body has not carried out annual reviews as mandated by the GPA, and 
the single document that it has produced has done little to help bridge the impasse. Both mechanisms 
suffer from the same problems, which is the vague and problematic drafting of their mandate and a lack 
of capacity and adequate terms of reference to undertake effective monitoring and evaluation 
processes. Aside from this, they are both constituted by members of the very parties whose progress 
they are intended to monitor, this leads to incentive problems. Finally there has been a conspicuous lack 
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of political will to abide by the agreement and take the committees’ recommendations on board. It is 
unlikely that either body will have a profound impact on the implementation of the agreement going 
forward. 
Security Sector Reform 
The greatest indictment of the multi-party agreement is its failure to include an article on the 
comprehensive reform of the security sector. Security sector reform (SSR) is often undertaken in the 
wake of civil wars and conflict, it refers to reform interventions that are undertaken within the sector to 
address policy, legislation, structural and behavioural matters to realign policy, law, structures and 
behaviours to a human rights respecting culture.340 It is intended to promote adherence to principles of 
accountability, transparency, participation, good governance and respect for the rule of law within 
bodies that make up the security sector.341 As was discussed in the second chapter, the personnel of the 
security sector and the ZANU-PF elite are fused which has led to a militarisation of politics and a 
politicisation of the security sector. This has continued, largely unabated, during the unity government’s 
term. The continued intimidation and arrest of senior MDC members and party supporters and the 
refusal of military chiefs to salute the prime minister can be seen as proof of the partisan nature of 
security personnel. This security elite has conflated the security of the ZANU-PF elite with national 
security at the expense of human security and human rights. As the GPA failed to mandate 
parliamentary or civilian oversight of the security sector and the MDC ceded control over these 
institutions, the sector has continued to be accountable only to the president and the party.  
The GPA allowed for the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) which was formalised by the 
National Security Council Act (2009) to review national policies on security, defence, law and order; 
review national, regional and international security, political and defence developments; receive and 
consider national security reports and give orders to the security services as well as ensuring that the 
operations comply with the constitution.342 As with much of what is mandated by the GPA, this body has 
failed to fulfil its obligations due to a lack of political will and the obstinacy of the ZANU-PF securocrats. 
This body has done little more than to serve as a cover for the continued dominance of the Joint 
Operations Command. For their part, the MDC’s actions with regards to this issue has been worrying; 
their lack of a policy position on security sector reform in the form of a draft national security policy, 
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draft defence policy or draft intelligence policy is a serious failing on the part of this ‘government in 
waiting.’343 The MDC factions have failed to capitalise on their successes and act decisively throughout 
the period of the GNU.  
This does not bode well for the elections that have been scheduled to follow the dissolution of the unity 
government. ZANU-PF has been willing to mobilise its coercive arms to ensure an electoral victory in the 
past, and its declining approval ratings will make the use of force a necessary tactic to ensure a victory at 
the polls. It is crucial that security sector reform is undertaken prior to the elections to prevent a rerun 
of the violence of 2008. 
Land Reform 
The parties to the GPA agreed that the coalition government would address the land issue, which has 
been a veritable powder keg in Zimbabwean history. They agreed to undertake a land audit for the 
purpose of “establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownership.”344 More than three 
years after the creation of the unity government following the signing of the GPA, the Ministry of Lands 
and Rural Resettlement (a ZANU-PF controlled ministry) has announced that it will be undertaking a 
comprehensive land audit.345 The recommendations of previous land audits have been ignored by 
government in spite of the exposure of widespread corruption by government officials. The stalling over 
the land issue is likely due to pressure by ZANU-PF officials not to undertake the audit as it is likely to 
expose widespread illegal activities by party members during the 2000-2008 period. It is unlikely that 
the land audit will be completed by the end of the unity government’s term and if ZANU-PF wins 
another term in office, it is extremely unlikely that this review will be carried through. 
Election Roadmap 
The communiqué of the SADC troika in Livingstone in March 2011 marked the growing frustration of the 
region’s leadership with the situation in Zimbabwe. Following recommendations from this body, a draft 
election roadmap was developed and signed by negotiators on 22 April. The roadmap identified 24 key 
issues which remained unresolved and the regional heads of state called upon the GPA principles to 
draw up timelines for implementing the plan.346 A subsequent draft was initialled on 6 July which 
focussed on 8 key areas, including sanctions, constitution-making, media reform, electoral reform, rule 
                                                          
343
 Ibid, p. 37 
344
 Article V, subsection 5.9a, Global Political Agreement, 2008 
345
 “Zimbabwe: Third Land Audit on the Cards,” All Africa, 2 March 2012, found at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201203030015.html, accessed on 5/03/2012 
346
 International Crisis Group. 2011b, p. 8 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 98 
 
of law, freedom of association and assembly, legislative agenda and commitments and the actual 
election.347 In spite of this, the implementation of the roadmap has been hampered by deadlocks. In 
May, ZANU-PF instructed its negotiators not to engage further on issues relating to security sector 
reform which created problems in three areas.348 First, in spite of agreements reached on voter 
registration and education, there was disagreement on how to ensure the independence of the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). Secondly there are serious disagreements on key rule-of-law 
concerns such as continued state-sponsored violence, the lack of oversight over the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) and the MDC’s proposed amendments to the draconian Public Order and Security 
Act.349 The final area of contention is over the deployment of SADC election monitors in the upcoming 
polls. There has been no movement on these issues for months, and there has been no compromising by 
the three principals. There is growing anxiety that ZANU-PF will not concede an inch on what it views as 
its strategic advantages.  
In November 2011, the MDC formations and ZANU-PF referred 16 issues to the facilitation team which 
related to deadlocked areas and areas of non-implementation which they felt unable to solve. These 
issues were i) the failure to establish a National Economic Council; ii) the failures of the re-engagement 
committee and SADC’s efforts to re-engage with the EU over the issues of sanctions; iii) the deadlock 
over the setting up of a land commission and undertaking of a land audit; iv) disagreements over 
allegations of the closure of political space; v) failure of the GPA principals to meet with to meet with 
the attorney-general, commissioner of police and heads of security and intelligence, vii) disagreements 
over allegations of the partisanship of state organs, viii) unfinished business relating to the legislative 
agenda (including the human rights bill, amendments to the Electoral and Criminal Procedures Act and 
realignment of laws with the forthcoming constitution); ix) disagreements on political violence and the 
role of the police; outstanding issues on x) media reform and regulation and xi) appointments, xii) JOMIC 
delays on establishing a commission of enquiry to investigate violence, harassment, intimidation and 
other violations; disagreements relating to xiii)electoral reform as stipulated in the roadmap, xiv) rule of 
law as defined in the roadmap and xv) freedom of association and assembly and finally the xvi) 
violations of the GPA provisions on the rule of law, free political activity and respect for constitutional 
provisions.350 
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President Zuma was to have met with the principals in October 2011, but the meeting had still not 
occurred by mid-March. His ability to break the deadlock appears limited, particularly without greater 
support from SADC on crucial areas such as the security sector. In spite of the creation of the roadmap, 
the parties continue to disagree on key reforms and this will likely continue to hamper implementation 
of the GPA and the preparations for a new election. 
Conclusion 
In spite of the high hopes of many in the region following the signing of the unity accord between ZANU-
PF and the two MDC factions, little success has been made on implementing the directives of the Global 
Political Agreement. Where there has been limited progress, this is tempered with some worrying 
trends and the maintenance of avenues for political manipulation as in the cases of the Zimbabwe 
Media Commission and electoral institutions and processes. The GPA itself was a product of political 
compromise in a situation where Mugabe retained the upper hand, this resulted in a skewed ‘sharing’ of 
power which has allowed the intransigent party to consistently frustrate or delay reforms whilst 
outwardly appearing to be committed to the process. The way in which government was structured as a 
result of the GPA allowed for the creation of what often seems to be two ‘parallel’ governments that 
rarely agree on policy. The institutions presided over by the prime minister have been relegated to a 
peripheral position and the prime minister has had little influence within cabinet and other ZANU-PF 
dominated bodies. The wording of the agreement and its failure to nullify contrary constitutional 
provisions has allowed Mugabe to insist on the retention of the majority of his presidential powers, and 
he has flouted the GPA a number of times using the defence that his actions were constitutionally 
justified. 
The main aim of the GPA was to end the violence and create a transitional government to oversee 
reforms with the end goal being a new election. While the violence was halted for a short time after the 
signing of the agreement, arrests and intimidation of opposition members including members of 
parliament, have continued largely unabated. The only difference was that ZANU-PF either tried to 
superficially distance itself from reports of violence (or undertake misinformation campaigns to blame it 
on the MDC) or would use the ‘law’ to invent trumped-up charges against the accused. The reforms 
envisioned by the GPA have largely been frustrated, the constitution-drafting process has been subject 
to repeated delays and is unlikely to reflect the views of the people while the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission has been plagued by a lack of resources and political will. ZANU-PF has been able to out-
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manoeuvre the MDC factions at almost every turn, while they have been unable to present a united 
front and have failed to capitalise sufficiently on their strengths.  
If the constitutional draft is presented for referendum in early 2012, it is unlikely that it will represent a 
clean break from the Lancaster House constitution as it is unlikely to be substantially different from the 
‘Kariba draft’ and the MDC will have had to make concessions to ZANU-PF to prevent them from stone-
walling the constitutional draft in parliament. Thus the new constitution is likely to largely conserve the 
pre-2008 status quo. It is also clear that in the absence of comprehensive electoral and security reforms, 
the next election and possibly even the referendum may be plagued by violence at similar levels to that 
seen in 2008. Even in the eventuality of the fulfilment of thoroughgoing reforms mandated by the new 
constitution and legislation governing the elections and security sector, ZANU-PF has repeatedly shown 
its disdain for the law and its willingness to do anything necessary in pursuit of political survival. 
Unfortunately, the power-sharing agreement signed in 2008 has failed to transform power relations 
within Zimbabwe. 
Conclusion 
The mediation processes that led to the signing of the two agreements were substantially different. The 
Kenyan mediation was led by Kofi Annan and his team of prominent African personalities, which brought 
a high level of legitimacy to the proceedings. In addition, they invited technical support teams from 
private firms to help turn political questions into technical problems. The mediators held the right 
balance of familiarity with the country balanced by a strong sense of impartiality. In Zimbabwe, the 
mediation was undertaken by Mbeki and a team of South African political advisors. Mbeki has been 
repeatedly criticised for his partiality towards the former ruling party and his ideological biases were 
likely transported into the document and this allowed the creation of an inequitable arrangement. The 
mediation was not subject to a similar degree of international pressure as that which was seen in Kenya. 
Consequently, the agreements which were signed differ greatly in character. 
The Kenyan agreement wasn’t one document, but ten signed over a period of four months. It was 
comprehensive and included measures intended to resolve long-term issues. In spite of this, it failed to 
clarify a number of important issues. It failed to specify a guarantor of the accord and didn’t stipulate 
any monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities 
were later mandated by the AU to continue to oversee the implementation of the agreement. In this 
capacity, Annan instituted a civil society monitoring mechanism which would form the basis of 
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discussions at a series of conferences and review meetings. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Ironically, the Zimbabwean agreement allowed for the creation of two monitoring mechanisms, but 
both were constituted by members of the political parties whose performance the structures were 
intended to assess. These mechanisms have been ineffective as they lack the necessary independence 
and political will to monitor the reform process effectively. 
The implementation of the Kenyan Accord has been relatively successful. Although it was initially 
marred by disagreements between the principals, the parties have collaborated meaningfully to 
implement two review commissions, undertake electoral reform and oversee the promulgation of a new 
constitution. In contrast, the reforms that have been undertaken in the Zimbabwean case such as the 
reforms to the ZMC and the electoral commission have still allowed for substantial loopholes which 
would allow ZANU-PF to halt future progress. Violence has continued in Zimbabwe, albeit in a more 
discreet fashion. The agreement’s failure to mandate security reform is one of its greatest failings. It has 
allowed the intransigent elite to maintain its grip on the coercive structures of the state and continue 
efforts to suppress dissent and pressure the MDC into a retreat from the unity government. While the 
Kenyan agreement has been more successful, it has also had its failings. The government has failed to 
make adequate progress on addressing the plight of internally displaced persons and has not sufficiently 
addressed the land question. The reasons for the relative success of the Kenyan case and the stagnancy 
and lack of reforms seen in the Zimbabwean case will be addressed in the following two chapters. 
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Introduction 
Regional and international actors and bodies have played crucial roles in ensuring the implementation of 
the power sharing agreements in both Kenya and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, the roles played in the two 
cases have diverged, with Kenya experiencing greater international influences, whilst in Zimbabwe the 
regional body – the Southern African Development Community – has played a primary and almost 
unilateral role. This chapter will suggest that the different approaches undertaken by numerous actors 
towards the countries helps to explain the differing levels of success in implementing the reforms 
between the two cases.  
Kenya 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, Kenya is an extremely important African country from a geostrategic 
perspective. It has always been perceived as a stable and maturing democracy in a region plagued by 
political instability. When it experienced unprecedented levels of post-election political violence in 2007-
2008, the international community was taken by surprise and undertook rapid interventions to try to 
restore the country’s stability. This chapter will attempt to gauge the role played by both regional and 
international actors in ensuring the implementation of the agreement in the post-mediation phase. 
Regional Influences 
East African States 
The East African Community (EAC) was an important regional actor in the 1960s; it undertook 
experiments in expanded trade and investment links, forged cooperation in services and built a common 
regional identity.351 Differences between states served to destroy the emerging regional bloc in 1977, 
but since the mid-1990s, a new movement has emerged to restore and revive the EAC. Kenya had 
always been a core member of the group, a regional hegemon and beacon of political stability. This 
perception was drastically undermined by the 2007-2008 crisis and this called into question the 
credibility of regional bodies in managing conflicts.352 The EAC and the regional Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) remained paralysed and were unprepared to deal with the crisis. In 
spite of a few unsuccessful attempts on behalf of regional leaders to mediate an agreement in the crisis-
torn country, the domestic actors rejected their overtures, preferring ‘international’ mediation in the 
                                                          
351
 Khadiagala, G M. 2009, p. 432 
352
 Ibid 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 104 
 
form of the AU-Annan initiative. As a result of this, regional actors have largely been excluded from 
impacting upon the implementation of reforms in Kenya, preferring instead to defer to the African 
Union’s Panel of Eminent African Personalities (PEAP). As noted by Khadiagala (2009), regional actors 
have failed to draw important lessons from the 2007 crisis and 2008 mediation and have not capitalised 
on the opportunity to have a broad debate on collective strategies and institutions to manage diversity 
across the regional ethnic, racial and class divides.353 In the event of the re-emergence of hostilities in 
Kenya, it is likely that regional actors will again play a less than marginal role. 
The African Union and Kofi Annan 
As noted in the previous chapter, the African Union mandated the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities under Kofi Annan to undertake negotiations in 2008. The AU was directly involved through 
its commission Chairpersons, Jakaya Kikwete and John Kufour. Following the successful negotiation, the 
AU has not intervened directly to ensure the implementation of the power sharing agreement except 
through the PEAP Panel and the panel’s Chair and former UN chief, Kofi Annan. On 14 March 2008, the 
AU Peace and Security Council issued a statement which commended both the principals and the 
negotiators for the agreement that had been reached. The Council requested that the Panel would 
“continue to support the Kenyan parties in the implementation of these Agreements, including support 
to the various Committees and Commissions provided therein, as well as in the follow-up to the 
recommendations emanating from them.”354  Further, the AU requested that the Panel would “provide 
all the necessary support to the Coalition Government and other stakeholders in the Constitutional 
Review Process.” The AU thus consigned the monitoring and enforcement of the power sharing 
agreement to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities.  
To ensure continued engagement and streamline and facilitate the implementation of the agreements 
and the KNDR process, the Panel created a scaled-down Panel Secretariat, named the Coordination and 
Liaison Office (CLO) which would be stationed in Nairobi. This office came into force from 30 July 2008 
and was mandated to assist in the implementation of the KNDR commitments and support the coalition 
government in its attempts to address the long-term issues identified by Agenda Four.355 This body 
would also ensure clear communication between members of the Panel, government, civil society and 
the Kenyan public. In August 2010, the coalition government extended the mandate of the CLO for a 
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further two years as it envisaged that the body’s assistance would continue to be needed ahead of the 
elections scheduled for 2012. 
Although it was noted in the previous chapter that the agreement failed to specify monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms and the role of enforcement parties, this has since been established by the AU’s 
request to the Panel and the establishment of the CLO. Rather than creating a political body to monitor 
and report on the implementation of the agreement, the Panel mandated civil society to undertake 
independent monitoring of the Accord. This has been done in a participatory, credible and evidence-
based manner by the designated institution, South Consulting Ltd. The group has been undertaking 
independent reviews of the implementation of the KNDR under its Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation Monitoring Project since January 2009. The institute uses a mix of methods to collect its 
data, including interviews, focus groups, baseline surveys and the use of credible government, civil 
society, UN, media and NGO reports.356 The resulting reports then formed the basis for discussions in 
the implementation review meetings and conferences held by the Kofi Annan Foundation in conjunction 
with other partners such as the CLO, the International Center for Transitional Justice (the ICTJ) and the 
Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre). 
These organisations have been crucial partners in ensuring the implementation of the power sharing 
agreement. The HD Centre is “is an independent organisation dedicated to helping improve the global 
response to armed conflict.”357 The Centre has been involved in Kenya since the outbreak of the crisis 
when, on Kofi Annan’s request, it seconded two staff members to provide support to the mediation 
team and the Panel Secretariat. They also provided strategic advice on tactical issues and the 
formulation of peace agreements. They have continued their involvement in the post-agreement phase 
by providing strategic advice to the PEAP Panel. The ICTJ is also an independent, non-political 
organisation specializing in the field of transitional justice. According to their website, the “ICTJ works to 
help societies in transition address legacies of massive human rights violations and build civic trust in 
state institutions as protectors of human rights.”358 The organisation works to support government, civil 
society and the population at large in four key areas which are: criminal prosecutions, institutional 
                                                          
356
 South Consulting. 2009. “Project Context and Summary of Findings,” Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation Monitoring Project, found at: 
http://south.co.ke/Downloads/Reports/Projectcontextandsummaryoffindings.pdf 
357
 This brief can be found at: http://kofiannanfoundation.org/kenya 
358 International Center for Transitional Justice,  http://ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/kenya 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 106 
 
reform, truth-seeking and reparations.359 Each of these organisations is able to provide specialist advice 
on key issues surrounding the implementation of the accord and assist in keeping the coalition partners 
and government accountable. The involvement of these organisations is a substantial break from 
previous conflict mediation tactics which involved political actors as mediators. The Economist (2011) 
has referred to the increasing trend to involve private bodies in conflict negotiations as “privatising 
peace.”360 These bodies are unable to impose the same sanctions for non-compliance as traditional 
actors, but they also have a wider range of possible actions open to them and are able to be more 
creative in a search for solutions.361 This is an area in which further research should be undertaken to 
outline the positive and negative aspects of the involvement of private actors in negotiations in order to 
provide guidance for future mediation efforts. 
Review meetings on the status of implementation have been held regularly since 2009, with the third 
KNDR Conference – themed “Building a Progressive Kenya” – having taken place in December 2011.362 
This conference was attended by the KNDR Dialogue Team comprised of the principals from each party, 
AU Panel members and each party’s negotiators from the 2008 mediation process. The members of the 
AU Panel were John Kufour, Joe Clark, Graça Machel, Kofi Annan, Benjamin Mkapa, Quett Ketumile Joni 
Masire, Amos Sawyer and Willy Mutunga. There were approximately 350 delegates from government 
departments, agencies and commissions, civil society, the media, research organisations and UN 
agencies as well as former ambassadors and technical advisors who gathered to discuss the future of 
Kenya and debate the progress made on the KNDR process. Following this, on 17 January 2012, the 
Dialogue Team held its eleventh review meeting. These meetings have been convened regularly in the 4 
years since the signing of the power sharing agreement, to review the status of the implementation of 
reforms by the Kenyan government. The next meeting has been scheduled for 17 April 2012.363 This 
meeting and those that have gone before have met to discuss the reports compiled by South Consulting. 
These civil society reports on the implementation of the KNDR process have formed the basis for 
decisions that are taken by the Team and have influenced the degree of pressure to be applied to the 
Kenyan government in specific areas of governance reform.  
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Kofi Annan and the Panel have remained engaged with Kenya’s political leadership by undertaking 
regular visits to the Kenyan capital to meet with the principals. They have also attended regular press 
briefings and made statements following the announcement of developments that are crucial to the 
stability of the coalition government. Annan has also returned to Kenya periodically to lend his support 
to the process at difficult moments.364 This has been important as it has placed sustained pressure on 
the two leaders to move forward with reforms in spite of the existence of anti-reform elements within 
parliament. This has also been bolstered by sustained pressure applied by international actors.  
International Influences 
Kenya is an important factor on the African agendas of many ‘Western’ countries. As was noted in the 
previous chapter, international influences were particularly important in ensuring the success of the 
mediation efforts in 2008. Although they have played a smaller part in ensuring the success of the 
accord, foreign governments and multilateral bodies have placed pressure on the principals in times of 
conflict and deadlock. In April 2008 following the signing of the agreement, the parties were deadlocked 
on the division of cabinet posts. As a means to pressure the parties to break the impasse, the European 
Union threatened to cut off aid if a deal was not reached timeously.365  
The United States of America has also played an important role in applying pressure to the parties. In 
August 2009, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton met with senior Kenyan officials and informed them that 
the US government expected the implementation of the political and economic reforms without further 
delay.366 She also stated that the Obama administration was considering placing a travel ban on Kenyan 
officials who were obstructing efforts to implement reforms. In September of the same year, after 
continued foot-dragging by the Kenyan government, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Johnnie Carson, wrote a letter to the principals which threatened that the “future relationship with the 
United States is directly linked to the degree of your support for urgent implementation of the reform 
agenda as well as a clear opposition to the use of violence.”367 These threats are significant as Kenya is 
one of the greatest recipients of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa and sees the US as an important trading 
partner. If the USA had carried through with these threats, it would have had significant ramifications 
for the Kenyan economy. 
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 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has also undertaken an initiative to 
promote the “full implementation of the political, institutional and accountability reforms to align 
Kenyan institutions to the new constitution that are essential (sic) to bring true democracy, prosperity, 
and stability to Kenya.”368 It has used its local structures and soft power to place pressure on 
government through civil society structures and by empowering local actors.   
Following the maturing of the coalition government and the reduction of overt disagreements and 
deadlocks, the international community has not played a significant role in exerting pressure for 
reforms. The perception is that the government is ‘hobbling along’ and implementing reforms, albeit in 
fits and starts. There has not been a sufficiently low level of reform to warrant intervention and there is 
a perception that the Kenyan crisis has passed. This has meant that the Panel has largely been left to its 
own devices. 
The International Criminal Court 
The decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to confirm the charges and institute cases against 
four of the people identified by the CIPEV Commission has and will have unintended consequences on 
the implementation of the Accord and the political stability of Kenya. This is particularly true for Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto, the most prominent of the four who have been charged. Both politicians in 
the coalition government, Kenyatta and Ruto have presidential ambitions and have announced their 
intentions to run for the presidency in 2012. Prior to the confirmation of charges, the ICC proceedings 
had begun a process of realignment within Kenyan politics. There was the creation of a political alliance 
based on opposition to the ICC process and comprised of three ethnicities, Kikuyu (Kenyatta), Kalenjin 
(Ruto) and Kamba (Musyoka).369 This has led to it being dubbed the “KKK” alliance. The reason for their 
collusion was that it was assumed that an umbrella party would make it easier to cross the new 
threshold for winning the presidency, as the constitution has made this substantially more difficult. The 
members of the alliance believe that if they win the election and control the government, they will at 
least be able to delay the ICC proceedings.370 Subsequent to the confirmation of the charges, Kenyatta 
stepped down from his role as finance minister, although he retained the position of Deputy Prime 
Minister. Francis Muthaura, the third Kenyan to be indicted, has stepped down from his role as the Head 
of Public Service and Secretary to Cabinet. Their resignations may cause delays in the implementation of 
reforms and the passing of legislation by cabinet. Unfortunately, late in 2011 South Consulting had 
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already noted that the implementation of crucial reforms had taken a back seat to jostling ahead of the 
elections that are planned for 2012.  
The ICC proceedings have also reignited concerns over a resurgence of political and ethnic violence. In 
addition, there is a growing perception – aided by the propaganda campaigns of the affected politicians 
– that the ICC proceedings are merely a means by which the ‘West’ can pave the way for their preferred 
candidate, Odinga, who is seen to be the biggest beneficiary of the ICC predicament.371 This is likely to 
increase ethnic tensions in the areas most affected during the post-election violence. The Standard, a 
Kenyan daily newspaper reported that “the frenetic pace of electioneering activities by all political 
formations point to heightened anxieties, with leading politicians going out to all corners of the country 
to assert themselves as the next power barons.”372 The ICC proceedings have introduced a significant 
measure of uncertainty, anxiety and instability into the political system and this is sure to result in 
continued realignments amongst affected politicians within their parties. This will, no doubt, take 
precedence over the implementation of the agreement in the short term, and it may even threaten to 
derail it entirely.  
Conclusion 
In spite of their proximity and familiarity with the Kenyan case, regional countries and organisations 
have played peripheral roles in the negotiation and implementation phases of the KNDR process. This is 
largely as a result of their initial failures in the negotiation phase, but also due to the relative weakness 
of the regional East African Community (EAC). The most influential actor in ensuring the success of the 
accord has been Kofi Annan, as Chairman of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. There is a sense 
that the AU as a whole has not played a direct role in ensuring implementation, apart from working 
indirectly through the PEAP Panel. Although the Panel is an AU structure, it seems that ownership of the 
process has really been demonstrated by the Kofi Annan Foundation and related NGOs. Early in the 
implementation process, there was discernible pressure from countries such as the USA and regional 
blocs such as the EU to push the parties towards full effectuation of the agreement. This pressure has 
largely subsided due to the perception that the Kenyan crisis has passed and that the government is 
continuing with reforms, albeit at a diminished pace. Interestingly, the Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities has undertaken a cross-cutting strategy to promote implementation of the agreement. 
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They have encouraged the participation of international NGOs as technical experts to help guide the 
process, while mandating Kenyan civil society with the monitoring of the Accord. The participation of 
international agencies and eminent Africans has infused the process with legitimacy while the 
involvement of civil society has encouraged independent and objective reporting as well as broad 
ownership of the process. This also assists civil society to build its capacity to hold government to 
account and it encourages domestic advocacy around governance issues which may help to prevent 
backsliding and the need for constant engagement with the Panel as an enforcement party. 
Unfortunately, the decision to undertake the criminal prosecution of four Kenyans at The Hague has 
served to undermine and delay the implementation of the Kenyan Accord as politicians shuffle in a bid 
to secure their political futures ahead of the 2012 elections. 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
International and regional actors have long played a significant role in post-independence Zimbabwe, 
albeit in different ways. The role played by South Africa has been particularly important, and this has not 
ceased to be true during the tenure of the inclusive government. While in the Kenyan case, the African 
Union (AU) played a pivotal role, in Zimbabwe it deferred instead to the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), a regional body with a relatively strong history of cooperation between states. SADC 
in return appointed South Africa as the main party to intervene in Zimbabwe, first through the 
mediation efforts of President Thabo Mbeki and later through President Jacob Zuma who served as a 
mediator and guarantor of the implementation of the GPA. This chapter shall look briefly at the roles 
played by these important actors on impacting the outcome of the Global Political Agreement of 2008. It 
will also seek to understand the ways in which these actors were manipulated by the principals in an 
attempt to influence political outcomes.  
Regional Influences 
South Africa and Mbeki 
South Africa has played an important role in Zimbabwean affairs since early 2000. This was borne out in 
the country’s numerous engagements with Zimbabwean leaders and with regional and international 
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organisations concerned with the deepening crisis in the country. South African President Thabo Mbeki’s 
approach to Zimbabwe has been the subject of an extensive academic debate which will not be covered 
in detail here. However, it is important to understand this history in order to make sense of the failings 
of the GPA and the inherent bias within the document towards ZANU-PF. 
Mbeki’s approach towards Zimbabwe was characterised by three aspects. The first is the policy of ‘quiet 
diplomacy,’ the calling card of this framework is a refusal to recognise and address human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the Mugabe government and a tendency to refrain from criticism of the ZANU-PF 
government.373 This policy was evident in many speeches and statements made by the South African 
statesman. Secondly, following from this, Mbeki acted to block all criticism and proposed action against 
Mugabe in international fora. Thirdly, he deflected pressure for action on the Zimbabwean issue by 
claiming that negotiations between the principals were underway and that this mitigated the need for 
alternative actions by outside actors.374 Mbeki’s actions and statements towards Zimbabwe and the 
stance of the ruling African National Congress is illustrative of these points.  
Following the land invasions of 2000 and the accompanying widespread state-sponsored violence, 
Mbeki announced his support for the land reform process and wrote off South African concerns over the 
issue as residual racial prejudice.375 In spite of the extensive violence as a result of the reform process 
and the growing repression ahead of the 2000 elections, Mbeki allayed concerns expressed by the 
United States over the high levels of conflict and the credibility of the election and was still 
photographed walking hand-in-hand with Mugabe. Election observer missions from South Africa 
consistently declared the 2000, 2002 and 2005 polls ‘free and fair,’ or ‘credible’ in the face of 
widespread mayhem, oppression and human rights violations.376 A critical report on the 2002 elections 
written by Judges Moseneke and Khampepe was suppressed by Mbeki and had still not been released 
into the public domain a decade after its drafting. The findings of the South African election observer 
missions stood in stark contrast to those of most international delegations, such as those issued by the 
EU mission in 2002 which led to the imposition of travel restrictions on a number of senior ZANU-PF 
functionaries.377 
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Mbeki repeatedly frustrated attempts by international multilateral institutions to criticise the Mugabe 
government. Following the 2002 election, Mbeki blocked a condemnatory resolution on Zimbabwe at 
the annual meeting of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (UNHCHR). After this, he 
and his administration repeatedly introduced motions of ‘no action’ on the Zimbabwean situation at the 
UNHCHR and other UN bodies over the following years as a means to squash any formal debate on the 
issue.378 Even in April 2008, following the first round of elections, the South African government used its 
position on the UN Security Council to prevent the issue from appearing on the Council’s agenda. In July 
of the same year, following the widespread clamp down on the opposition, Mbeki lobbied Russia and 
China to exercise their veto against a resolution which would have imposed an arms embargo on 
Zimbabwe and sanctions on Mugabe and 11 of his core collaborators.379 Time and again, the reason 
cited to prevent action on Zimbabwe was that South Africa was in the process of initiating or facilitating 
negotiations between ZANU-PF and the MDC factions.380 Even in April 2008, at the height of the state-
sponsored crackdown, Mbeki insisted that the situation in Zimbabwe was not a crisis, but a normal 
electoral process.381 
During his tenure, Mbeki was repeatedly criticised by the official opposition and large sections of South 
African society for his policy towards Zimbabwe.  As President, Thabo Mbeki continually acted in a 
partisan manner towards Robert Mugabe. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011) contends that this can partly 
be explained by the ties that Mbeki created with ZANU-PF since the 1980s, his ideological sympathies 
with other African governments constituted by former liberation movements and his personal views of 
the complexity of the Zimbabwean situation.382 Crucially, he suggests that Mbeki’s stance was informed 
by his wider foreign policy imperatives. His foreign policy emphasised multilateralism rather than the 
unilateralism that had backfired in the country’s dealings with Nigeria, Lesotho and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). He also wanted to avoid the bullying strategy that had been pursued by the 
Apartheid regime in the SADC region and crucially, he wanted to avoid being seen to be pushing a 
western regime-change agenda in Harare. Finally, Mbeki intended to position South Africa at the head of 
the ‘African renaissance’ by taking a leading role in stabilising the continent politically and economically 
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and fighting for a more respected place for Africa within the global political order.383 Each of these 
aspects encouraged Mbeki’s perceived soft stance on the situation in Zimbabwe. 
Following the March election, Levy Mwanawasa, the Zambian president and chair of SADC convened an 
emergency summit to discuss the refusal of the ZEC to declare the results of the presidential poll. On his 
way to the summit, Mbeki detoured to Zimbabwe and greeted Mugabe with the usual displays of 
affection including hugging and holding the hands of the ageing dictator.384 After this meeting, Mbeki 
addressed a group of reporters and stated that the delay in announcing the results from the election 
was part of the ‘normal electoral process in terms of the law of Zimbabwe’ in spite of its blatant 
illegality. As Mugabe had decided not to attend the SADC meeting, Mbeki delivered the disputed 
president’s input to the heads of state of the 15-member union and he tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent 
Tsvangirai from addressing the meeting.385 As a result of these issues and those highlighted above, 
Mbeki’s mediation in the 2008 negotiation process came under increasing criticism from a number of 
sectors including the MDC-T, sections of the ANC tripartite alliance, countries like Tanzania and 
Botswana and the West. Each of these groups expressed doubts regarding the South African president’s 
neutrality.386 
Following from the close relationship between Mbeki and Mugabe, and the South African president’s 
inclination to protect the Zimbabwean regime from international criticism, it is far easier to understand 
the failings written into the GPA and the uneven sharing of power between the parties. This is not 
necessarily to say that Mbeki conspired to create a lop-sided agreement, but that his ideological 
leanings and propensity to defer to the elder statesman most likely led him to employ less leverage and 
accept a weaker agreement than may have been the case under a different mediator. 
The Southern African Development Community  
Zimbabwe’s economic and political implosion has had wide-reaching regional implications. As a result, 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a 15-member regional security grouping, has 
long been involved in the situation in Zimbabwe. The country has been a constant feature on the agenda 
of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) for the past decade. In spite 
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of its increasing frustration with Zimbabwe in the 2007-2008 period, SADC’s principles of solidarity 
prevented the organisation from criticising Mugabe’s policies in the early 2000s. However, even SADC 
was unable to pronounce the 2008 election processes as credible, particularly in light of the 2004 
protocol on elections developed by the regional body.387 Following the SADC-mandated mediation 
initiated by SA President Thabo Mbeki in 2007, the union deferred to this nation and allowed the 
regional hegemon to take the lead on ensuring the implementation of the power sharing agreement. In 
spite of SADC’s decision not to legitimise the 2008 election and to begin negotiations to institute a 
power-sharing government, they still invited Mugabe to the summits of heads of state under the guise 
of “President of Zimbabwe” and refrained from direct criticism of the aging leader.  
SADC’s mission is “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good 
governance and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective 
player in international relations and the world economy.”388 However, the principles in Article 4 of the 
SADC treaty have largely trumped concerns with good governance and durable peace and security. 
Article 4 provides for the “sovereign equality of all states” and “solidarity, peace and security.”389 
Sovereignty has repeatedly been invoked as a reason for the states to refrain from interference in each 
other’s affairs, and solidarity has prevented the body from making statements condemning the actions 
of a member state. 
SADC’s reluctance to criticise or apply direct pressure to Mugabe to implement the GPA also has 
historical roots. The countries of the SADC region were plagued by similar experiences of colonial 
repression and stark similarities in their subsequent liberation struggles. Countries in this regional bloc 
remain dominated by governments constituted by former liberation movements whose ideology is still 
deeply rooted in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiment.390 Mugabe has played upon this and 
deliberately models himself and his party as the guardians of the ‘African nationalist revolution’, a 
bastion in the region and internationally against resurgent neo-imperialist forces led by Britain in 
collusion with the United States and European Union.391 While his anti-imperialist rhetoric often seems 
laughable, it still resonates deeply with many of the leaders in the region, particularly the remaining ‘old 
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guard.’ In addition, many of the leaders of SADC still feel indebted to Mugabe and hold him in high 
esteem. This is a result of the important role that he and the Zimbabwean defence forces played in 
various struggles in a number of the region’s countries. Zimbabwe intervened in Mozambique in behalf 
of the FRELIMO government in the 1980s; actively participated in UN peacekeeping operations in 
Angola; played an important role in the mediation of disputes in Mozambique and Angola; supported 
the ANC struggle in South Africa in its later years and commanded a force of Zimbabweans, Angolans 
and Namibians during the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998.392 Angola, 
Mozambique, the DRC and South Africa are all indebted to Zimbabwe and Mugabe, thus making it 
difficult for these regional powers to openly criticise the Zimbabwean president even within the SADC 
forum. 
Following the resignation of Mbeki as president and the election of Jacob Zuma in 2009, the new South 
African president assumed the role of mediator in Zimbabwe. While Mbeki had been lenient on 
Mugabe, Zuma took a stronger stance. In a clear break with Mbeki’s era, Zuma appointed three of his 
most powerful and trusted advisors to act as his points persons for the mediation process. These three – 
Lindiwe Zulu, Mac Maharaj and Charles Nqaqula – would act on Zuma’s behalf and report to him on all 
developments in the Zimbabwean situation.393 At SADC’s special summit on Zimbabwe in Maputo in 
November 2009, Zuma was reported to have been firmer with Mugabe than anyone in SADC had been 
since the emergence of the crisis. He reportedly told the three principles that “with him at the helm of 
the mediation, it was no longer business as usual.”394 This stronger stance was as a result of South 
African frustration with the slow pace of reform and an intention to have settled the Zimbabwean issue 
ahead of the soccer world cup in June 2010. Meanwhile, SADC allowed South Africa to keep their 
position as facilitator and continued to defer to the state while calling for adherence to the GPA, 
continued negotiations on outstanding issues, renewed foreign investment and assistance and the 
removal of sanctions.395  
It soon became apparent that in spite of the stronger stance adopted by President Zuma, the unity 
government had continued to stumble along and the reform process continued to be stymied. This led 
to a perceptible hardening of SADC’s stance towards the Zimbabwean parties, and ZANU-PF in particular 
                                                          
392
 Ibid, pp. 13-14 
393
 International Crisis Group. 2010. Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition, Africa Briefing 
No. 70, 3 March 2010, p. 13 
394
 Ibid 
395
 Ibid, p. 14 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 116 
 
during 2011. At its summit in Livingstone in March, the organisation noted the lack of progress on the 
Zimbabwean situation and the concurrent resurgence of political violence. The summit then issued a 
communiqué which resolved that: 
 there must be an immediate end of violence, intimidation, hate speech, harassment, and any other form 
of action that contradicts the letter and spirit of GPA; 
 all stakeholders to the GPA should implement all the provisions of the GPA and create a conducive 
environment for peace, security, and free political activity; 
 the Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe should complete all the steps necessary for the holding of the 
election including the finalisation of the constitutional amendment and the referendum; 
 SADC should assist Zimbabwe to formulate guidelines that will assist in holding an election that will be 
peaceful, free and fair, in accordance with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
Elections; 
 The Troika of the Organ shall appoint a team of officials to join the Facilitation Team and work with the 
Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to ensure monitoring, evaluation and 
implementation of the GPA. The Troika shall develop the Terms of Reference, time frames and provide 
regular progress report, the first, to be presented during the next SADC Extraordinary Summit. Summit 
will review progress on the implementation of GPA and take appropriate action.
396
 
 
This communique caused considerable distress and frustration within ZANU-PF’s ranks. The party then 
undertook a regional lobbying effort to prevent the statement from being endorsed by the member 
states. In spite of their efforts, the statement was endorsed at the summit of heads of state in June and 
it seemed that the body would be taking a much harder stance on the Zimbabwean issue. 
Unfortunately, the resolutions of the SADC communiqué have not translated into significant changes in 
the Zimbabwean situation. The team of officials that were to be deployed to bolster the work of JOMIC 
had still not been mobilised more than 8 months since the endorsement of the communiqué. It seems 
that the Zimbabwean issue has been an Achilles heel for the regional organisation. A ruling on 
Zimbabwe by the SADC Tribunal and the Tribunal’s subsequent suspension show the inability of the 
regional body to enforce rulings and decisions against Mugabe. The SADC Tribunal was established in 
1992 to ensure adherence to the SADC treaty by member states and to adjudicate disputes between 
member states and individual persons who are citizens of SADC countries. The case which appears to 
have led directly to the suspension of the tribunal involved Zimbabwe; the court ruled that a number of 
white Zimbabweans had been subjected to racial discrimination and had been denied access to legal 
recourse in the country after their land had been seized during the Fast Track Land Reform process.397 
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The Tribunal found the government guilty of a breach of its treaty obligations and directed the state to 
pay compensation to the claimants. The government of Zimbabwe first ignored and then violated the 
ruling.398 The Tribunal then referred Zimbabwe to the SADC Council of Ministers for appropriate action, 
who was then obliged by the SADC treaty to recommend sanctions or suspension.399 Instead of 
suspending Zimbabwe as it had in the case of Madagascar, SADC suspended the tribunal citing the need 
for a review of the institution’s role, functions and terms of reference. This is an example of the 
toothless way in which the regional body deals with Zimbabwean intransigence, and it does not bode 
well for its ability to enforce compliance with the GPA. 
Unfortunately, late in 2011 there was a noticeable slackening in the commitment of Zuma’s facilitation 
team to ensure the full implementation of the Agreement. Zuma's international relations adviser, 
Lindiwe Zulu acknowledged this problem citing more immediate domestic and international 
commitments.400 The recent decision by Tanzania not to appoint a monitor to the JOMIC committee is 
also a major victory for Mugabe’s regional lobbying efforts. Dar es Salaam has agreed with Mugabe that 
sending such a monitor would be a breach of national sovereignty.401 Recent remarks made by Zambian 
President Michael Sata to London’s Daily Telegraph suggesting that Tsvangirai is “pro-Western” and 
unreliable are seen as part of a growing trend towards growing SADC sympathy for the aging 
Zimbabwean president and his election plans. The situation in the former ‘breadbasket of Africa’ seems 
to have split SADC into various alliances, particularly along generational lines.402 Following a meeting in 
January 2012 held between President Sata and Mugabe in Livingstone, the Zambian president came out 
in support of the holding of elections in 2012 in the crisis-ridden state, a move that is seen as a 
significant crack in the uniform position of the regional body which may enable Mugabe to split the 
bloc.403 Zimbabwe-fatigue has also begun to set in following the third anniversary of the creation of the 
unity government and the continuing frustration of reform efforts. South Africa has quietly suggested 
that in the face of the looming 2013 deadline, it may negotiate a GPA-2 – a second period of compulsory 
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power sharing.404 Undoubtedly this would be against the wishes of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, and it is likely 
that they will increase regional and continental lobbying efforts to endorse the holding of a new election 
within 2012.  
In sum, the Southern African Development Community was tasked with the oversight of the 
implementation of the GPA along with the AU. Rather than taking a strong stance on the issue, the 
regional body deferred to the South African mediators and facilitators. This meant that the process was 
largely guided by the whims and personalities of the South African facilitator. Regardless, SADC has a 
vested interest in seeing the Zimbabwean crisis resolved as members of the body are estimated to have 
lost more than US$36 billion in potential investments in Zimbabwe as a result of the protracted crisis.405 
The regional bloc has continued to call for the full implementation of the GPA and the election roadmap 
as well as the removal of international sanctions on the members of Mugabe’s ruling elite, but has 
refrained from placing sanctions on the intransigent parties. How these contradictory trends in SADC’s 
role in settling the Zimbabwean issue will play out remains to be seen in light of the favoured principles 
of sovereignty and solidarity amongst member states in a climate of increasing Zimbabwe-fatigue. The 
SADC body has few enforcement mechanisms, and even fewer that it is willing to use against one of its 
founding members. 
The African Union  
The African Union (AU) has not played as strong a role in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe as it had in 
mediating the Kenyan impasse. The crisis in Zimbabwe split AU states into pro- and anti-Mugabe 
camps.406 The post-election crisis was a crucial area for debate at the 11th AU Summit in Sharm el Sheikh, 
Egypt in July 2008. Eventually the summit adopted a resolution that didn’t apply sanctions against the 
government nor even insist on the upholding of AU core principles on the conduct of elections.407 
Instead, the resolution encouraged the continuation of mediation by SADC to enable the two main 
political parties to negotiate a solution to the impasse. The reluctance of the AU to be firm with 
Zimbabwe, particularly over its overt disregard for AU principles governing elections, suggests that 
solidarity remains a vital imperative in the AU and it continues to complicate the AU’s role as an honest 
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broker in national conflicts.408 The reluctance of this body to condemn the violence in Zimbabwe is 
evidenced by the defeat at an AU Summit in 2006 of a resolution issued by the AU Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights in 2005 condemning the excessive use of force by the Zimbabwean state 
against its citizens.409 The failure of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights – established in 
2004 – to pass a judgement on the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe is a further indictment of the 
failure of AU organs to deal adequately with the situation in the Southern African country.  
The African Union has played a largely marginal role in the situation in Zimbabwe in spite of its status as 
a guarantor. Instead the continental body has deferred responsibility for guaranteeing and overseeing 
the implementation of the Zimbabwean agreement to the regional SADC body. This has served to 
undermine efforts to ensure the resolution of the crisis as SADC is often unwilling or unable to take a 
strong stance on the Zimbabwean situation and the lack of intervention from the AU has not provided 
the adequate pressure on the Zimbabwean parties to overcome the numerous deadlocks. At the January 
2012 Summit in Addis Ababa, the Zimbabwean issue was not debated, in spite of Mugabe’s lobbying to 
garner support for elections in 2012. In the absence of a stronger position taken by the AU Summit of 
heads of state and a concerted effort by SADC, the problems with the GPA’s implementation are likely to 
linger on and success will be determined almost entirely by the efforts of the South African facilitation 
team. 
International Influences 
The influences of international organisations and foreign powers on the implementation of the power 
sharing agreement have been limited. The United Nations has played almost no role, particularly after 
South Africa, China and Russia frustrated moves by the UN Security Council to introduce resolutions on 
intervention in Zimbabwe in 2008.410 Attempts by Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, and his Assistant 
Secretary-General were snubbed by Mugabe when they sought deeper engagement. In spite of this, it is 
worth noting that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has remained consistently engaged in the 
country and has escalated its involvement since the creation of the inclusive government.411 The UNDP 
has engaged through the Multi Donor Support Fund and provided substantial funding to the COPAC 
process, enabling considerable progress to be made in the consultation and drafting stages.  
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The Commonwealth of Nations would have been well placed to influence the implementation of the 
power sharing agreement, had it not been for a decision taken in 2003 to suspend the errant country 
and Mugabe’s subsequent withdrawal from the body.412 This move placed the African nation firmly 
outside the realm of influence of the organisation, and as a result the Commonwealth has played no role 
in influencing the outcomes of the inclusive process. 
Sanctions 
The only area in which international players have had limited influence is in imposing and maintaining a 
sanctions regime against members of ZANU-PF. These ‘targeted’ sanctions are a relatively new form of 
sanctions regime which is targeted at specific individuals (in the form of travel bans and asset freezes); 
others involve policies that relate to the international financial institutions (IFIs) and government-to-
government relations (such as restrictions on loans, credit and development assistance as well as arms 
embargoes).413 There are exceptions within and distinctions between all of these measures and they are 
not uniformly applied by different states, but the generic term ‘sanctions’ will be used in this chapter for 
simplicity. These sanctions were first applied by the European Union and United States of America in the 
early 2000s as a response to state-sponsored violence and governance problems. Currently the USA has 
imposed sanctions against 121 individuals and 69 entities and its Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (ZDERA) instructs US representative in the IFIs to vote against credit and loan extensions 
except those intended for basic human needs or good governance purposes.414 The EU’s measures also 
target individuals within the ZANU-PF elite and their business interests; these individuals were identified 
as being inhibitors of democratic change within Zimbabwe. These measures are a new form of sanction 
which is intended to “constrain and change certain behaviour and promote international norms and 
standards as well as meet domestic policy needs.”415 The impact of these measures has been difficult to 
gauge and detailed evaluations of the impact of sanctions have not been undertaken, which leads to a 
reliance on anecdotal evidence. It seems that while the sanctions have become a frustration for 
members of the ZANU-PF elite, they have not had the desired effect of pushing members of the party to 
commit to the full implementation of the GPA.416 Instead, anecdotal evidence points to the possibility 
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that sanctions have strengthened ZANU hardliners against the party’s moderates and the MDC factions 
and has provided a justification for the frustration of reform efforts.417 
The removal of sanctions was included as a clause within the GPA and intransigent members of the 
former ruling party have used the MDC’s inability to have these sanctions removed as a justification for 
their foot-dragging and the slow pace of reforms.418 MDC-M419 representatives and members of civil 
society have suggested that these individuals want sanctions to remain so that the ZANU-PF – which has 
already mounted a successful misinformation campaign around this issue – can use the sanctions regime 
as a rallying-point during the coming elections. ZANU-PF and Mugabe have used the sanctions issue as a 
propaganda narrative to reinforce their image of Zimbabwe as a victim of external interference and neo-
colonialism and have repeatedly insisted that the country’s economic woes are directly attributable to 
the Western-imposed sanctions. The MDC formations have failed to counteract ZANU-PF’s propaganda 
machine and a large percentage of Zimbabweans have bought into the party’s rhetoric. The former 
ruling party has also used this issue to discredit the former opposition, arguing that they take direction 
from Washington and London and are little more than Western puppets.420 
While there is little hard evidence relating to the impact of the sanctions regime, there is mounting 
agreement that they have not been effective in promoting behavioural changes or greater 
implementation of the GPA. The amounts of money that have been frozen are generally small both in 
absolute and relative terms to the likely resources of the individuals targeted.421 In addition, the looting 
of mineral resources from the recently-discovered Marange and Chiadzwa diamond fields have allowed 
senior party members and security force leaders to circumvent the negative impacts of the sanctions 
regime. In particular, the arms embargoes that have been imposed have been inefficiently enforced and 
monitored and are often not comprehensive.422 Members of the security forces have still been 
successful in finding alternative arms sources, particularly from China. The sanctions have been 
ineffective in promoting the implementation of the GPA, but western states maintain that the removal 
of sanctions will only occur upon full execution of the GPA and the holding of free and fair elections. In a 
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number of ways, the sanctions have helped to slow down the reform process and provide a platform for 
antagonism between the principals to the agreement. The role of international actors has thus been 
ambiguous with regards to the implementation of the GPA. 
Conclusion 
In the Zimbabwean case, international bodies and states have largely played peripheral roles in ensuring 
the implementation of the power sharing agreement. The measures they have undertaken to coerce 
compliance have been largely ineffectual. At a continental level, the African Union has not played a 
significant role, in spite of its position as a guarantor of the agreement. This is a result of an AU policy 
which defers to regional organisations as the primary interlocutors in instances of crisis and mediation. 
The Southern African Development Community has played a primary role in mediating and facilitating 
the Global Political Agreement through its South African facilitators, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. 
SADC has shied away from being firm with the Zimbabwean parties and in spite of the firmer stance 
adopted at the March 2011 summit, little has come of the resolutions adopted by the body. The 
lacklustre performance of the principals and the stuttering reform in Zimbabwe is largely attributable to 
the inadequacies within SADC and the body’s inability to deal harshly with intransigent parties. The 
enforcement of the implementation of the 2008 agreement is likely to continue to be left up to the 
South African facilitation team, who are currently preoccupied with other important issues both at a 
continental and international level. Zimbabwe has been an Achilles heel for the regional bloc, and may 
well succeed in rendering a significant split in the body. 
Conclusion 
Regional and international bodies and organisations have had divergent, but extremely important 
impacts on the implementation of the power sharing agreements in Kenya and Zimbabwe. While in 
Kenya, the regional body was unable and unwilling to participate in mediation and implementation 
processes, the Southern African Development Community has been directly responsible for the 
Zimbabwean situation from early on in the crisis. The African Union participated in the Kenyan process 
through giving the Panel of Eminent African Personalities a mandate to both negotiate and enforce an 
agreement. In Zimbabwe, this continental body refrained from acting as an enforcer, opting instead to 
defer to the regional SADC bloc.  
From the above discussions, it is clear that the personality and perceived legitimacy of the negotiator 
and facilitator is a crucial determinant of the success or failure of the agreement. In South Africa, Thabo 
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Mbeki’s ideological leanings and sympathies for the former ruling party in Zimbabwe led to the creation 
of a lop-sided agreement and a lack of innovative thinking around the promotion of a balanced coalition. 
In Kenya, Kofi Annan exhibited inspired leadership and innovative thinking. In spite of the faults built 
into the Kenyan Accord, he ensured that cabinet positions were evenly distributed and through a 
sharing of assistant positions, that no party could turn allocated government ministries into personal or 
party fiefdoms. This has led to the Kenyan government performing more effectively than its 
Zimbabwean counterpart, for which the term ‘government of national unity’ is a laughable misnomer.  
In terms of the monitoring and evaluation of the agreement in Kenya, Annan again displayed inspired 
leadership through his decision to have independent civil society organisations act as monitors of the 
implementation of the Accord. The reports created through this inclusive civil society process were then 
taken to the highest levels and discussed in a series of review meetings which included implementing 
partners, government functionaries, PEAP members and technical advisors. This allowed for greater 
pressure to be placed on government by civil society, technical experts and independent international 
actors, and it promoted the cooperation of the coalition partners in spite of the existence of anti-reform 
elements in government. In Zimbabwe, the monitoring mechanisms were instead sabotaged at birth by 
the decision that they would be comprised of members of the political parties who were party to the 
agreement. Accordingly, it would be in their interests not to report accurately or to ensure that the 
committee would be wracked by internal conflicts. When monitoring has been undertaken in Zimbabwe, 
the follow-through from the regional body has not been sufficient to place pressure on intransigent 
elements and enforce implementation. Both Mbeki and Zuma failed to garner the support of the 
international community to place concerted pressure on the principals, and where this happened, it was 
successfully deflected and dismissed by Mugabe as neo-imperialism. Both Mbeki and Zuma failed to 
include members of civil society or technical experts in the process, preferring instead to have their own 
political functionaries involved in monitoring and evaluation. This has led to a lack of sufficient skills in 
mediation and navigating the complex issues facing the unity government and an increasingly politicised 
process. The situation in Zimbabwe needs to be ‘depoliticised’ and reduced to a technical exercise of 
monitoring and evaluation and the enforcement of decisions. 
In spite of the role of SADC as a guarantor of the agreement, it has been unwilling and unable to enforce 
its decisions taken against Robert Mugabe, and has instead allowed the 88 year old president to dictate 
the agenda. In the Kenyan case, the agreements neglected to nominate an enforcement agency, but the 
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effective use of carrots and sticks by the lead negotiator in the post-agreement phase has allowed for a 
substantial degree of progress to be made. 
Finally, the role of sanctions and the ICC prosecutions in ensuring implementation has been mixed. The 
sanctions have allowed anti-reform elements in Zimbabwe to justify their foot-dragging and there is 
little evidence that they have contributed substantially to changing norms and behaviour as was 
intended. The ICC prosecutions have introduced substantial anxiety and tension into the political 
environment and it is likely that the concern with ensuring their political futures will lead politicians to 
place the implementation of the reform agenda on a back-burner. 
The role of different bodies and organisations has been a crucial determining factor in the 
implementation of the power sharing agreements. This is not to ignore the age-old debate over 
structure and agency; in fact, the sixth chapter in this report will briefly examine the role of political 
culture and spoilers in determining the outcomes of the agreements. 
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Introduction 
The influence of ‘spoilers’ and local political actors is particularly relevant to the Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean cases, as the interests and disposition of participants have been important to determine 
the degree of success or failure of power sharing agreements. Stedman (1997) points out that the 
greatest risk to peace-building in post-conflict situations can come from ‘spoilers’ – these are defined as 
leaders and parties that have the capacity and will to resort to violence to subvert peace processes 
through the use of force.423 This is not an uncontroversial statement, but the following chapter will 
attempt to gauge the veracity of this claim for the two cases under consideration. This definition needs 
to be slightly amended for the purposes of this report and for its application to instances of power 
sharing in the context of democratic deadlock. Instead, spoilers in this case can be seen as leaders and 
parties that have the capacity and will to frustrate reform processes through obfuscation, delays and 
non-implementation. Although the influences of regional and international actors have been vital in 
ensuring the implementation of the agreement, their ability to achieve success is determined and 
constrained to some degree by the cooperation and actions of local political actors. Both cases display 
the ‘politics of survival’ in which members of the political elite do what is necessary to ensure their 
political futures. The way in which this has played out in each case has been different as each country’s 
particular history and political culture has shaped incentives and avenues for action. The divergence 
seen in the implementation of the power sharing agreements across the two cases can largely be 
explained by the disparate interests and motivations of the principals in each country. This chapter will 
attempt to build upon the chapters that have come before and briefly outline the political culture 
prevalent in each country and the impact of political actors on the implementation of the agreements. 
Kenya 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 of this report outlined the major fault lines existent in Kenyan society prior to the outbreak of 
violence in December 2007. This chapter noted that Kenyan political parties are inadequately 
institutionalised and prone to undertaking ephemeral alliances which have short shelf-lives. Due to 
inadequate institutionalisation of these parties, politics in Kenya has long been characterised by a 
preoccupation with ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation during times of heightened political tension. 
Alliances that have been struck across ethnic fault lines have not been deep or altruistic, but rather 
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opportunistic attempts to maximise personal or party political agendas. During the multi-party era, 
Kenyan politics has undergone periods of concentration – as leaders brokered viable electoral pacts – 
and fragmentation when these alliances inevitably broke down following the completion of the 
election.424 This has led to a situation where few political actors have not, at one or another point, 
worked as colleagues.425 This high level of elite cohesion would have important repercussions for the 
implementation of the power sharing agreement. 
Corruption and Patronage Politics 
Since the late colonial period, Kenyan politics has been characterised by a strong patronage system that 
was enhanced and continued under Kenyatta and Moi. These patronage systems were largely 
perpetuated along ethnic lines, and a perception that economic privileges were accruing inequitably 
along ethnic lines was a significant driving force for ethnic animosity in the lead-up to the 2007 election. 
The signing of the Kenyan accord did not eradicate the patronage system; instead both parties 
experienced strong pressure from below to provide avenues for patronage for political leaders at both 
national and local levels who had mobilised support during the election campaign and its aftermath.426 
This led to the creation of the bloated cabinet and the exorbitant salaries and benefits paid to 
parliamentarians which has placed them amongst the highest paid legislators in the world.427 This move 
was made in June 2010, shortly before the referendum for the new constitution which would prevent 
arbitrary salary increases for parliamentarians.428 This shows the disdain of law-makers for the people of 
Kenya, and their intention to accumulate as much as possible before the new constitution serves to 
constrain the resources available to them to maintain their dense patronage networks. 
 The post-agreement era has not seen a significant reduction in corruption in spite of statements made 
by the principals regarding the rooting out of corrupt officials. In December 2010, officials from the 
finance ministry reported that corruption may be costing the government as much as $4 billion per year, 
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reportedly by siphoning money from development projects.429 In July 2011, the World Bank suspended a 
drought management project after an audit determined that more than US$4.4 million dollars or Sh362 
million had been embezzled over two financial years.430 Corruption has long been a major problem in 
Kenya in spite of the existence of anti-corruption legislation and the existence of the Kenyan Anti-
Corruption Commission created in 2003. The 2002-2007 Kibaki government’s failure to prosecute high-
level corruption has not been corrected by the new government, in spite of it taking an outwardly strong 
stance against graft by public officials. Leaked US embassy cables from 2011 suggest that Kibaki and 
Odinga intentionally failed to take action against officials implicated in corrupt activities relating to a 
maize scheme and the free primary education system. The reason for their lack of action is reportedly 
due to the implicated persons being members of their families and their close associates.431  It took 
nearly four years for the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) Bill to be passed into law, and it 
only took effect on 5 September 2011. This bill created a new anti-corruption commission with better 
oversight institutions and an increased mandate. The Act fundamentally alters the legal institutional 
framework of anti-corruption efforts.432 However, the creation of the commission is not an end in the 
fight against corruption. The commission is awaiting the enactment of other legislation and the drafting 
of regulations to enable a number of its functions. It will also require substantial political will to ensure 
the independence and successful functioning of this institution. 
Elite Cohesion 
As noted above, the elite nature of politics in Kenya and the continual reshuffling of political alliances in 
Kenya had led to a high level of elite cohesion. The crisis in 2007 and 2008 had been the result of 
mounting distrust between Kibaki and the ODM alliance which centred on Odinga. The ODM had been 
created as an alliance of the disenchanted following Kibaki’s reneging on the founding promises of the 
NARC coalition. The cleavages fomented in this period of fragmentation had not fundamentally split the 
elite, as the alliances formed were only loose coalitions based on individual self-interest and 
                                                          
429
 Mwachiro, K. “Kenya Corruption Costs Government Dearly,” BBC, 3 December 2010, found at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11913876, accessed on 5/03/2012 
430
 “Donors Cut Aid Over Fresh Funds Scandal,” The Daily Nation, found at: 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Donors+cut+aid+over+fresh+funds+scandal+/-/1056/1196592/-/62ggocz/-
/index.html, accessed on 5/08/2011 
431
 Leftie, P. “Kenya: Wikileaks – Principals Accused of Covering Up Scandals,” The Daily Nation, 1 March 2011, 
found at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201103010989.html, accessed on 5/03/2012 
432 Oiteno, W. “The New Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission: An analysis of its functions and administration,” 
Transparency International – Kenya. Found at: 
http://www.tikenya.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=89&Itemid=146, accessed on 
5/03/2012 
A Marriage of Inconvenience: Comparing the Implementation of the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Power Sharing Agreements 
 
Page | 129 
 
considerations of political survival. Many of the leaders such as William Ruto, Musalia Mudavadi and 
Charity Ngilu who found themselves as members of the ODM in 2007, had previously been protégés and 
allies of Kibaki and Moi. Considering the deep connections that cut across perceived party lines, the 
violence in 2007 and 2008 had not rendered a deep divide within the political elite, but had called into 
question how the spoils would be divided in the post-election phase.433 In Kenya there has not been a 
long history of fierce rivalry between parties such as that seen in Zimbabwe. 
Impunity 
The violence 2007 and early 2008 was extremely complex and was perpetrated by a wide range of 
actors. Both the ODM and PNU were implicated in the violence and culpability permeated through all 
levels of party and government hierarchies. As a result of the diffusion of violence, neither the 
government nor the opposition were able to claim a monopoly over victimhood, and both had reason to 
fear prosecutions.434 This helps to explain why the Kenyan government has consistently failed to hold 
perpetrators to account and has undermined the TJRC, for fear that these processes would implicate 
government functionaries and disrupt patronage structures. Indeed the ‘KKK’ alliance created by William 
Ruto, Uhuru Kenyatta and Kalonzo Musyoka based on their opposition to the ICC proceedings is a clear 
example of the alliances created to continue the culture of impunity and frustrate attempts to bring 
justice within reach. 
Politics of Collusion435 
There are a number of ways in which these dynamics have undermined the implementation of the 
power sharing accord. The disagreements seen during the early days of the power sharing agreements 
were less the result of an open rivalry between the parties and the principals than clashes over how the 
spoils of the new government would be divided.436 The implementation of the agreements was initially 
slow, characterised by foot-dragging and inadequate political will. This was particularly true of the 
attempts to achieve justice for the victims of the post-election violence. In spite of the CIPEV 
commission’s report being published in October 2008, the recommendations to institute a special 
tribunal had not been implemented by 5 November 2009.437 Parliament had repeatedly frustrated 
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attempts to create a court to address the issue of impunity for the violence. Four years later, in spite of 
the ICC proceedings, far-reaching justice for victims is still kept off the agenda. The Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission has been hobbling along, but achieving little due to time constraints and an 
overly broad mandate. This seems to be contrived rather than incidental as government tries to stymie 
the processes that may lead to members of the political elite being implicated in violent activities. The 
politics of collusion theorised by Cheeseman and Tendi (2010) suggests that the history of elite cohesion, 
corruption, patronage and a shared responsibility for violence has led to the creation of a broad anti-
reform alliance within cabinet and within parliament. This explains the distinct lack of reform on the 
areas identified in the previous chapter. As few of the reforms enshrined in the new constitution 
threaten to disenfranchise one particular party disproportionately over the other, there has been a 
relative consensus between the parties over reform efforts. The 2010 constitution’s reduction of 
presidential powers is thus not seen to be threatening by either of the parties as they stand on a 
relatively equal electoral footing and it is reassuring that should they lose, their opponent will not be all-
powerful. 
Conclusion 
The lack of an opposition culture such as that prevailing in Zimbabwe has led to a better record on the 
implementation of the power sharing agreement in Kenya. Kenya’s high level of elite cohesion enabled 
dialogue across the two parties and resulted in progress in a number of areas, particularly on 
constitutional reform.438 Due to the relatively equal standing of the two parties to the agreement, and 
the uncertainty of the outcome of the 2012 elections, the reforms to government institutions in the 
Kenyan Accord have not been stymied to the degree of the Zimbabwean case. This relative uncertainty 
has provided an atmosphere in which the parties have allowed for a reduction of executive powers to 
prevent the possibility of the opposition gaining an all-powerful presidency. However, in areas in which 
there is widespread culpability within the political elite, such as corruption and human rights violations, 
these groups have collaborated to prevent prosecution and continue a culture of impunity. The political 
lobbying that has begun in earnest ahead of the 2012 elections is likely to further delay the effectuation 
of the Accord. 
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Zimbabwe 
Introduction 
The political culture in Zimbabwe has, for more than two decades, been characterised by a ‘politics of 
survival.’ Threats to the dominance of President Robert Mugabe and his liberation coterie have been 
countered with the increasing militarisation of government and the creation of a dense web of 
liberation-nationalist propaganda which has not only been mobilised against the internal opposition but 
also against external threats to their continued hegemony. This politics of survival has led to a hardening 
of political boundaries and the reinforcement of a siege mentality on the part of a small ZANU-PF elite 
which has undermined the functioning of the unity government and hindered the implementation of the 
power sharing agreement. It is clear that in Zimbabwe, the full implementation of the agreement has 
been hindered by political ‘spoilers.’ This chapter will argue that this siege mentality is reinforced by the 
propensity of the agreement to fundamentally alter the structures of power and threaten the political 
survival of the ZANU-PF elite. This has led to the extremely slow pace of reform in Zimbabwe and a high 
propensity of reneging and ‘double-speak’ amongst members of the former ruling party. It is recognised 
that the members of ZANU-PF and their interests are not uniform, but that the intransigent core of the 
elite holds the levers of power and has successfully managed to side-line the party’s moderates. Building 
on previous chapters, this chapter will aim to delineate the political culture prevalent in Zimbabwe and 
outline how this and the influence of political spoilers have undermined the full implementation of the 
Global Political Agreement. 
Building the Laager439 
In the mid-1990s in response to economic crisis which was engendering growing frustration with the 
ZANU-PF government, the party began its encampment. Increasingly, government decisions were taken 
within party structures and technocrats were replaced with party functionaries. Following the rise of 
labour militancy and the war veteran revolt of the late 1990s, Mugabe began to militarise government, 
appointing military personnel to important posts within state structures. In defence of the status quo, 
ZANU-PF began to institutionalise its patriotic nationalism, claiming to be the only legitimate power-
holders and demonising political opponents as treasonous enemies of the people and of the project of 
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national liberation.440 The emergence of the opposition in 1999 and the defeat of the constitutional 
referendum in 2000 led to a growing militancy against the opposition and those who were perceived to 
have supported them. This, in turn, reinforced the importance of the Joint Operations Command and 
the securocrats within government ranks. The military became Mugabe’s key constituency, particularly 
as the fight for succession to the ZANU-PF throne became more heated.441  
As the economy began to plunge in the 2000s, ZANU-PF functionaries and particularly members of the 
upper echelons of the party were able to accumulate enormous wealth. This was largely through the 
illegal exploitation of resources and contracts in the DRC and via trading in foreign currency and 
commodities during the country’s darkest economic times. While the country fell apart, the elite 
concentrated its efforts on shoring up their gains and protecting their access to the state. This is the 
context in which increasing state repression and violence must be understood. 
What the GPA Means for ZANU-PF  
While there were no mechanisms for achieving justice or national healing – such as the Kenyan Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission – written into the Global Political Agreement, the new 
constitution and a change in the Zimbabwean structures of power and political authority pose a 
significant threat to the ZANU-PF elite. These raise the spectre of criminal prosecution for human rights 
violations, corruption and fraud.442 The GPA and the constitutional reform process threaten to dismantle 
the coercive architecture of the state that has been the mainstay of the ZANU-PF elite. It also threatens 
to reform the executive presidency and repeal the repressive legislation that has allowed the security 
forces to suppress the population while maintaining a façade of the rule of law. It is also unlikely that 
the party will win a free and fair election, in spite of the population’s growing disenchantment with the 
two MDC formations. As such, the changes envisaged by the GPA threaten the economic and political 
survival of this elite and introduce the possibility of being held accountable for past atrocities. 
Accordingly, it is not in their interest to allow the full implementation of the power sharing agreement. 
These issues help to explain the reluctance of the party to undertake the necessary reforms. 
Liberation Nationalism  
In a bid to justify the continued dominance of the ruling party in a context of burgeoning repression and 
societal demands for change, the ZANU-PF elite has increasingly relied on a discourse of liberation 
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nationalism and perceived internal and external threats. Since the emergence of the looming threat of 
the opposition MDC gaining a foothold in Zimbabwe during the 2000 and 2002 elections, Mugabe has 
repeatedly divided Zimbabweans into authentic and inauthentic citizens, patriots and sell-outs.443 Only 
those Zimbabweans who voted for ZANU-PF are authentic national citizens with patriotic hearts, while 
those who voted for the opposition have been deemed to be traitors, sell-outs, enemies and puppets of 
imperialism.444 This fierce patriotic nationalism based on the liberation history has enabled the exclusion 
of a large number of Zimbabweans and the authorisation of violence against those who were no longer 
‘citizens.’445 In this context, Mugabe has been characterised as the only trusted guardian of national 
history, land and Zimbabwean heritage. Within this discourse, Mugabe’s incumbency does not derive 
legitimacy from elections, but from his fight against British imperialism and neo-colonialist forces within 
the country that seek to undermine this patriotic history. The use of this patriotic history and the MDC’s 
monopoly over victimhood has served to harden political identities and it has undermined the potential 
for finding a middle ground between the principals.446 
Mugabe has successfully mobilised the perceptions of external and internal threats against citizens and 
countries alike. Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders have repeatedly employed what Andrea Grove (2011) has 
described as a strategy of ‘framing threat.’ This involves depicting particular actors as dangerous to 
one’s constituency in order to rally support.447 Grove argues that Mugabe’s successful use of this 
strategy has enabled him and his elite to overcome challenges such as economic crisis, turbulence over 
land reform, the rise of the opposition, a loss of regional leadership and broad international 
condemnation.448 Mugabe regionalised and internationalised his domestic concerns by framing the 
threat of economic collapse and opposition ascendency within Zimbabwe as a vast white conspiracy 
supported by the US and the UK to overthrow a liberation movement.449 He ‘shrewdly caught the mood 
of most developing-world leaders…’ and framed the problems within Zimbabwe and the growing 
international condemnation within a discourse of the protection of sovereignty and Zimbabwe’s role as 
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a vanguard against Western interference in the region and globally.450 His framing-threat strategy held 
two themes, the first was that all of Zimbabwe’s problems had external roots, and secondly that the 
problems faced in Zimbabwe are the same as those facing all of Africa and even the rest of the 
developing world – this is the threat of neo-colonialism.451 This is a crucial element of his strategy as it 
has led to a tendency for many African leaders to tread lightly around Zimbabwe, as condemnation of 
the leader and his policies could be perceived as selling out to neo-colonialism and the pushing of a 
western regime-change agenda. This reframing of his domestic politics within a continental discourse 
has allowed Mugabe to act with relative impunity, as to oppose him is to ‘pander’ to western agendas.  
“A Regime-Change Agenda”  
During the three years since the creation of the GPA, Mugabe and his allies have framed all attempts to 
alter the structures of power in the country as the pushing of a ‘western regime-change agenda.’ 
Emerson Mnangagwa, the Zimbabwean Defence minister and ZANU-PF hardliner was quoted in the 
government mouthpiece, the Herald, in January 2012 as saying "With the emergence of the regime 
change agenda around the year 2000, our defence policy had to be tailored towards countering 
influences that were being spread by the Western media through such devices as the Internet, CNN, BBC 
and Sky News."452 This offensive security policy was justified through a recourse to the constitution and 
the principle of national sovereignty: "The constitutional obligations of the ZDF are threefold, that is, to 
defend Zimbabwe's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests, to participate 
in the creation of a common regional security architecture and to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and stability," he said. These threats of the western regime-change agenda have 
also increasingly been wielded against the SADC facilitator, Jacob Zuma, and his team following their 
adoption of a stronger stance on the lack of reform within the country.453  
Mugabe has played on the fears of countries within the region and across the continent to frame ZANU-
PF’s intransigence and resistance to reform as the resistance to a neo-colonial agenda of regime change. 
He has successfully invoked sovereignty to undermine the efforts of SADC and to marginalise calls for 
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greater implementation of the GPA. In February 2012 in response to a call by Lindiwe Zulu, a member of 
Zuma’s facilitation team, for the full implementation of the GPA prior to the holding of new elections, 
Mugabe has threatened to reject Zuma as mediator.454 
The Politics of Partisanship455  
These trends have resulted in what Cheeseman (2011) refers to as the politics of partisanship. This is 
theorised as a power sharing arrangement which is characterised by deep divisions between rival parties 
and which is likely to result in frequent periods of deadlock and little meaningful reform.456 The 
willingness of partisan players and spoilers within Mugabe’s clique to obstruct and subvert reform in 
Zimbabwe has resulted in painstakingly slow progress and a deep divide separating the MDC formations 
and ZANU-PF.457 The intransigent former ruling party has continued to use its exclusionary patriotic 
history to polarise the political system and prevent meaningful collaboration. ZANU-PF has repeatedly 
taunted both MDC factions during the tenure of the unity government in an attempt to provoke them 
into withdrawing from the accord, thus ensuring its failure without ZANU-PF incurring the blame.458 This 
is due to provisions in the constitutional amendment that stipulate that should either of the parties 
withdraw from the unity government, the country would return to the pre-GPA constitutional 
dispensation. This would be a substantial victory for ZANU-PF and this goal has motivated many of their 
actions during the post-agreement phase. The MDC formations have remained divided and have been 
unable to outmanoeuvre ZANU-PF.  
The intended ‘government in waiting’ of the MDC-T has proved to be a weak partner in the unity 
government. It has not undertaken an effective regional lobbying campaign to increase support for its 
cause amongst regional leaders who are somewhat predisposed against opposition movements.459 The 
MDC factions have also failed to consolidate their resources and present a united front against Mugabe, 
a strategy which would have given them substantially more leverage against the former ruling party.460 
For their part, the MDC-M leadership has threatened their legislators with party expulsion if they are 
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seen to be getting too close to the MDC-T.461 In spite of the mandate given to the party during the 2008 
elections, the MDC-T has failed to lead in parliament where it has not used its speakership and majority 
to initiate progressive legislation or even to move aggressively against repressive laws such as AIPPA and 
POSA.462 The MDC-T’s policy documents and medium-term plans are vague on action steps and the 
Prime Minister’s office is often by-passed on policy decisions.463 The party’s strategy with regards to 
ZANU-PF decisions and policy seems to be one of protestation and capitulation; they have been overly 
accommodating of the former ruling party and have been unable to exert sufficient influence over the 
policy agenda. Morgan Tsvangirai has also failed to collaborate successfully with ZANU-PF moderates 
such as Vice President Joyce Mujuru which would help to marginalise the hardliners within the party and 
create a broad reform-minded coalition within government. Finally, the MDC-T has not taken concrete 
steps to undermine the obduracy of ZANU-PF, rather than mobilising civil society or political moderates, 
Tsvangirai had repeatedly called for interference from SADC which has increased the perception of him 
by many in the region as a soft leader, incapable of governing without external support. These failings 
have allowed ZANU-PF to retain its dominance and out-manoeuvre the MDC factions at every turn.   
Conclusion 
The culture of entrenched political camps and identities has contributed significantly to the lack of 
thorough-going reform that has been seen in Zimbabwe. The efforts of the ZANU-PF elite to maintain 
their grip on power and prevent possible prosecution for human rights violations have frustrated GPA 
implementation efforts. The reforms to the structures of power that have been proposed in the GPA and 
in the draft constitution threatens the very survival of the ZANU elite and their continued access to the 
state’s resources. This has provided them with incentives to maintain the status quo and prevent the 
dilution of power that would be associated with the full implementation of the power sharing 
agreement. The politics of partisanship as seen in Zimbabwe is likely to lead to the continuation of 
attempts to subvert the GPA and delay the reform process until the next elections in 2012 or 2013. 
Conclusion 
The differing levels of reform seen in both cases relates to the different political cultures prevailing in 
the two countries. While regional and international actors have been critical to ensure the 
implementation of the agreements, their available avenues for action are constrained by the interests 
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and actions of local political actors and spoilers. In Kenya, a history of elite cooperation and cohesion as 
well as the equality of the parties and substantial uncertainty of electoral outcomes has led to the 
relatively successful implementation of the Accord and the introduction of a new constitutional 
dispensation. In spite of this, widespread culpability for corruption and the perpetration of violence has 
led the parties to collaborate to frustrate efforts to end the culture of impunity in the country. In the 
Zimbabwean case, the siege mentality of the coterie of securocrats around Robert Mugabe and their 
intention to protect their ill-gotten gains has prevented real cooperation between the principals. The 
reform process presents a number of dangers for this group which has led to their propensity to 
frustrate the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement. The MDC factions have also proved 
to be wholly ineffective in providing an alternative to ZANU-PF and have been unable to capitalise on 
their opportunities to encourage change. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, the prevailing political culture 
and the interests of the elites have served to help determine the reform agenda and undermine 
attempts to achieve justice.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
In a context where power sharing agreements have increasingly been proposed as a means to end 
violence and restore stability to crisis-wracked states in the aftermath of highly contested elections, it is 
fundamentally important to review the success of these arrangements and their propensity to 
encourage change within government and society. The great diversity of power sharing agreements 
makes comparative studies particularly difficult. This has played out within this report, as there are 
substantial differences in the form that power sharing has taken across the two cases. It is vital to keep 
in mind that these agreements are the result of fire-engine diplomacy in which the immediate goal of 
reaching an agreement takes precedence over long-term issues and concrete structural changes to the 
nature of power relations. This report has argued that the success of the implementation of the power 
sharing arrangements in Kenya and Zimbabwe has largely been determined by the agreement itself, the 
level and quality of engagement by mediators, regional and international forces and the interests of the 
parties to the agreement. These variables are considerably interlinked and interdependent as the 
behaviour of political actors influences both the nature of the agreement and the constraints facing the 
guarantors of the agreement. In addition, stronger action undertaken by regional and international 
actors can help to determine the nature of the agreement and the constraints placed on the actions of 
domestic political actors. It is crucial that negotiators understand and attempt to anticipate the way in 
which each of these elements will play into the successful implementation of power sharing accords. 
Barbara Walter (1997) suggested that the more power sharing was built into an agreement, the more 
likely its chances of success. This has been partially validated by this report, but the author would argue 
that the equal distribution of power allows for a more successful reform process. Mehler (2009) 
suggests that the extent or degree of power sharing is an important variable in the success of these 
accords.464 This has proven to be of vital importance in this case. In Kenya, the decision to enforce the 
equal distribution of power within ministries as well as across cabinet worked to promote cooperation 
and undermine unilateralism within government. By contrast, the Zimbabwean agreement failed to 
adequately share power, instead it created parallel structures which worked independently and allowed 
ZANU-PF to marginalise its agreement partners within government and policy-making. The creation of a 
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lop-sided agreement in the Zimbabwean case has resulted in little reform and relative stagnancy within 
government as the parties constantly compete for dominance. The importance of creating a balanced, 
well-formulated agreement which accounts for all interests and creates incentives for cooperation 
cannot be overstated. 
Stedman (1997) intended to bring a discussion of personal interests and the role of ‘spoilers’ back into 
the debate on power sharing. Although his definition of spoilers was developed in conversation with the 
role of personal interests in undermining power sharing in contexts of civil war, this concept still remains 
applicable. Chapter 6 of this report sought to underline the vital role of political interests and culture in 
promoting or undermining reform efforts in the two cases. In spite of initial disagreements between the 
parties, a long history of elite cohesion in Kenya has allowed for the achievement of substantial reforms 
and the relatively successful implementation of the Kenyan Accord. In spite of the success of a number 
of reforms, parties in Kenya have colluded to prevent meaningful progress in strategic areas such as land 
reform and addressing corruption and impunity. This is as a result of the widespread culpability of 
political actors in these areas. In Zimbabwe a history of political polarisation and a siege mentality 
amongst members of the ZANU-PF old guard have frustrated reform efforts which would serve to 
undercut their power and introduce possibilities for criminal prosecution. Additionally, the former 
opposition parties have been unable to capitalise on their strengths in parliament to make substantial 
changes to government policy.  
Sriram and Zahar (2009) theorised that the degree of third party engagement was an important factor in 
determining the success of power sharing agreements. This assertion has been validated by the analysis 
of power sharing in the Kenyan and Zimbabwean cases. The author would argue that it is not only the 
degree but also the quality of engagement that has been a vital determinant of success. While in Kenya 
the mediator undertook innovative and reflexive strategies to level the playing field and create 
incentives for reform, the impact of SADC and South African mediation has been less positive. The 
influence of Thabo Mbeki on the mediation of the Global Political Agreement and the relationship 
between the principals has cast a long shadow over the process and has allowed ZANU-PF hardliners the 
freedom to subvert change. SADC has also been unable or unwilling to apply adequate pressure to 
enforce compliance with the agreement due to the dominance of principles of solidarity and non-
interference alongside a shared liberation history and vestiges of respect for the elder Zimbabwean 
statesman. 
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On the basis of the preceding discussion it is somewhat difficult to recommend strategies to improve the 
process currently underway in Zimbabwe. The history of the GPA has allowed for the entrenching of 
ZANU-PF hardliners in positions of power from which it would be particularly difficult to disengage 
them. It is clear that SADC and the South African facilitation team must apply increased pressure to the 
parties. This could be in the form of either soft power such as economic pressure or incentives from 
South Africa or a show of hard power via sanctions from SADC. The facilitator should also apply pressure 
to ZANU-PF by involving civil society in the monitoring and implementation of the agreement, although 
the intransigent party has proved itself to be particularly resilient to civil society concerns. In the event 
of South Africa mediating a ‘GPA-2’ as has been suggested, it is vital that the revised agreement is 
subject to better formulation and contains defined roles for the principals. This agreement will likely 
need to include a number of exit strategies such as protection from prosecution for hard-line elements 
within the old guard. The monitoring mechanism must also be independent of political interests and 
influence and pressure to conform must be consistently applied by all parties including the African 
Union. Finally it is important for the agreement to contain clear and enforceable timelines to transform 
the reform process from an inherently political to a more technical exercise. 
From an analysis of the implementation records of both cases it is clear that these agreements are 
unlikely to fundamentally transform Kenyan and Zimbabwean society and their prevalent political 
cultures. In some ways they seem likely to have only delayed meaningful reform and reinforced a 
culture of impunity. While the promulgation of a new constitution is an important milestone, it is 
necessary to reflect that a constitution is unlikely to result in change if the political elite do not adopt a 
culture of constitutionalism. Political cultures prove to be extremely resistant to change, as the history 
of implementation in both countries has shown. It is important that civil society and regional and 
international actors collaborate to ‘pull in one direction’ to prevent reneging and backsliding and effect 
substantial transformation. 
Power sharing agreements are often seen as a betrayal of the popular will of the people and they create 
perverse incentives for incumbents to refuse to step down following a loss at the polls. They tend to 
reroute the channels of accountability and alter direct relationships between citizens and governments. 
However, in the context of widespread violence and loss of life, it is difficult to envisage other methods 
by which to mediate a return to stability. It is thus extremely important that mediators pay close 
attention to the political dynamics at play in the crisis-wracked country and use regional and 
international pressure effectively to negotiate an equitable arrangement to prevent stagnancy and 
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inflexibility in the resulting government. It is vital that guarantors are impartial mediators who are able 
to employ a balanced set of ‘carrots and sticks’ to ensure compliance and reduce reneging. The process 
underway in Kenya has highlighted a number of best practices that should be extended to future 
mediation efforts. To begin with, the mediator and mediation team held the right balance of familiarity, 
moral integrity, international authority and legitimacy to be widely perceived as honest brokers in the 
process. The mediator then employed innovative strategies to reduce the process from a political to a 
technical exercise through employing the services of private mediation bodies. Pressure was 
consistently applied to the principals through mandating a civil society organisation with the monitoring 
of the agreement and by using these reports to exert pressure for reform on specific bodies. Finally, the 
monitoring and implementation processes were given additional impetus through both national 
conferences and regular internal implementation review meetings to oblige the principals and 
intransigent elements to commit to implementing the precepts of the agreement.  
It is important that a process is undertaken to identify both best and worst practices in the mediation 
and facilitation of power sharing agreements to help fortify future agreements and increase the 
likelihood of success. Power sharing agreements should only be seen as a stop-gap measure and should 
be negotiated in such a way that allows for the strengthening of oversight capacity while placing 
horizontal checks through power sharing institutions to encourage cooperation and help to prevent 
polarisation. Finally, it is important to see power sharing as a process rather than a once-off event; 
engagement in the post-agreement phase must continue in a regular and reflexive manner to encourage 
the successful implementation of reforms and ensure future democratic consolidation. 
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